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ABSTRACT 
 
The Japanese Kwantung Army created Manchukuo as a client state in northeast China 
in March 1932. The new entity followed policies that coincided closely with Japanese 
political and economic interests. In the enterprise of constructing Manchukuo, the 
Japanese authorities employed a set of strategies and policies to restructure the 
relationship between state and society. The strategies and policies established the 
Japanese power in the political domains of Manchukuo and facilitated drastic change in 
its socioeconomic structures. However, Manchukuo eventually dissolved after the 
Japanese surrender at the end of the Pacific War in August 1945.  
Drawing from primary sources in Chinese, Japanese and Korean published in 
the 1930s and 1940s, this thesis presents a history of the central characteristics of 
Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo during 1932 and 1945. This thesis analyses the 
elements of Japanese rule that were expressed in the policies and practices implemented 
in Manchukuo. In doing so, the thesis illuminates the nature, strength and weakness of 
Japanese imperialism. This approach generates insights into the mechanisms and 
limitations of Japanese rule, and it contributes to the theoretical construction of 
Japanese imperialism.   
Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo involved a high degree of political 
intervention in the military, economic and social spheres as well as the reorganisation of 
state structures. The Japanese authorities stablished public order through the elimination 
of social resistance and the construction of rural settlements; the reorganisation of the 
rural administration through the baojia and self-government initiatives; the 
establishment of rural financial order by organising cooperatives; the control of the 
procurement and distribution of agrarian output through coercion; and the management 
of labour through state mobilisation.  
This thesis argues that the Japanese strategies and policies of control represented 
a process of reshaping state structures. The Japanese authorities demonstrated great skill 
in exercising control over the agriculture, government administration, and finance and 
labour relations in Manchukuo. The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo revealed both 
effectiveness and limitations. The effectiveness was manifested in the establishment of 
social order and institutions to serve the needs of control. The limitations lay in the 
degree of compliance that the Japanese ensured in the local populace and in the extent 
to which the Japanese power penetrated into the production relations of the rural society.
xi 
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1 
Introduction 
 
In March 1932, the Japanese Kwantung Army created Manchukuo, a client state of 
Japan, in Northeast China.
1
 Although the Japanese authorities presented the new state to 
the world as a manifestation of the self-determination of the Manchurian people to 
shape their own future under Japanese guidance, the government structure was largely 
dominated by the Japanese officials and its policy was subject to Japanese instruction. 
In the process of constructing Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities restructured the 
relationship between state and society. They established Japanese power in the political 
domains of Manchukuo and facilitated drastic change in its socioeconomic structures. 
However, Manchukuo dissolved after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Pacific 
War in August 1945.  
This thesis presents a historical account of the implementation and effects of 
Japanese strategies and policies for the rule over rural Manchukuo from 1932 to 1945. It 
examines how Japanese authorities used strategies and policies to control the social, 
political and economic activities of the population in rural Manchukuo; how they served 
the complex objectives and interests of the Japanese imperialistic enterprises; and 
particularly the extent to which the rural control extended to the rural population of 
Manchuria. It reveals the internal logic of Japanese rule by analysing the engagement of 
the ruling powers of the Japanese government and Kwantung Army during their 
fourteen years of consolidating rural control in Manchukuo.  
Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo involved extensive reorganisation of rural 
resources and extended to almost every aspect of rural life, ranging from rural 
administration and settlement pattern to agrarian market and labour relations. This 
thesis addresses several overarching questions: What was the significance to the 
Japanese of controlling rural areas? How were Japanese policies implemented and 
revised over a fourteen-year period? What strategies were conceived and implemented 
in rural Manchukuo by the Japanese authorities? How were the control mechanisms 
shaped into vehicles for the state building of Manchukuo? What were their objectives 
and what did they actually achieve? What was the logic of Japanese rule? What were 
the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese rule? This thesis addresses these questions by 
looking closely into the implementation and effects of ruling mechanisms in rural 
                                                          
1
 In this study, the terms of “Manchuria” and “Manchukuo” are used distinctly. “Manchuria” is 
used to refer to the three provinces in Northeast China — Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, as 
well as the adjacent parts of Eastern Mongolia; “Manchukuo” is used to refer to the political 
entity established by Japan in Northeast China between 1932 and 1945.  
2 
Manchukuo, and demonstrates that dynamics of rural Manchukuo was largely shaped 
by the Japanese strategies and policies in the process of rural control.  
Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo had important consequences for the 
governmentality of Japanese imperialism. Its significance necessitates an examination 
of how the strategies and policies were implemented, revised and evaluated by the 
Japanese authorities. Although Manchukuo was not a formal colony of the Japanese 
empire, the pattern of rule exercised by the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo was 
essentially similar to the pattern of colonial rule that Japan exercised in its formal 
colonies. It is for this reason that in this study, the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo 
is framed in the context of colonialism. Colonial rule is inextricably associated with 
goals of colonial enterprises. The goals of colonial enterprises could be either socially 
developmental, or economically exploitative and politically repressive. These goals 
included economic exploitation, acculturation, assimilation, affirming supremacy, and 
facilitating economic growth and social progress. Colonial rule is exercised by colonial 
authority to sustain the system of colonial governance in place. Colonial rule is a 
process of shaping socioeconomic relations. In colonial societies, the state and its agents 
as the coloniser constitute the powerful while subjects or citizens as the colonised are 
the powerless. The power of the coloniser determines that the range of activities over 
which they can exercise authority is limitless. To back its authority, colonial authorities 
usually utilise a wide range of strategies including the construction of incentives and the 
threat of coercion and persuasion.
2
 Meanwhile, they clothe these strategies with political 
propaganda and slogans. The strategies employed by colonial authorities are forms of 
repression, oppression, exploitation and collaboration. The extent, to which colonial 
strategies can succeed in achieving their desired ends, depends on such factors as money, 
alliance, collaboration, determination, knowledge, torture, prison and intelligence.
3
 In 
rural Manchukuo, the Japanese colonial authorities employed most of the above factors 
to establish a political order characterised by punishment and discipline. 
General works on Manchukuo have focused on the political nature of 
Manchukuo. Duara highlights the contested nature of Manchuria in the geographical 
and historical imagination of China and Japan. Duara’s approach is largely on the level 
of discourse and representation, rather than political economy. He discusses a number of 
                                                          
2
 W. Phillips Shively, Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993, 6. 
3
 For a discussion of strategies for social control, see Paul Sites, Control: The Basis of Social 
Order, New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, 1973, 141-72. For a general discussion of 
typology of social control, see James J. Chriss, Social Control: An Introduction, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013, 36-54. 
3 
discursive representational means by which the Manchukuo regime sought to claim 
sovereignty. While Duara is ambitious in interpreting the ideological forces behind 
Japan’s efforts of state building in Manchuria, his discussion under-examines how the 
exercise of power transformed ideas into policies.
4
 Yamamuro analyses the rise and fall 
of Manchukuo by focusing on its political structures including state formation, ideology 
and institutions. Yamamuro covers how Manchukuo was formed, operated and 
transformed during its fourteen years of existence. Yamamuro shows the actors who 
were involved in the state-making process of Manchukuo. Specifically, he observes how 
the Japanese military conspired to found Manchukuo, and how the Kwantung Army 
worked to gain Chinese complicity.
5
 
After the military takeover of Manchuria in 1931, Japan established authority in 
vast areas. Military control enabled the Japanese authorities to manipulate the social 
structure of Manchuria to accomplish their own goals. At the very core of Japanese 
thinking during this period was the question of what form of control should be adopted 
to ensure them access to the social and economic resources of Manchuria. At this time, 
the Japanese authorities faced considerable popular resistance in the rural areas of 
Manchuria. The widespread anti-Japanese resistance involved soldiers, farmers, and 
Communists who used rural Manchukuo as the base for launching the anti-Japanese 
movement.
6
 Meanwhile, the endemic banditry caused great social disorder in rural 
Manchukuo. The conditions of rural Manchukuo as an unsettled and unstable society 
posed a serious threat to the Japanese military occupation of the region. In order to 
maintain social stability and establish a permanent presence in Manchuria, the 
Kwantung Army launched military suppression against the resistance forces. 
In analysing the conditions of security in Manchuria in the early 1930s, scholars 
have explored the complex nature of the Japanese governmentality in suppressing local 
resistance. Li explores the roles of internal resistance forces in the political and social 
contexts of Manchuria and focuses on how Japanese authorities conceptualised banditry, 
and implemented administrative, ideological and military measures to suppress and 
                                                          
4
 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
5
 Shin’ichi Yamamuro, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
6
 For the anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria, see Tsunejirō Tanaka, “Ma    ”          
 a  a            d         y , Tokyo   yokuin sho ō,     ;   yan u, Chuang  hang, and 
Kun Wang, Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 2013, 
194-206.  
4 
pacify resistance forces in Manchukuo.
7
 Li demonstrates that the bandit suppression 
was not simply a military endeavour, but also a series of administrative and legal efforts 
by the Japanese and Manchukuo governments. Li argues that bandit suppression 
launched by the Japanese military was a means to obtain legitimacy and authority.  
Lee and Mitter focus on local resistance against Japanese oppression, arguing 
that resistance occurred as a response to the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. 
Lee examines the Communist movement in Manchuria that went through frequent 
policy shifts and organisational changes during the period of 1922 to 1945.
8
 Lee shows 
that the mass movement, which was organised by the Communists who grew from 
having little interest in Manchuria into a principal force in local resistance, failed in 
Manchuria. According to Lee, while after 1937 in Manchuria the Communists obtained 
considerable popular support from the rural population of Manchuria, they only enjoyed 
scant success in their resistance to Japanese rule.  ee’s study indicates that the Japanese 
rule over Manchuria remained formidable given their strategies and tactics in 
diminishing local resistance. Making use of Chinese sources, Mitter re-examines the 
common themes of resistance and nationalism in Manchuria by taking into account the 
multiple responses to Japanese occupation in Manchurian society. Mitter analyses the 
Chinese resistance to and collaboration with the Japanese in the initial period after the 
Mukden Incident in 1931.
9
 Mitter argues that the Chinese resistance and nationalism 
have been exaggerated in historiography while a variety of responses to the Japanese 
occupation existed in Manchurian society. In his analysis, Mitter shows that the one-
sided story of resistance is a myth.  
Although scholars such as Mitter provide new perspectives on the social 
resistance in Manchuria, the mainstream approach in the scholarly debates about this 
area remains a nationalist one that acknowledges binary constructions of imperialistic 
repression versus national resistance, colonial exploitation versus national development. 
This nationalist approach has generated two effects. First, it has equated Japanese 
imperialism with the colonial authority that encounters the resistance and opposition of 
the colonised. Second, it has identified the colonised with class categories in Marxist 
terms. In other words, this approach shapes historical examination of colonialism in 
                                                          
7
 Yaqin  i, “‘Bandit Suppression’ in Manchukuo (  32-45),” Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 
2012. 
8
 Chong-Sik Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet 
Interest, 1922-1945, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.  
9
 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern 
China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
5 
terms of oppression and resistance.
10
 The approach that treats nationalism and 
colonialism as separate and isolated variables may not be adequate to capture the 
multiple possibilities of their interrelations.
11
  
After the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, the security conditions of rural 
Manchukuo remained a considerable challenge to Japanese rule because the 
administrative system of Manchukuo was still at a rudimentary level and the Japanese 
were only beginning to establish their power in the Manchurian villages. In 1933, the 
Kwantung Army first reorganised a community-based system of civil control known in 
Chinese history as the baojia system. Its primary function was to maintain local order, 
collect taxes and organise civil projects. The Kwantung Army reintroduced the baojia 
system as a supplementary measure of police into the structure of local government 
when the police system was not fully established in Manchukuo.
12
 With a clear agenda 
on social security, the baojia system was characterised by imposing collective 
responsibility on local inhabitants in rural Manchukuo. As a result of its structural 
organisation and function, the baojia system established an institutional rule that 
subjected rural inhabitants to organised surveillance.  
The baojia system as a social control mechanism has been studied less in the 
context of Manchuria and more in the context of modern Chinese and Taiwanese history. 
Harris, Chen and Ts’ai have produced insightful discussions of the baojia systems in 
China and colonial Taiwan.
13
 In examining the baojia system in Republican China, 
Harris argues that the baojia system revived by the Kuomintang in the 1920s served not 
only as a mechanism for local control, but also as an institution of local self-government. 
                                                          
10
 This old analytical mode of Japanese imperialism is suggested in  aka ayashi’s study on 
colonial Taiwan. See Masahiro aka ayashi, “A Perspective on Studies of Taiwanese Political 
History: Reconsidering the Postwar Japanese Historiography of Japanese Colonial Rule in 
Taiwan,” in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule: 1895-1945, eds. Ping-Hui Liao and David 
Der-Wei Wang, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 20-1. 
11
 This argument is developed on Shin and  o inson’s argument on the historical narratives of 
colonial Korea. See Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, “Introduction   ethinking Colonial 
Korea,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, 5.  
12
 For a general discussion of the baojia system, see Masataka Endō, “Manshūkoku tōchi ni 
okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai  ‘minzoku kyōwa’ to hōchi kokka toiu futatsu no kokuze wo 
megutte,” Aj a  a    y      y , no. 20, February 2013, 37-51.  
13
  ane J. Harris, “From Democracy to Bureaucracy  The Baojia in Nationalist Thought and 
Practice, 1927-  4 ,” Frontiers of History in China, vol. 8, no. 4, December 2013, 517-57;  
Ching-Chih Chen, “The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-  45,” 
The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, February 1975, 391-416 and “Police and 
Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, eds. 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 213-39; 
Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, “One Kind of Control: the Hoko System in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 
1895-  45,” Ph.D. diss., Colum ia University,    0. 
6 
In analysing the baojia system in colonial Taiwan, Chen and Ts’ai argue that the baojia 
system employed by the Japanese colonial authorities in Taiwan was more effective 
than the baojia system implemented in Qing China and it functioned as a policing organ 
and administrative unit in local control. The works of Harris, Chen and Ts’ai show the 
complex nature of the baojia system that operated in different historical and 
geographical contexts, and indicate links to the ways in which the baojia system 
operated in Manchukuo. While such scholarship is crucial to our understanding of how 
the baojia system evolved and worked in different contexts, it cannot be directly applied 
to the analysis of the case of Manchukuo in view of differences in time periods as well 
as political and social conditions.  
In the scholarship of the baojia system of Manchukuo, Endō analyses the 
development, features and functions of the baojia system in Manchukuo as well as its 
conflict with Manchukuo’s state policies and the factors underlying such conflict.14 
Endō argues that the structure of the baojia system was inconsistent with the state 
policies of ethnic harmony and rule of law in Manchukuo. First, regardless of the 
development of modern law systems, the state of Manchukuo still relied on collective 
responsibility (lianzuo) as a form of social discipline for control over the rural 
population. Second, the full exclusion of Japanese and partial exclusion of Koreans 
from the baojia system contradicted the rhetoric of “ethnic harmony” (   z     y wa). 
Third, the notion of facilitating local self-government through the baojia system was 
self-contradictory because the system itself was intrinsically a policing mechanism 
established on violence.
15
 hile Endō’s study  riefly traces the baojia systems in the 
historical contexts of China and colonial Taiwan, it does not look closely into how they 
were practised in these contexts. This thesis develops Endō’s study further  y 
examining the baojia system in these historical contexts to better reflect the continuity 
and discontinuity in the structure and practices of the system.   
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in   3 , the Kwantung Army’s 
large-scale military suppression of anti-Japanese resistance in Manchukuo greatly 
enhanced the public security in Manchukuo. The baojia system in the eyes of Kwantung 
Army leadership had not been an efficient measure in local government as expected. As 
one of the steps in the reform of local administration carried out in 1937, the Kwantung 
Army replaced the dysfunctional baojia system with a local self-government system 
                                                          
14
 Endō, “Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai,” 3 -51.  
15
 Endō, “Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai,” 48-9. 
7 
known as the jiecun system.
16
 The jiecun system was devised on the models of local 
self-government in Japan. It functioned primarily as a local administrative mechanism 
to manage administrative and financial affairs in rural areas. Although the Japanese 
authorities permitted a certain degree of autonomy to local administrators in managing 
local affairs, the central government of Manchukuo still exercised tight control over 
rural administration through tax extraction and administrative directives.  
 Little academic attention has been drawn to the examination of the mechanism 
of local self-government in rural Manchukuo. The most important work on the jiecun 
system is the study by Okumura.
17
 Okumura examines the development, characteristics 
and function of the jiecun system. Okumura argues that the jiecun system, which was 
modelled on the Japanese        system, excluded popular election from its structure 
and constructed local self-government in its structure as an ad hoc to facilitate political 
and economic integration in rural Manchukuo. Okumura also argues that the large 
administrative villages in the jiecun system were reconstructed on the model of local 
administrative system in Manchuria under  hang Xueliang’s regime in the   20s. One 
important contri ution of Okumura’s study is to indicate the continuity and 
discontinuity of the jiecun system with tradition. An insightful addition to the discussion 
of the local self-government in Manchukuo is the preliminary research on local self-
government in Japan by Steiner. In his study, Steiner discusses the structure and 
evolution of the local self-government of Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the 
postwar era.
18
 Steiner examines the various levels of government including the 
neighbourhood, the muddling distribution of functions between them, the fiscal system 
and the way it makes local entities dependent on the state and the administrative 
structures of local entities. Although Steiner’s discussion of local self-government in 
Japan does not relate directly to the local governance of Manchukuo, it provides a 
comparative perspective about the similarities and differences between the structures of 
local self-government in Manchukuo and in Japan.  
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Manchukuo as a supply base 
became increasingly important for Japan’s economic autarky, and the need for Japan to 
ensure effective control over rural society necessitated the reinforcement of power. In 
doing so, Japan organised political mobilisation and economic reconstruction in rural 
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Manchukuo, and extended power to all aspects of rural life. These strategies included 
the founding of the National Neighbourhood Association (kokumin rinpo soshiki) and 
launching of the village reconstruction movement.
19
 The former stressed the role of the 
state in terms of mobilisation and placed rural neighbourhoods of Manchuria in the 
service of Japan’s enterprises. The National Neighbourhood Association enhanced 
community association among inhabitants and improved mutual defence and 
agricultural production in rural areas. The latter had a strong economic agenda of 
increasing agricultural production by introducing farming technology to and extracting 
agricultural surplus from villages.
20
 These efforts turned the rural society of Manchukuo 
into a massive machine that assumed a wide range of wartime duties such as food 
production, neighbourhood air defence, fire-fighting, and first-aid training. 
The Concordia Association (ky wa a ) also had a prominent presence in the 
rural areas of Manchukuo during this period.
21
 The CA was a political organisation 
established by the Kwantung Army in 1932 with the aim to encourage Chinese 
collaboration with Japanese rule in Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army controlled the 
operation of this organisation and turned it into an instrument of Japanese control. One 
important institutional function of the CA was the Union Council (r      y    a ) 
which served as the legislature of the CA.
22
 The Union Council was established at 
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various levels of local government in Manchukuo to serve as the main channel through 
which the regional branches of CA conveyed their views to central leadership. 
Institutionally, they sym olised the “union of  ureaucrats and the people”. The Union 
Council was designed as a forum in which branch representatives, the government, and 
participants of other related organs could exchange their views unreservedly and realise 
the ideals of Manchukuo.
23
  
Scholars have paid close attention to political ideology as a context for the 
analysis of the CA. Egler argues that the ideology and organisation of CA was 
characterised by ethnic harmony, which served to restrain the growth of nationalism, 
was rudimentary and obscure with an inclination to slide into the expediencies of 
propaganda.
24
 Hirano, Suzuki and Okabe have systematically examined the historical 
development of the CA.
25
 In his paper published in 1972, Hirano carefully explores the 
organisational structure and ideology of the CA. Hirano divides the history of the CA 
into an earlier period of political idealism and a later period of mass mobilisation. The 
former refers to the integration of national identities and establishment of legitimacy by 
promoting political ideals; the latter refers to the gradual cultural, spiritual and political 
subordination of Manchukuo to Japan.
26
 Hirano argues that political mobilisation 
facilitated by the CA was aimed to maintain political stability and establish political 
legitimacy in Manchukuo. In his paper published in 1986, Hirano analyses the ideology 
of the CA by examining the formation, structure, function, and origin of ethnic harmony. 
Hirano argues that the Japanese authorities used the idea of ethnic harmony as an 
instrument to achieve political and national integration. According to Hirano, the 
limitation of ideology is that ethnic harmony should by no means be viewed as an 
intrinsic characteristic of national integration, and it is impossible to accomplish a true 
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national integration simply through the idea of ethnic harmony.
27
 In situating the CA in 
the context of Japanese imperialism, Suzuki’s study examines the historical 
development and transformation of the CA. According to Suzuki, the CA exhibited the 
character typical of a political party and supplemented the Kwantung Army in 
maintaining local security and facilitating local administration. Suzuki argues that the 
CA served as the foundation of the wartime fascist regime of Japan.
28
 Okabe examines 
the ideology, structure and activities of the Manchuria Youth League (Ma            
renmei) and the Concordia Party (ky wa  ), the predecessors established on the eve of 
the Mukden Incident. According to Okabe, although the Manchuria Youth League and 
the Concordia Party were not government organisations, their political enterprises 
served as an essential feature of Japanese rule in Manchuria. Okabe shows the 
significance of these two organisations. For the Manchuria Youth League, the 
engagement of the Kwantung Army and Japanese businessmen in its decision-making 
process was prominent. For the Concordia Party, it not only shaped public opinion and 
mo ilised popular support in Manchuria,  ut also facilitated the formation of CA’s 
ideological and political configuration.  
These studies have examined the structure and development of CA as a political 
organisation supported by the Japanese military, but they have neither contextualised its 
role in rural society nor explored its connections with other control mechanisms. The 
role of the CA in rural Manchukuo becomes particularly important after the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, during which period the organisation became integrated 
into a broader system of Japanese rural control. I do not challenge the conventional 
view that the CA acted as a political umbrella organisation of the Japanese Kwantung 
Army to mobilise popular support for Japanese rule in Manchukuo. Rather, I intend to 
complement the discussions of the CA by analysing its organisational features of village 
councils in relation to local self-government in rural Manchukuo. I suggest that village 
councils within the structure of the CA reflect the degree to which self-government was 
substantiated in the pattern of Japanese rule over rural society.  
The Japanese authorities were well aware of the economic opportunities 
presented by Manchukuo, and openly sought economic development. The Japanese 
accomplishment of economic control was achieved principally by the seizure of land 
resources and the mobilisation of labour. The seizure of land resources was achieved by 
agrarian control, while the mobilisation of labour was substantiated by labour control. 
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The Japanese authorities were determined to make the agrarian economy of Manchukuo 
self-sufficient. As the Manchukuo government enforced the industrialisation plan in 
1937, the importance of agriculture as a base of industrial raw materials increased. The 
Japanese authorities also established a rationalised agrarian system in which resources 
could be evenly exploited to provide sources of income for the state. The Japanese 
established a labour control system to recruit, manage and mobilise labour. Labour was 
primarily drafted from rural Manchukuo and North China. The Japanese depended 
largely on the Chinese labour system for control over the labour force. The Japanese 
authorities gradually increased administrative intervention in labour control and turned 
labour service into a compulsory form of service.  
Some scholars have analysed the ways of agrarian control by the Japanese 
authorities in Manchukuo. Kazama examines the agrarian control through the lens of 
circulation of agrarian capital and state control organisations.
29
 Kazama argues that the 
Japanese capital penetrated into the agrarian market and diminished the Chinese native 
capital in the market share. Yasutomi argues that the penetration of Japanese power in 
rural areas was substantiated through financial organisations such as cooperatives, and 
that the agrarian control through financial strategies was eventually limited because of 
the resistance of farmers to use the service of the financial organisations.
30
 Shibata 
argues that the financial organisations of Manchukuo failed to establish a firm presence 
in the rural areas and to penetrate completely into the rural sectors.
31
 
The historiography of the labour control in Manchukuo takes an approach that 
views labour control as a binary discourse of exploitation and resistance. Historians 
have interpreted the labour control in terms of the nationalist-liberation struggle of 
workers. The Chinese and Korean labour force is viewed as cheap and unskilled 
workforce exploited by a discriminatory labour system, while the Japanese management 
of the labour force is perceived as a form of exploitation of workers. The labour policy 
of Manchukuo is characterised as being a self-serving policy driven by Japanese 
political and economic interests. The examination of labour is largely framed in the 
investigation of the labour relations of the South Manchuria Railway Company (minami 
Ma          d   a        a   a, SMRC). Myers examines the evolution of the 
industrial labour force in Manchuria, the size and distribution of the workforce, and the 
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source and movement of labour.
32
 Matsumura, Xie and Eda examine the labour policies 
of the SMRC enterprises, the life conditions of the SMRC workers, and the workers’ 
resistance movement against the SMRC.
33
 Tucker argues that supply of labour and 
demand for labour created contradictions for the Japanese policymaking in Manchukuo. 
The contradictions emerged in the early period of Japanese rule and they became 
sharpened with the intensification of war and increasing economic difficulties after 
1937.
34
 This thesis complements the previous research on labour control by taking into 
account the labour relations in the agricultural sector of Manchuria. I argue that the 
outreach of the Japanese control of labour in rural areas was not facilitated directly by 
the implementation of labour policy, but was a consequence of the Japanese 
immigration policy. 
As we have seen from the above, in general, over the course of fourteen years of 
managing Manchuria, the Japanese authorities designed a series of strategies to tighten 
their control over the rural life of Manchuria. These strategies combined the use of 
physical force and construction of ruling mechanisms. Specifically, the form of control 
exercised in rural Manchukuo constituted a sophisticated structure characterised by 
suppression of patriotic resistance, creation of policing mechanisms, founding of 
political organisations, rearrangement of local administrative systems, and 
reorganisation of agrarian structure and labour relations.
35
 Overall, control mechanisms 
reorganised the political, social and economic relations of rural Manchukuo.  
Some academic attention has been drawn to the organisation of rural 
Manchukuo. This scholarship uses the model that focuses on Japanese repression and 
local resistance to examine the aims, strategies and structures of Japanese control over 
the Manchurian rural society. The foundational works by Kazama, Che and Li have 
carefully considered the policies of control machines that operated in rural Manchukuo. 
Kazama’s study surveys the development of control institutions in Manchukuo during 
the 1930s and 1940s by focusing on the baojia system and jiecun system, National 
Neighbourhood Association and the role of the CA in rural control in the 1940s. 
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Kazama argues that the Japanese control over the Manchurian rural society was a form 
of weak government in which Japanese policies were inconsistent and subject to 
change.
36
 Che’s study on the local administration of Manchukuo is a comprehensive 
treatment of the Japanese control of Manchurian society. Che outlines the structure and 
character of the administrative classifications in rural control. According to Che, there 
were three periods in the development of local government in Manchukuo. Local 
government in the first period was placed completely under the supervision of police; 
local government in the second period adopted the model of Japanese local government 
and in the third period unified multiple control institutions into one single mechanism.
37
 
Che argues that rural control of Manchukuo was a dynamic system in which various 
patterns existed and techniques were employed. By locating Japanese rule in the model 
of conflict and resistance, Li examines various dimensions of rural Manchukuo under 
Japanese domination: village organisation and structure, transformation of land 
ownership, and agricultural control. Li argues that the significance of Japanese control 
over rural Manchukuo lies in two factors. First, in comparison with the Japanese rule in 
urban Manchuria, the rule in rural Manchukuo was much more intense and cruel. 
Second, rural Manchukuo was the main battlefield for anti-Japanese resistance led by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in which the discourse of invasion and anti-
invasion, oppression and anti-oppression, and domination and anti-domination were 
taking place.
38
 Li suggests that the Japanese control over rural Manchukuo was a form 
of rule characterised by military dictatorship. Rural Manchukuo under Japanese control 
was a colony established by Japanese military authority. Its outlook should not be 
viewed as rural landscape formed under normal historical circumstances, but rather as a 
consequence of external forces.  i divided the extent of Japan’s enterprises of rural 
control into three periods: the early period was a colonial regime established by 
violence. The middle period was a form of government that adapted to local conditions. 
In the late period, people in rural society were instrumentalised to back the Japanese 
war machine and directed towards the path of war.
39
 While these works analyse the 
general structural classifications of the rural control systems in Manchukuo, they have 
not located the analysis in the context of the socioeconomic conditions of the rural 
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society of Manchukuo and have not examined their relevance to the strategic thinking of 
the Japanese authorities in their rule of Manchukuo.  
Taken together, the growing interest in the scholarship of Japanese rule over 
Manchuria acknowledges Japanese rule not simply as the direct use of force, but as an 
integrated political, economic and cultural system in which the Japanese authorities 
exercised their power in various ways. This view leads to the recognition of the multi-
directional flow of power and the stronger emphasis on the variety of responses and 
experiences within the structure of Japanese imperialism.
40
 The scholarship dedicated to 
the history of Japanese policy in Manchukuo has tended to examine the rural control 
systems developed by the Japanese separately as independent actors in the discourse of 
Japanese imperialism, and has not analysed the structural transformation of these 
systems. Moreover, they have paid little attention to the goals, techniques and effects of 
rural control strategies and their links to the representation and character of Japanese 
ruling logic. Scholarly examination of the Japanese strategies that does not take into 
account their social basis may not be able to reflect the essential nature of the Japanese 
colonial enterprises. Thus, it is worth making efforts to locate control strategies in their 
social basis. The challenge is to integrate the analysis of Japanese strategies in the 
broader context of the historical discourse of Manchuria to see how these strategies 
worked to mould the rural dynamics under the alien rule of Japanese imperialism.  
This study attempts to illuminate the origins, nature and extent of Japanese rule 
over rural Manchukuo. The significance of this study is twofold. First, rural Manchukuo 
occupied a prominent position in the Japanese goals and strategies of managing 
Manchukuo. The goals of Japanese control lay largely in the exploitation of human and 
material resources in rural Manchukuo. It is for this reason that the Japanese power was 
deeply involved in economic and political activities of rural society. Rural areas also 
presented tremendous opportunities and challenges to the Japanese rule. Economically, 
rural Manchukuo as a supplier of foodstuffs was essential for Japan to retain its 
economic self-sufficiency. Politically, the rural society of Manchukuo was highly 
unsettled. The active guerrilla activity in rural areas threatened the very foundation of 
Japanese rule. The economic and political significance of rural Manchukuo made 
control over the rural area a vital part of Japan’s enterprises in Manchukuo. Second, the 
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process of control systems at work is a strong indicator of the colonial ideology and 
practice of Japanese imperialism. By integrating the local into the political and 
economic enterprises of Japan, control systems consolidated the Japanese rule over 
Manchukuo. Assuming the important status of rural Manchukuo and roles of control 
mechanisms in the overall structure of Japanese rule, an examination of Japanese rule 
over rural Manchukuo contributes greatly to our understanding of the rationale for 
Japan’s imperialism in Manchukuo.  
The principal argument put forth in this study is that the Japanese rule over rural 
Manchukuo involved a high degree of political coercion and state violence. The 
Japanese authorities strengthened their rule over rural Manchukuo by means of 
counterinsurgency operations, the institutionalisation of systems of rural administration 
and defence, and the reorganisation of land and labour resources in rural areas. The 
Japanese rule revealed both effectiveness and limitations. The effectiveness was 
manifested in the establishment of social order and institutions to serve the needs of 
control. The limitationss lay in the degree of compliance that the Japanese ensured in 
the local populace and in the extent to which the Japanese power penetrated into the 
production relations of the rural society. Another argument is that the Japanese 
authorities made great efforts to achieve effective control by taking into account local 
conditions. In doing so, they consistently appropriated, reorganised and restructured 
control mechanisms in ways that could suit the needs of the Japanese blueprint and 
social conditions of Manchukuo. In consequence, the Japanese authorities adopted 
control strategies as experimental ad hoc measures in practice.  
The limitation of this thesis lies in its scope and approach. First, this thesis limits 
its scope to the examination of Chinese, Koreans and Japanese communities in 
Manchuria. Assuming that forms of Japanese control over other ethnic groups also 
conditioned the internal logic of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria, this limitation 
would result in contributing to an incomplete picture of Japanese control logic in rural 
Manchuria. Second, the approach of this thesis is built on the dichotomy between 
repression and resistance, so it focuses on the unidirectional flow of Japanese military, 
political and cultural power in the governmentality of Manchukuo. In other words, my 
approach does not take into account the broader range of structures through which the 
Japanese rule operated and the mutual effects of agents, whether individuals or 
institutions, on colonial governmentality. Instead, the attention of the thesis is drawn to 
the authority structure of Japan as the ruler, rather than the responses of the local 
subjects of Manchukuo to the Japanese rule.  
16 
The sources used in this thesis consist of a diverse range of materials. One 
category of sources includes gazetteers and yearbooks published by the Manchukuo 
government. Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao, Ma         a  and Ma        za     p  
are official records of polices of the Manchukuo government. Gazetteers and yearbooks 
cover not only data on laws, regulations, reports and statistics, but also internal 
information on the process of making and enforcing policies by local government. In 
this sense, they provide deep insight into the legal, administrative and ideological 
contexts in which the rural control was exercised in Manchukuo. Given their official 
nature, these sources are particularly useful to understand the Japanese thinking about 
organising Manchurian society. Another category of sources is magazines and journals 
published in Japanese and Chinese languages in the Manchukuo period. Each 
publication records articles on the local government of Manchukuo. The main 
publications are discussed as follows. Ky wa   d  is the official journal of the CA 
published from 1939 to 1945. This journal covers a wide range of topics including not 
only the policies of the CA, but also local administration and agricultural development 
of Manchukuo. Ma      y    , a magazine edited by the Japanese Sinologist and 
ideologue Tachibana Shiraki, covers articles written by Chinese and Japanese 
intellectuals, researchers from the SMRC, and officials in the Manchukuo government. 
Covering the entire period of Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Ma      y     
published between 1931 and 1945 is an invaluable source of information to understand 
the official and non-official Japanese thinking of Japanese enterprises in Manchukuo. 
        pp  is a monthly journal published by the SMRC from January 1937 to 
January 1945. This journal is dedicated to the propaganda production and security 
maintenance in Manchukuo. It covers informative articles on Japanese strategic thinking 
of and approaches to ideological control in the Japanese management of Manchukuo. 
K    is a journal published by the Central Committee (     a ) of Agricultural 
Prosperity Cooperative Association (k n  gassakusha, APCA) of Manchukuo between 
November 1940 and March 1945. This journal carries reports, statistics and data of 
Manchurian agriculture in the period of Japan-Manchukuo bloc economy. Its highly 
official record of government policies is a relatively reliable source of data to examine 
the conditions of Manchurian agriculture and rural society. Ma           a   pp  is the 
official journal published monthly by the Investigation Section of the SMRC. The 
journal covers research articles on a diverse range of topics including land, customs and 
social institutions of Manchuria. Its academically oriented content is a great source to 
understand Manchurian society from academic perspectives. Two monthly journals 
17 
M            a   pp  and Na        y    pp   published by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (minseibu, MCA)
41
 of the Manchukuo government in the 1930s, contain 
research articles on the details of government policies and conference proceedings 
related to the local administration of Manchukuo. In addition to the aforementioned 
sources, I also draw on a wide range of monographs and general studies on Manchuria 
published in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, Ma      y  a           y , a 
systematic study of the local insurgency in Manchuria conducted by the Manchukuo 
Ministry of Defence Advisory Department (Ma                     j      a  ) in the 
1930s, is consulted in this thesis. This Japanese study includes rich information about 
the Japanese strategies of political and military domination in rural Manchukuo. In spite 
of its highly political orientation, this material goes beyond the scope of political 
propaganda and provides a useful record of the rural society of Manchuria. The above 
sources are important in the sense of revealing how and why decisions were made for 
rural control. While the original sources used in this study contribute to our 
understanding of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo, they also have limitations. 
The majority of the materials are sources produced by official organisations, so to a 
certain extent they carry a character of political propaganda. Their political orientation 
may result in producing biased and generalised assumptions in these sources.  
This thesis proceeds chronologically, moving from the establishment of 
Manchukuo in March 1932 to its disintegration in conjunction with the Japanese 
surrender in August 1945. Each chapter has a thematic focus on the aspects of Japanese 
rule over rural Manchukuo. Taken as a whole, they can be read as a comprehensive 
analysis of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter one is an account of the social, 
economic and political conditions of the rural society of Manchuria at the eve of the 
creation of Manchukuo in March 1932. This chapter focuses exclusively on such 
aspects of rural society as the nature of agriculture, the structure of villages, land 
relations, and population and immigration. In addition, this chapter also analyses the 
Japanese creation of Manchukuo as an incremental process of establishing Japanese 
political and economic interests in Manchuria. This chapter concludes that the Japanese 
interests in Manchuria on the eve of the Mukden Incident were principally economic.   
Chapter two examines the Japanese counterinsurgency efforts to maintain public 
security in the early period of Manchukuo. The chapter examines the local resistance 
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against Japanese rule and the Japanese counterinsurgency programs that included 
military suppression and construction of hamlets for the physical segregation of 
civilians from insurgents. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities depended 
largely upon coercion and violence to maintain public security in the early stage of 
Japanese rule over Manchukuo. 
Chapter three investigates the baojia system, a Chinese mechanism of social 
control that operated in rural Manchukuo between 1933 and 1937. This chapter 
examines the structural characteristics, application and scope of the baojia system, and 
argues that the Japanese authorities utilised the Chinese mechanism of social control as 
a tool to extract tax revenue and to build social stability in rural Manchukuo.   
Chapter four discusses local self-government in rural Manchukuo in the period 
of 1937 to 1940. This chapter compares local self-government in Manchukuo with the 
tradition of local self-government in Japan, and suggests that the local self-government 
in Manchukuo was a variation of the Japanese local self-government that took into 
account the local conditions of Manchukuo. This chapter examines the aspects of 
organisation, administration and finance of local self-government, and argues that in 
Manchukuo a high degree administrative intervention by the state was involved in the 
local self-government and that the local government only achieved limited 
administrative independence.  
Chapter five discusses the Japanese control over agrarian circulation. This 
chapter examines the expansion of Japanese capital in the agrarian system of 
Manchukuo and the penetration of Japanese administrative power in it. It shows the 
agrarian transition of Manchukuo from uncontrolled to controlled market mechanisms 
and direct state requisition and quotas. This chapter concludes that the Japanese agrarian 
control established a state monopoly over the pattern of agrarian production, the 
regulation of agrarian pricing, and the distribution of agrarian products.  
Chapter six analyses the Japanese control over the labour force. This chapter 
examines the structure and the working conditions of the labour force, and the Japanese 
policy of compulsive labour service. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities 
exercised increasingly tighter control over labour relations in Manchukuo. In the rural 
areas, the Japanese immigration brought about change in the structure of the labour 
force. The Japanese authorities also established a systematic network of control over the 
labour force through the Chinese system of labour management and the compulsory 
labour service for the state. 
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Chapter One: The Social Setting of Manchuria 
 
By the time of the Japanese invasion in September 1931, the territory of Manchuria had 
been integrated into the sphere of influence of the Japanese empire. The Japanese 
commercial activities in Manchuria greatly enhanced the significance of the region to 
the Japanese interests, thus making Manchuria an essential part of the blueprint of 
Japanese imperialistic expansion. This chapter sets a background for the analysis of 
Japanese rule over the Manchukuo state during 1932 and 1945. First, this chapter 
analyses the socioeconomic structure of Manchurian society including its agrarian 
character, village structure, land relations and demographic structure. Then it examines 
the process of the penetration of Japanese power in Manchuria from the establishment 
of economic interests to the creation of the Manchukuo state. This chapter argues that 
the socioeconomic structure of the Manchurian society served as the social basis for the 
Japanese management of the Manchukuo state.   
 
The Agrarian Conditions of Manchuria by 1931  
The agriculture of Manchuria was characterised by the extensive use of labour, 
simplicity of farm tools and implements, and the absence of fallow. Farmers aimed to 
receive a maximum return from a unit of land through the intensive use of labour and a 
minimum expenditure of capital in the form of animal power and modern agricultural 
equipment. Farmers usually lacked capital to invest in farm equipment, so they made 
the tools and implements themselves. In consequence, the efficiency of agrarian 
production in Manchuria was low.
1
   
The agriculture of Manchuria underwent a transition from subsistence farming 
to commercial farming at the turn of the twentieth century. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, the agriculture of Manchuria was characterised by self-sufficient farming. 
Farmers were highly self-sufficient and rarely needed the market for their basic 
provisions. Because of the extremely low demand for farm products in the market, 
commercial farming was almost non-existent. The railways constructed in Manchuria 
during this period created a basis for the development of commercial farming, and 
transformed Manchuria into an economic unit that was linked to the world through trade. 
Manchuria began to supply a growing demand for soybean for the international market. 
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In the 1920s, millions of soybean products were supplied to Japan, North America and 
Europe.  
The size of farms varied greatly in southern and northern Manchuria, ranging 
from very small landholdings of an acre to holdings covering several hundred acres.
2
 
The average size of a farm was seven acres. In reality, farmers in large numbers owned 
less than seven acres, while a considerable number of them owned no land at all and 
were compelled to farm on rented land.
3
 In northern Manchuria where land was 
relatively plentiful, the practice of large-scale faming was widespread. In southern 
Manchuria where the density of farm population was great, the average size of a farm 
was considerably smaller than in northern Manchuria. The farming was accordingly 
practised on a small scale.   
The main crops grown in rural Manchuria were soybeans, wheat, sorghum, 
millet, and maize.
4
 In 1931, the main five crops accounted for over 80 percent of the 
total agricultural output of Manchuria.
5
 Among the five crops, soybean was the premier 
cash crop. Soybeans had been cultivated in Manchuria for centuries, but until about the 
middle of the nineteenth century the output was small and their utilisation was limited 
chiefly to local consumption. Soybean production increased rapidly with the 
improvement of the methods of oil extraction from soybeans and the general increase of 
their usefulness. Wheat was another cash crop grown mainly in northern Manchuria. Its 
production primarily targeted the domestic market. Sorghum, millet and maize were 
subsistence crops consumed locally. Sorghum was mostly produced in southern 
Manchuria, while millet was the chief food crop of northern Manchuria. Maize was the 
leading crop in the rough lands of southeastern and eastern Manchuria.
6
  
The soybean output in Manchuria occupied a remarkable position in the total 
output of soybeans in the world. In 1930, approximately 60 percent of the world bean 
products were from Manchuria.
7
 In the period of 1927 to 1930, Japan remained the 
biggest importer of soybeans from Manchuria in the world.
8
 By 1931, Manchuria had 
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become the leading source of Japan’s imports of soybeans. Beans were used in Japan 
for industrial purposes.  
Soybeans were produced in Manchuria mainly for export. Before 1908, 
Manchurian soybeans were shipped only to China and Japan. With the extension and 
expansion of the markets in Japan, China and Europe, soybean production increased 
very rapidly and by 1929, Manchuria was exporting bean products.
9
 As the most 
important crop in Manchuria, soybean products constituted 77 percent of the total value 
of all exports in 1898 and declined slowly to about 59 percent in 1931.
10
 In 1930, of the 
total bean output in Manchuria, over 82 percent was exported to markets and offered for 
sale. Only 18 percent was consumed by producers.
11
 Manchuria’s export of soy eans 
grew at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent from 1908 to 1931.
12
  
The outbreak of the Great Depression in late 1929 affected the growth of the 
agrarian economy of Manchuria. In general, the economic depression reduced the 
demands for the imports of the Manchurian agrarian products. The reduced demand in 
turn led to the decline of exports, domestic prices and farm incomes, and the rise of 
unemployment in the agriculture of Manchuria. For example, the soybean prices in 
Dalian expressed in gold currency declined from 100 in 1929 to 78.97 in 1930 and 
46.97 in 1931.
13
 The incomes of farmers in Heilongjiang fell from 170 yuan in 1927 to 
81 yuan in 1931.
14
 As the majority of cash crop was produced in northern Manchuria, 
the impact of economic depression was felt stronger in northern Manchuria. The export 
trade in this region declined sharply during   2  and   3 . Shipments from Ang’angxi 
fell by 30 percent in 1931 and a further 60 percent in 1931, and those from Hailar fell 
by more than half from 1928 to 1931.
15
 The depressed conditions of agriculture 
compelled many farmers to sell or lease their land in order to maintain their subsistence. 
According to a Japanese investigation about the land sale and leasing conditions in 
Benxi County, land sold in 1930 was three times the land sold in 1929, while land 
leased in 1930 was nine times the land leased in 1929.
16
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The Social Character of Villages  
In Manchuria, villages could be named in various terms such as cun, tun, zhuang, and 
bao, among which cun and tun were possibly most generally used. The variation in the 
names of villages is a customary linguistic practice in Chinese.  
The Manchurian villages were settlements established as the extensions of kin 
and lineage relations, which served to strengthen residents’ identity and militate against 
the influence of their surroundings. Settlers usually lived in densely populated villages, 
surrounded by farmland.
17
 The pattern of settlement, as witnessed by Western travellers 
to Manchuria, was that the clustering of houses formed compact villages, protected by 
walls made first of mud and later brick or stone and surrounded by fields that expanded 
from the central core across an unbroken stretch of farmland to the edge of wilderness.
18
  
In the Manchurian villages, houses were very close to each other. This was 
especially the case in central and southern Manchuria where population density was 
greater. The distance between villages was an average of approximately 2.2 kilometres 
with 2.52 kilometres in northern Manchuria, 2.29 kilometres in central Manchuria and 
1.74 kilometres in southern Manchuria.
19
 This pattern of dense inhabitation developed 
in part because of the need for protection from bandits and marauders, in part because of 
the need for mutual aid in farming, and in part because of the kin relations among 
village residents.
20
  
The average size of household varied from region to region in Manchuria. The 
average household had approximately eight members. In northern Manchuria where 
household size was larger, the average number was 16.4 members.
21
 Reports of 
Japanese investigation show that the most common size of household ranged from six to 
ten members.
22
 Household size was a symbol of social status and wealth. Households of 
30 to 50 members were usually landlords, while the average number was 7.3 members 
in the case of poor peasants.
23
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According to the statistics published in 1931, the average village household and 
population in each province of Manchuria was as follows: 629.8 and 3005.3 in Liaoning, 
174.7 and 1258.8 in Jilin, 74.3 and 466.8 in Heilongjiang and 275.8 and 1700 in Rehe.
24
 
This data suggests that the village size in Liaoning was an average of 47 households per 
village, in Jilin seven households, in Heilongjiang six households and in Rehe six 
households. The village size of Manchuria, however, seemed to have increased shortly 
after 1931. The Japanese investigation conducted shortly after 1931 in northern 
Manchuria, which is presumably Heilongjiang, shows that the average size was 10 to 50 
households, among which 30-50 households was the majority.
25
  
Age and sex distribution in the demographic structure of Manchuria suggest that 
Manchurian villages in the 1930s were generally communities of young adults with a 
noticeably high ratio of males. According to the statistics in 1931, sex division was 117 
percent male in Manchurian villages. Sex division was 116 percent male in Liaoning; 
114 percent male in Jilin; 126 percent male in Heilongjiang; and 123 percent male in 
Rehe.
26
 The higher ratio of males in sex division can be partly explained by the nature 
of Manchuria as a society of high population mobility, in which some proportion of the 
population were single men who came to Manchuria from North China as sojourners for 
opportunities better than those at home in the 1920s.
27
 Age distribution indicates that 
the proportion of 50 years or less was much larger than that of 50 years or more among 
all age groups in Manchurian villages. Exact data of age distribution is given by Russian 
statistics of 703 village households in northern Manchuria. The proportion of age group 
1 to 10 was 27.4 percent; of 11 to 20 was 24.8 percent; of 21 to 30 was 14.2 percent; of 
31 to 40 was 12.9 percent; of 41 to 50 was 9 percent. The proportion of 50 years or less 
was 88.3 percent.
28
 We can draw similar conclusions about age distribution from the 
Japanese statistics of villages in northern Manchuria as well. In the selected villages of 
the Japanese investigation, the proportion of 1 to 10 years was 27.1 percent; of 11 to 19 
years was 17.3 percent; of 20 to 30 years 20.3 percent; of 31-45 years 18.6 percent; and 
of 46 to 50 years 4.3 percent.
29
 This data suggests that 50 years or less accounted for 
87.6 percent in all age groups. The demographic structure of Manchurian villages 
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exhibited a certain degree of unequal distribution of sex and a tendency of settlement by 
young residents.  
The Manchurian villages developed various forms of cooperation based on 
kinship, work and other ties. In general, the social network of villages involved three 
major relationships: kinship, non-kin ties and association arising from informal 
organisations.
30
 Kinship was the basis for village association and cooperation, resulting 
in work organisation based on lineage and clan. Kinship was also a corporate body 
serving as an alliance across common surnames and ritual unity celebration. Leaders in 
the kinship system, who were always male, established rules and regulations to 
administer community affairs and to supervise the conduct of kin members. As a rule, 
the regulations encouraged good conduct in the Confucian tradition and imposed 
punishment in the event of violation of rules. Non-kin ties were established through 
extended kinship relations and friendship in villages. The formation of non-kin ties was 
facilitated by the benefits of mutual assistance in farming and defence. In addition, such 
informal organisations as crop watching associations (qingmiaohui) also developed 
social bonds among village residents. The crop watching association was an 
organisation formed by villagers for the protection of grain. Initially, village households 
tried merely to protect their own fields with privately hired watchmen. When this 
practice proved to be costly, they joined with other villagers to make crop watching a 
common effort. Households paid a fee according to the size of their landholdings to the 
village heads, who would in turn use the money collected to hire farmers to stand guard 
in the fields.
31
  
The social functions of the villages divided them into natural villages (zirancun) 
and administrative villages (xingzhengcun). The former was a single ecological unit 
integrated by economic production and social cooperation. The latter was a political unit 
assuming such administrative functions as tax collection.
32
 The village leadership 
usually consisted of a headman, an assistant, and a village council constituted by four or 
five farmers. The headmen were local elites of large landholdings. The council members 
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were the same household heads.
33
 The village leaders were accountable to the county 
official and local police. The main responsibility of village leaders was to manage 
village finance, school and temple facilities, self-defence corps and crop-watching 
associations.  
The practices of agrarian marketing of farmers turned villages into units of 
economic production. The relationship of the Manchurian villages with the outside 
world was established through the marketing activities carried out by the village 
households. The market was a centre for economic and social exchange. Farmers 
participated in the periodic markets or standard markets in rural towns to sell part of 
their crops. On the market day, buyers and sellers came from a radius of several 
kilometres to engage in the commercial transactions of agricultural products. Buyers 
were small merchants and brokers. They engaged in bargaining with farmers for better 
prices. The market created competition that encouraged village households to engage in 
economic activities, thus facilitating the commercialisation of agrarian production and 
circulation.  
 
Land Relations  
Land ownership went through change in Manchuria. Under the Qing rule, the land of 
Manchuria was a state property. The government prohibited the sale and purchase of 
land. In the late period of Qing rule, the government relaxed land sale and purchase, and 
encouraged Chinese immigration to Manchuria. These measures facilitated the 
privatisation of land ownership in Manchuria.
34
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
privatisation of land accelerated as a result of the change of government. In the period 
between 1911 and 1931, land ownership went through a rapid process of privatisation 
and commercialisation. The provincial governments of Fengtian, Jilin and Heilongjiang 
began to sanction free transaction of land owned by the privileged class of the late Qing 
government. In Heilongjiang, for example, land privatisation proceeded very rapidly. 
By 1931, over 95 percent of its land including wilderness had become privately 
owned.
35
 Seeing land as a profitable commodity, many local landlords, gentry, 
merchants and warlords bought large tracts of land from provincial governments 
through their economic and political privileges, and became large landowners.  
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According to development period, capital investment and labour intensity, the 
definition of landholdings varied widely in Manchuria. In northern Manchuria, large 
landholdings were more than 100 xiang
36
 or between 50 to 100 xiang. In central 
Manchuria, large landholdings were above 500 mu
37
 or above 70 xiang. In some areas 
of southern Manchuria, large landholdings were 70 mu or 10 xiang.
38
  
Landholdings exhibited a pattern of uneven land distribution. The degree of 
unevenness developed gradually. According to the 1922 statistics, land distribution was 
more even in Fengtian and Jilin than in Heilongjiang. Among the total rural households 
of Fengtian, only 14.9 percent owned more than 100 mu; 20 percent owned 50-100 mu; 
23.8 percent owned 30-50 mu; 21.4 percent owned 10-30 mu; and 10.9 percent owned 
less than 10 mu. Jilin came next in the scale: 26 percent owned more than 100 mu; 22.5 
percent owned 50-100 mu; 27.4 percent owned 30-50 mu; 16.6 percent owned 10-30 mu; 
and 7.1 percent owned less than 10 mu. In comparison with the conditions of land 
concentration in Fengtian and Jilin, the conditions in Heilongjiang were significantly 
higher. 45.2 percent of farmers owned more than 100 mu; 22.9 owned 50-100 mu; and 
31.9 percent owned less than 50 mu.
39
  
 
Table 1.1. Land Distribution in Rural Manchukuo between 1934 and 1935 
 
 Northern Manchuria Central Manchuria Southern Manchuria 
Household Area Household Area Household Area 
Large Landowners 2.9 50.0 0.2 3.2 4.22 40.42 
Medium Landowners 11.2 37.9 16.7 69.0 14.76 35.88 
Small Landowners 10.5 10.0 17.5 22.3 15.47 13.71 
Minute Landowners 12.2 2.1 16.7 5.5 33.04 9.99 
Landless 63.2 --- 48.9 --- 22.51 --- 
 
Source: ang, “Jindai dong ei xiangcun shehui yanjiu,” 224.  
 
Statistics from 1928 about land distribution in northern Manchuria shows that 
among all the social class in Manchuria, rich and middle peasants accounted for the 
largest share of population and land ownership. The proportion of household and 
landholding is as follows: 26 percent and 3.6 percent for landlords, 65 percent and 53.5 
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percent for rich and middle peasants, 8.7 percent and 35.7 percent for poor peasants. 
The proportion of wage labour was 0.3 percent and 7.2 percent.
40
  
A Japanese investigation conducted between 1934 and 1935 reveals more 
comprehensive results about the conditions of land distribution of Manchuria. As shown 
in Table 1.1, the distribution of land was fairly uneven. In northern Manchuria, owners 
of large landholdings accounted for 6 percent of the number of households, but owned 
60.6 percent of total land. In southern Manchuria, owners of large landholdings 
accounted for 4.22 percent of the number of households, but owned 40.42 percent of 
total land. In central Manchuria, owners of medium landholdings accounted for 17.6 
percent of the number of households, but owned 69.0 percent of the total land.  
       
Table 1.2. The Structure of Rural Social Class in Manchuria 
 
Category 
Southern Manchuria 
(Ten Villages) 
Central Manchuria 
(Ten Villages) 
Northern Manchuria 
(Seven Villages) 
Landlord 2.8 11 7.8 
Rich Peasant 4.0 0.5 2.5 
Middle Peasant 14.2 15.0 14.3 
Poor Peasant 14.8 20.4 13.6 
Extremely Poor 
Peasant 
23.5 28.7 23.1 
Peasant Total 56.5 64.6 53.6 
Wage Labour 13.5 17.9 34.4 
Migrant Worker 2.3 --- --- 
Miscellaneous 4.4 6.5 5.3 
Unemployed 0.4 --- --- 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Manshikai, Ma      a  a    y  j       , Tokyo  Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi kankōkai,   64-
1965, 716.  
Note: the data of landlord is a total calculation that includes large landlord, middle landlord, small 
landlord and extremely small landlord. The data of middle peasant is a total calculation that combines 
upper middle peasant and lower middle peasant. The sub-categories of middle peasant are combined 
because the differentiation of them is unspecified and unclear in the original source.  
 
 
The rural class structure of Manchuria consisted of landlords and peasants. The 
acreage of land owned by landlords exceeded 700 mu.
41
 In general, there were two types 
of landlords in Manchuria. This first type was called absentee landlords (buzai dizhu). 
Absentee landlords were usually gentry and warlords who rented out their land but did 
not live in rural villages. They retained a financial interest in their property in rural 
villages and invested in urban businesses. The second type was called managerial 
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landlords (jingying dizhu). Managerial landlords was an emerging class in Manchuria 
who attained their initial wealth primarily from hiring wage labour and selling part of 
their surplus products for profit. Their management of farming was professionalised and 
specialised, which had increased the agrarian productivity and commercialisation.
42
  
Peasants consisted of tenants and wage labour. There were three categories of 
tenants: rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants. Rich and middle peasants 
owned an average of 100-700 mu per household. Poor peasants owned less than 100 mu 
per household on average.
43
 Wage labour usually owned no land at all. They maintained 
subsistence by providing labour for landlords and rich peasants. In southern Manchuria, 
a large pool of wage labour was constituted by former tenants who had been forced to 
sell their land and turned into wage labour. In northern Manchuria, wage labour was 
often constituted by immigrants from North China who made a living by working on the 
farms owned by landlords and rich peasants.  
The data about the general conditions of class division in rural Manchuria is 
unavailable. A rough estimate of the class division in rural Manchuria can be seen from 
a Japanese investigation conducted in the early 1930s that shows the structure of rural 
class in the selected villages of southern, central and northern Manchuria. As shown in 
Table 1.2, in selected villages of the Japanese investigation, the proportion of peasantry 
accounted for more than half of the rural population; the proportion of wage labour 
came next to that of peasant; and landlord constituted a very small portion of rural 
population in Manchuria. The high proportion of landlord and wage labour in northern 
Manchuria suggests that the scale of farming was much larger in northern Manchuria 
than in southern and central Manchuria.  
 
Table 1.3. The Proportion of Wage Labour (unit: percent) 
 
Category Northern Manchuria Southern Manchuria 
Wage Labour 34.4 13.4 
Semi-Wage Labour 
Or Extremely Poor 
Peasant 
23.1 22.0 
Extremely Poor 
Peasant and Migrant 
Worker 
--- 6.3 
Migrant Worker --- 2.3 
Total 100 100 
 
 
Source: Manshikai, Ma      a  a    y  j       , 719.  
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The regional patterns of landholding pointed to different modes of labour 
relations. Small landholdings were worked by family labour, while large landholdings 
required more labour than the ordinary family could supply. The scale of farming in 
terms of land acreage and number of livestock determined the demand for labour, and 
shaped the structure of the distribution of wage labour in the rural class relations.  
The proportion of wage labour varied considerably. In southern Manchuria 
where arable land was well cultivated, farming was managed on a small scale and 
family labour could meet the demand for labour in many cases. In northern Manchuria 
where there were large areas of land yet to be cultivated, large-scale farming was the 
prevalent form of farm management. The large scale of farming that was dependent on 
the intensive use of labour triggered the increase in the proportion of wage labour. 
According to the Japanese investigation conducted in the early 1930s which is shown in 
Table 1.3, the proportion of wage labour was 34.4 percent in northern Manchuria and 
13.4 percent in southern Manchuria. The difference is about 20 percent, suggesting that 
labour intensity was higher in southern Manchuria than in northern Manchuria.  
 
Population and Immigration 
By 1931, the inhabitants of Manchuria were both indigenous peoples and immigrants. 
Indigenous peoples were Tungus, Mongols and Manchus who had inhabited the region 
long before the arrival of immigrants in the seventeenth century.
44
 Immigrants were 
mainly Chinese and Koreans who settled in Manchuria for complex social, political and 
economic reasons. In 1931, the population of Manchuria was over 90 percent Chinese, 
with Manchus making up around 3 percent, Mongols around 6 percent, and Koreans, 
Russians and Japanese the rest.
45
  
The rural population that was engaged in the agricultural sector in villages 
occupied a significant position in the demographic structure of Manchuria. On the eve 
of the Mukden Incident in 1931, the share of agricultural population in Manchuria was 
80 percent.
46
 The proportion of farming households in the total households of 
Manchuria in 1932 is as follows: 82.3 percent in Liaoning, 74.7 percent in Jilin, 78.5 
percent in Heilongjiang and 79.9 percent in Rehe. This figure shows that farming 
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households constituted an average of 78.9 percent in the total households of Manchuria 
in 1932. Among the employed population that accounted for approximately 50 percent 
of the entire population, the proportion of the population who engaged in farming was 
an average of 37.47 percent.
47
  
The Chinese immigration to Manchuria started in the Qing Dynasty. Their 
settlement was concentrated in southern Manchuria where natural conditions, previous 
acquaintances, and established communities made life seem familiar, comfortable and 
promising.
48
 The Chinese settlement extended only limitedly to Jilin and Heilongjiang 
in northern Manchuria. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Chinese immigrants 
began to settle in northern Manchuria to cultivate the sizeable arable land. In 
consequence, the Chinese settlement expanded from the south to the north. According 
to one source, the population of Jilin and Heilongjiang increased rapidly in this period. 
The population of Heilongjiang in 1931 was almost twice that in 1912.
49
  
In the early twentieth century, the Chinese immigration to Manchuria was driven 
by both push and pull factors. Push factors included the disadvantageous conditions of 
overpopulation, famine, civil war, and banditry in North China. Pull factors were the 
advantageous conditions of Manchuria, government policies of encouraging 
immigration, and the accessibility of transport. Manchuria provided immigrants with 
many opportunities of building railways, working in mines and factories, clearing the 
wilderness and growing soybeans. Moreover, the provincial governments of Manchuria 
in the 1920s encouraged immigration to Manchuria. They offered immigrants seeds, 
inducements of free land, free houses and financial assistance for the purchase of 
agricultural implements. These opportunities were publicised in Shandong and Hebei. 
In addition, the accessible water routes and railway network linking North China with 
Manchuria facilitated the mobility of immigrants and increased the number of 
immigrants.
50
  
While some immigrants found work in urban industries and businesses, the 
greater proportion of immigrants went to the rural areas of Heilongjiang in northern 
Manchuria and engaged in farming. According to an estimate in 1927, more than 75 
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percent of Chinese immigrants settled in Heilongjiang.
51
 Because of the convenience of 
transport and easy access to market, immigrants initially concentrated along the railway 
lines. As the areas along the railway lines became crowded, new immigrants moved 
further away into the hinterland to seek for land for cultivation.  
Tenancy was a common practice among the arriving Chinese immigrants. The 
reason lay in the financial conditions of the Chinese immigrants who were often poor 
farmers and owned small holdings of land at home in North China. The small holdings 
of land compelled them to lease additional land to maintain subsistence. According to 
the statistics in 1925, more than 60 percent of the settlers possessed little or no land at 
all.
52
  
The prevalent form of tenancy in Heilongjiang, the area where most Chinese 
immigrants settled, was the system called pangqing. It consisted of two sub-categories. 
One was pangneiqing, under which the landlord supplied land, cattle, house and seed in 
return for 70 percent of the crop. The other was pangwaiqing, under which the tenant 
met the farming expenses as well as the cost of housing while the landlord supplied only 
the land.
53
 Rent was paid in kind and cash. The rent in kind could be either fixed in 
amount irrespective of the length of tenancy, or variable depending on the quality of 
land and the amount of money invested by landlords and tenants.
54
  
Korean immigration to Manchuria began as an individual pattern of population 
movement from the 1860s.
55
 Some Korean farmers immigrated to Manchuria to search 
for cultivable land for farming. After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the 
Government-General of Korea (             f , GGK) became the agent of Korean 
immigration to Manchuria. The large-scale cadastral land survey conducted by the 
Japanese colonial government in Korea between 1910 and 1918 deprived many Korean 
farmers of their land ownership, causing Korean farmers to immigrate to Manchuria.
56
 
Also, there was a rush of Korean political refugees and activists moving to Manchuria 
to organise an independence movement against the Japanese colonial rule in Korea. By 
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1931, Korean immigrants had settled in eastern Manchuria, the central area of southern 
Manchuria, the Jiandao region bordering with Korea, and the zones of South Manchuria 
Railway and Chinese Eastern Railway.
57
 Jiandao was the centre of Korean settlement. 
In 1930, the total Korean population of Manchuria was over 600,000, while the Koreans 
in Jiandao alone amounted to nearly 400,000.
58
  
The government of Manchuria generally deprived the Korean immigrants of the 
rights to obtain ownership after their arrival in rural Manchuria. Exceptions were made 
only for the Korean immigrants who had obtained Chinese citizenship. Even though the 
naturalised Korean immigrants were permitted to own land in Manchuria, their 
ownership was still insecure. The Chinese authorities could revoke their license in an 
arbitrary manner.
59
  
The majority of Korean immigrants became independent farmers and tenant 
farmers due to the small number of naturalised Korean immigrants in Manchuria. 
Among 36,900 households in three counties of northern Jiandao in 1917, only 9 percent 
of Korean immigrants were naturalised to Chinese citizens. In 1928, only 14 percent of 
Korean immigrants among 63,479 households in northern Jiandao were naturalised to 
Chinese citizens.
60
 In consequence, the majority of Korean immigrants were unable to 
own land, so they leased land from Chinese landlords and worked as independent 
farmers or tenant farmers. In the Hunchun area of Jiandao, the proportion of 
independent farmers and tenant farmers accounted for 92.3 percent in 1925 and 90.9 
percent in 1926.
61
  
The tenancy agreement was usually contracted orally, in some cases followed by 
a written note form the landlord. The length of a tenancy agreement was a period of five 
to twenty years, or five to ten years, or five to eight years. Rents were paid in either cash 
or kind. The cash payment of rent was made in accordance with the physical conditions 
of land. The rent was higher for cultivated land and lower for uncultivated land. The 
kind payment of rent was practised in the form of crop sharing. Farmers shared some of 
their crops with landlord as rent payment.
62
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Japanese Interests in Manchuria before 1931 
By the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Manchuria had been of great 
strategic and economic importance to Japan. Strategically, Manchuria was the forefront 
of defence against  ussian Communism and a  ase for Japan’s further expansion on the 
continent. Economically, Manchuria was a secure source of raw materials and 
foodstuffs, a market for Japanese goods and prospective outlet for Japan’s surplus 
population.
63
 The strategic and economic importance of Manchuria propelled Japan to 
establish a sphere of influence in the region for imperialistic expansion.  
Japan formally established its sphere of influence in Manchuria in 1905 
following Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. At this time, Japan secured a 
Manchurian territorial base in the form of the Kwantung Leased Territory (Ka      , 
KLT) located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, railway rights in southern Manchuria, 
and the right to garrison the rail corridor between Port Arthur and Changchun. Japan 
sent military forces, which came to be known as initially the Kwantung garrison and 
subsequently the Kwantung Army, to southern Manchuria for the purpose of 
maintaining security in the region.  
Japan consolidated its interests in Manchuria through the monopoly over railway 
transport. The significance of railway lay in its capacity to wield enormous economic 
power in proportion to the dependency of the Manchurian economy on its service. 
Railway was the primary means of transporting iron, coal, soybeans, rice and timber to 
the ports of Manchuria for export. Traditional overland transport or waterways might 
provide alternative support, but the speed and security of railway transport offered 
advantages incomparable with other modes of transport. The technology and capacity of 
railway in transport enforced a high degree of dependency of economic development on 
railway.
64
  
In 1906, the Japanese government founded the SMRC to exercise its economic 
and administrative rights in Manchuria. The SMRC stood at the centre of the Japanese 
project in Manchuria during the period from 1906 to 1931. The company served as a 
semi-governmental organisation to engage in commercial enterprises in Manchuria. The 
SMRC was an agent of the Japanese government and as such its operations were subject 
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to the supervision of Tokyo. The SMRC was also a covert army installation because an 
important part of its mission was the development of military railways and other 
strategic facilities.
65
 In general, the SM C helped to sta ilise Japan’s long-term 
engagement in Manchuria and contributed coherence to Japanese activities in 
Manchuria.
66
  
By placing the SMRC under its supervision, the Japanese government 
maintained firm control over the organisational structure of the company. The Japanese 
government retained the authority to appoint or approve all top management officials of 
the SMRC. The Japanese Prime Minister appointed the governor and vice governor. 
The board of directors, though elected by shareholders, required cabinet confirmation. 
The SMRC guaranteed the state a majority interest by mandating a 50 percent share of 
all stocks to the Japanese government with an additional 1 percent preserved for the 
Imperial Household. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( a      , MFA) supervised the 
company’s external relations including  usiness negotiations with Chinese and foreign 
entities, while the Japanese army exercised authority over matters of direct military 
relevance.
67
 The Japanese government also exercised control over the SMRC through 
huge government investment. The company’s charter initially set its authorised capital 
at 200 million yen, half of which was subsidised by the government.
68
  
The enormous financial support from Japanese government made the company 
quickly grow into the principal instrument of Japanese economic expansion in 
Manchuria. By the 1920s, it had diversified into a wide range of subsidiary ventures in 
mining, manufacturing and trade and controlled the greatest share of Japanese economic 
activities in Manchuria. The SMRC also financed a large number of industrial 
enterprises and public entities. Through the SMRC, Japan’s economic interests in 
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Manchuria expanded to the establishment of networks of railways, the organisation of 
financial institutions and the development of various industries.
69
  
The Japanese government policy on the SMRC was poorly coordinated. To be 
sure, the Japanese government policy evolved largely around the logic of managing the 
SMRC on business grounds and of protecting the railway rights against competition. 
However, policymakers in Tokyo often held substantially different views of the venture 
of the SMRC.
70
 Rival agencies often pursued conflicting agendas, either mild or 
aggressive in the extent and strategy of railway management.  
The operation of the SMRC was not always favourable to the Japanese 
government either. Sometimes the SM C’s activities undermined the interests of the 
Japanese government. For example, the SMRC offered serious competition to Japanese 
domestic enterprises for them to launch business activities in Manchuria. The low-cost 
Fushun Colliery (Fushun meikuang, FC), a subsidiary company of the SMRC, 
constituted serious competition against Japanese domestic producers in the Asian coal 
market. The SMRC also impinged on the Japanese government policy of facilitating 
Japanese immigration to Manchuria. The SM C’s hiring practices favoured low-wage 
Chinese workers over Japanese workers, which reduced the employment opportunities 
for Japanese and deterred the inflow of Japanese immigrants into Manchuria.
71
       
 
The Manchurian Crisis  
During the late 1920s, restiveness began to grow within the Kwantung Army over the 
foreign policy of the Japanese government towards Manchuria. Although the officers of 
the Kwantung Army agreed on the terms of maintaining the Japanese sphere of 
influence in Manchuria, they opposed the anti-military orientation of civilian leaders in 
Tokyo. Some staff officers of the Kwantung Army considered the Tokyo policy on 
Manchuria as weak and passive. They favoured a direct control over Manchuria by 
force.
72
  
The warlord Zhang Zuolin, the local ruler of Manchuria, stood gradually in 
opposition to the Japanese policies. A desire to install a leader in Manchuria who would 
be sympathetic to Japan led the senior staff officers of the Kwantung Army to engineer 
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the assassination of Zhang in June 1928. The plotted assassination did not bring an 
outcome favourable to the Japanese authorities. Zhang Zuolin’s successor, Zhang 
Xueliang, who was far from being a submissive collaborator, affiliated with the 
Kuomintang government and became increasingly unadaptable to Japanese wishes. 
 hang’s uncooperative position with Japan was reflected in his nationalistic policies and 
vigorous economic agenda for the expansion of transport facilities in Manchuria. Under 
 hang’s leadership, the Fengtian government adopted an active development policy and 
made several railway initiatives in Manchuria.
73
 As the SMRC was the chief instrument 
of Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria, the Japanese were concerned that the 
Chinese railway schemes would shade into economic nationalism and that the 
competition from Chinese railways would threaten the Japanese interests in Manchuria.  
The heightened Chinese nationalism during this period also damaged the 
Japanese interests in Manchuria. In Manchuria, the number of strikes and protests 
against Japanese businesses increased significantly between 1924 and 1928.
74
 Further, 
several incidents including the Wanbaoshan Incident (wanbaoshan shijian) and the 
killing of Captain Nakamura Shintarō in mid-1931 led the staff officers of the 
Kwantung Army to think that Japan’s relations with Manchuria had reached a point of 
crisis.
75
 The Wanbaoshan Incident started as a dispute that broke out between Chinese 
and Korean farmers over irrigation rights. The conflict soon escalated into anti-Japanese 
activities in a number of Chinese cities.
76
 Captain Nakamura was a Japanese military 
officer on active duty in Manchuria. In June 1931, he was captured and shot by Chinese 
soldiers who believed that he was a Japanese spy.
77
 The death of Captain Nakamura 
inflamed the treatment of the issues of Manchuria in Japan and gave the Japanese 
military a persuasive argument in using force to settle issues relating to Manchuria. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishirō of the Kwantung Army 
masterminded a plan to seize the territory of Manchuria by force. On 18 September 
1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army set off an explosion on the railway outside Mukden 
to create the fiction of a Chinese attack. The Kwantung Army troops responded swiftly, 
occupying Mukden the following day and the entire region of Manchuria by early 1932.  
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There existed opposition and resistance between Tokyo and the Kwantung Army 
in the course of Manchurian policy planning and execution.
78
 The position of the 
Kwantung Army at the time of the Mukden Incident favoured a direct colonial rule over 
Manchuria. Ishihara and his associates had initially aimed for a plan of three steps. 
According to this plan, the Kwantung Army would follow the sequence of occupying, 
partitioning and annexing the territory of Manchuria. Shortly after the launching of 
military conquest, they began to rethink the goal of a straightforward colonial settlement 
and to entertain the idea of establishing a client state under Japanese control. The 
Kwantung Army’s insistence that Manchuria be independent from China ran into 
opposition to the Tokyo policy that inclined towards recognising a regime with formal 
ties with China. Ishihara’s scheme appeared to the officers in Tokyo to be too radical as 
a solution to the Manchurian crisis. Ishihara and his associates, however, fully 
committed themselves to the scheme of creating an independent Manchuria in defiance 
of the military and civilian leadership of Tokyo. Tokyo, fearing that the Kwantung 
Army would develop into a separate political entity, broadly approved the decisions of 
the Kwantung Army in January 1932.
79
 In fact, the opposition between leaders of Tokyo 
and Kwantung Army was not so much a matter of difference in policy objectives, but in 
scope and timing. As far as the objectives of establishing control over Manchuria were 
concerned, there was marked agreement between both sides that adhered to not only 
maintaining but also expanding Japan’s interests in Manchuria. To a large extent, this 
agreement undermined opposition between the two sides.
80
  
 
The Creation of Manchukuo 
In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident, the Kwantung Army and the Japanese 
government planned to exercise full control over Manchuria through a guarantee of a 
special relationship between Manchuria and Japan. The Kwantung Army drafted several 
 lueprints to secure Japan’s position in managing the affairs of defence, diplomacy and 
peace preservation in Manchuria.
81
 Their plans for establishing an independent state 
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with sovereignty under Japan’s tutelage were largely consistent with the policies of the 
Japanese government. Tokyo agreed with the plan of the Kwantung Army for the 
establishment of a client state of Japan and for the securing of Japanese interests in 
Manchuria.
82
 
The Kwantung Army also received strong support from important social groups 
within Manchurian society who favoured the Japanese military occupation of 
Manchuria. These groups included Mukden businessmen and community leaders, 
former imperial members of the Qing Dynasty and Japanese communities in Manchuria. 
First, Mukden businessmen and community leaders were concerned with the stability 
and prosperity of Manchuria. In their eyes, Manchuria’s interests could be best 
protected by separating from China and establishing an independent state under 
Japanese military protection. Second, the former imperial members of the Qing Dynasty 
dreamt of an imperial restoration and attempted to establish an independent Manchuria 
by organising a small army and preparing an independence proclamation. Third, the 
Japanese communities in Manchuria such as the Manchuria Youth League called for the 
creation of a state based on pan-Asian cooperation and Confucian principles of 
government. These groups all agreed that Manchurian independence was desirable, that 
a new regime not controlled by any Chinese warlord was essential, and that Japanese 
military protection was necessary to maintain the autonomy of Manchuria.
83
  
The Kwantung Army reshaped the political making of Manchuria. They 
reorganised administrative organs at provincial level by utilising traditional self-
governing bodies. In doing so, the Kwantung Army established local governments 
headed by prominent Chinese collaborators with Japanese support in Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang respectively. In the light of the disorderly and confusing growth of local 
self-governing bodies, the Kwantung Army decided to establish an independent organ 
to guide and direct them.
84
 The Kwantung Army organised a Self-Government 
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Guidance Board (j        d   , SGGB) in November 1931. 85  At the time of its 
inception, the SGGB aimed to put the local self-governing bodies in order and to 
improve local economic conditions. Shortly, it developed into an agency of fostering 
and coordinating the independence movement of Manchuria.
86
 By January 1932, the 
SGGB issued a proclamation appealing to the people of Manchuria to overthrow the 
government of Zhang Xueliang, to join the Board as part of a popular movement 
towards independence of Manchuria, and to work together to set up a new 
administration that would improve the livelihood of people of Manchuria. A series of 
staff conferences were convened within the Kwantung Army in January and February of 
1932 to deal with such concrete issues of preparing and coordinating the establishment 
of the new state.
87
 By 18 February 1932, declarations of independence had been 
published severing the provinces of Manchuria from the Nanking government and the 
Kuomintang, and calling for the establishment of a new state.
88
 The Kwantung Army 
proclaimed the founding of Manchukuo on 1 March 1932. Xinjing (Changchun) in 
central Manchuria was designated as the capital of Manchukuo. Pu Yi was appointed as 
head of state and to be elevated to emperor two years later. A slogan of “ethnic harmony” 
was advertised as the guiding principle of Manchurian administration. It called for equal 
treatment of the citizens of Manchukuo, regardless of their ethnic background. 
 
Reshaping State Administrative Apparatus  
By the time of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, four Japanese institutions 
had exercised administrative control over Manchuria: the SMRC, the Kwantung Army, 
the Japanese consulates and the Kwantung Administration ( a      ), a civilian agency 
established in 1919 for governing the KLT. The four institutions in principle engaged in 
a division of labour. The SMRC engaged in the management of economic enterprises 
such as railways, coal mines and steel works. The Kwantung Army, which was 
reorganised from the Kwantung garrison in 1919, took charge in the maintenance of 
security. The Kwantung Administration, which was subordinated to the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs ( a       ) in Tokyo, undertook the administration of the KLT. The 
Japanese consulates, under the jurisdiction of the MFA in Tokyo, exercised consular 
jurisdiction to protect the Japanese residents and businesses in Manchuria.  
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This administrative arrangement created disunity for these institutions to 
exercise power in Manchuria.
89
 Although the regulation of the Kwantung 
Administration enabled the extension of its authority to the areas where the Japanese 
consulates had been established, it had little authority to supervise the consulates 
because the position of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was parallel to that of the MFA. 
There were also conflicts between the Japanese consulates and the SMRC. The 
president of the SMRC often disregarded the formal hierarchy and intervened in foreign 
affairs and the activities of the consulates.
90
 The Kwantung Army regarded the 
protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria as one of its primary responsibilities. It 
also saw itself as an instrument of imperial expansion and armed diplomacy, thus 
competing with the MFA for leadership in dealing with affairs in Manchuria.
91
 However, 
the influence of the Kwantung Army was largely restrained to military affairs by the 
other agencies.  
After the Mukden Incident, the Kwantung Army eliminated the three competing 
administrative institutions and installed a governing body capable of overseeing all civil 
and military affairs in Manchuria. The Kwantung Army directly placed their 
commander in the top position of the Kwantung Administration. The Kwantung Army 
reduced the power of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs through a reform in 1934 in 
which the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was replaced with an office in the Cabinet. It 
also limited the administrative jurisdiction of the Kwantung Administration to affairs 
within the KLT. In the same year, the Kwantung Army decreased the intervention of the 
MFA in the administration of Manchukuo by creating a position of special ambassador 
and by abolishing the Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchuria. The special ambassador 
who served in the consulates was made accountable only to the army. The Japanese 
consulates used to take charge in protecting the extraterritorial rights of Japanese 
subjects in Manchuria. The abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality eliminated the 
influence of Japanese consulates in the management of foreign affairs in Manchuria. 
Although the MFA still retained the right to advise on foreign affairs, it lacked the 
authority to constrain the Kwantung Army, which reported only to the prime minister.
92
 
The Kwantung Army also diminished the role of the SMRC in economic planning and 
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development. The Kwantung Army reorganised the SMRC, forcing it to divest itself of 
the many enterprises it owned and operated, demanding that it only manage the railway 
business in Manchuria, and insisting that it provide research support for planning 
Manchuria’s economic development.93 By 1933, the operation of the SMRC had been 
transferred into the hands of the Kwantung Army. These attempts established the central 
role of the Kwantung Army in the administration of Manchuria.  
In creating an administrative structure for the new regime, the Kwantung Army 
devoted careful attention to the ways in which its aims could reliably be reflected in 
practice. Their first attempt was to make an administrative structure in which Japanese 
officials occupied most significant positions. The government structure of Manchukuo 
was divided into judicial, control, legislative, and executive branches. The central body 
in the government was the executive branch that consisted of a State Council (kokumuin) 
and Cabinet departments of civil affairs, foreign affairs, defence, finance, industry, 
transportation, and justice.
94
 The State Council was headed by a Chinese Prime Minister 
and staffed by Japanese advisors. The commander of the Kwantung Army had the 
power to appoint and dismiss the Japanese advisors.
95
 Below this was the General 
Affairs Board (       , GAB), an advisory organ created to handle secret matters, 
personnel, and budget. Organisationally, the director-general received orders from the 
prime minister and handled the work of the GAB. The regulations of its departments 
were entrusted to the director-general for administrative affairs. Thus, the director-
general held substantive control over state secrets, personnel matters, and finances, and 
important state business was decided upon and enacted by Japanese officials arrayed 
amid these various offices.
96
 The Kwantung Army perceived the idea of concentrating 
important business in the GAB as the best option because it not only conformed to the 
quest for administrative efficiency, but also indirectly enabled their rule over 
Manchukuo by controlling those who held real power. Important policies of Manchukuo 
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were set at regular meetings attended by director-general and chiefs of the GAB who 
reviewed and discussed bills introduced to the State Council.
97
  
Second, the arrangement for exercising power in Manchukuo was also crafted in 
the Kwantung Army’s practice of “internal guidance” ( a        d ).98 This practice 
was a system of political tutelage that guaranteed the plans of the Kwantung Army and 
Japanese government in the political management of Manchukuo. It acknowledged the 
involvement of the Japanese officials in the political decision-making of Manchukuo.
 
In 
personnel allotment, for example, the Kwantung Army adopted the principle of 
controlling the strategic positions with a small number of Japanese officials. 
“Manchurians” were given top administrative positions and Japanese subsidiary ones, 
so the government organisation would appear to operate on the basis of the autonomous 
initiative of the “Manchurians.”99  The GAB was the exception to this rule. In this 
organisation, Japanese bureaucrats occupied the central positions and Manchurian ones 
assumed only subsidiary positions. The number of Japanese bureaucrats far exceeded 
that of Manchurian ones. From the top position of director-general for administrative 
affairs down, key positions were all allocated to Japanese bureaucrats. Japanese 
bureaucrats occupied at least 80 percent of these positions; in particular, the Japanese 
bureaucrats effectively controlled the pivotal functions of finance, personnel and 
resources.
100
 The Kwantung Army found this approach to be practical and beneficial. It 
could not only soothe the Chinese nationalism and avoiding adverse international 
reaction,
101
 avoid disfiguring the appearance of Manchukuo as an independent state and 
guarantee Japanese control over the planning and execution of important policies 
through the supervision of Japanese officials. The agency for enforcing “internal 
guidance” was the Third Section of the Kwantung Army set up in August 1932. On 
matters involving important political or administrative measures as well as decisions 
regarding the selection of Japanese officials, the GAB contacted the Third Section. 
After an investigation, reception of informal consent was requested in the name of the 
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Kwantung Army chief of staff to the director-general of the GAB. The Third Section 
also retained the authority of personnel appointment and dismissal.
102
  
The GAB and Kwantung Army’s “internal guidance” played an essential role in 
the Japanese strategy of administering Manchukuo. The Japanese intent of placing great 
emphasis on these two elements is evident in the Outline of a Plan for Guidance of 
Manchukuo (Ma            d         y   ) ratified by the Japanese Diet on 8 August, 
1933. It was determined that: “guidance of Manchukuo will fall primarily under the 
“internal guidance” of the chief commander of the Kwantung Army and the imperial 
Japan ambassador to Manchukuo, and it will be effectively undertaken by Japanese 
officials. Japanese officials shall become the core for the management of Manchukuo. 
The present system of the GAB shall be maintained.”103  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter presents an overview of the social setting and political history of 
Manchuria. On the eve of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Manchurian 
society was principally an agrarian economy with a growing industrial sector. The chief 
characteristic feature of the agriculture of Manchuria was commercial farming oriented 
for export and trade. Manchurian villages acted as units of economic production and 
social network organised around kinship and cooperation. The unequal pattern of land 
distribution facilitated the formation of class division of landlords and tenants. Variation 
in the length of tenancy agreement and the method of rent payment existed in different 
regions of Manchuria. Change occurred in the demographic structure with the arrival of 
Chinese and Korean immigrants.  
Before 1931, the Japanese interests in Manchuria were primarily strategic and 
economic. The Japanese authorities established their sphere of influence primarily 
through the economic activities of the SMRC. The Japanese control over Manchuria 
represented an incremental process of encroachment. It developed from the 
establishment of Japanese commercial interests in Manchuria to the political domination 
through the creation of the client state of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army rose to 
power rapidly with their military takeover of Manchuria in 1931. After the creation of 
Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army centralised its authority in the state administration 
and became the main actor in the Japanese rule over Manchuria.   
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Chapter Two: Maintaining Public Security 
 
After the Japanese military conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese authorities faced 
considerable popular resistance in rural areas. The resistance grew rapidly to become a 
security threat to the Japanese rule over the region. As a solution to this situation, the 
Japanese authorities instituted harsh counterinsurgency programs that included a large 
commitment of military force and the creation of “safety villages” (a z        ) and 
“collective hamlets” (   da     a  ). These measures were created on an ad-hoc basis, 
rather than well planned with long-term objectives. This chapter examines the 
conditions of public security, the Japanese military suppression of popular resistance 
and their construction of hamlets as a means to segregate civilians from physical contact 
with insurgents. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities successfully 
established their authority through force and coercion in the early stage of the state 
building of Manchukuo.  
 
The Security Conditions  
The security conditions on the eve of the Mukden Incident in September 1931 were 
unfavourable to the Japanese rule over the region. The political conditions were 
characterised by the rise of Communist insurgency. The economic situation also offered 
ample grounds for social instability. Economic depression severely affected the farmers, 
particularly because soybeans mostly for export comprised a large share of the income 
of farmers. The ravages of war and floods had also wrought economic havoc.
1
  
The Jiandao region in Manchuria was particularly unsettled. Its social instability 
can be explained by two factors. The first factor is the rise of Communism. The Korean 
Communists began to organise radical activities in Jiandao in the early 1920s. By the 
time of the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in September 1931, Jiandao had already 
been the centre of the Communist-directed activities in Manchuria.  
The second factor is the severe economic and political conditions that existed for 
the Korean farmers in Manchuria. Foremost were the issues of land and land rights. 
After the agreement signed between Chinese and Japanese governments in 1909, 
Koreans were permitted equal rights with Chinese with respect to land and property in 
only Jiandao. In other parts of Manchuria, Koreans could not own land unless they were 
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naturalised Chinese citizens.
2
 In 1930, 31.2 percent of all Korean farmers in Jiandao 
were pure tenants, possessing no land of their own, while only 13.7 percent of the 
Chinese farmers fell into this category.
3
 The restriction of land rights and land use for 
Koreans by the Chinese authorities caused widespread poverty in the Korean 
communities. The Korean farmers also faced serious suppression by the Chinese 
authorities after 1925. For some time after the Koreans immigrated to Manchuria, the 
Chinese authorities supported the Korean immigrants. However, their position gradually 
changed because they began to see Koreans as an element in Japanese encroachment in 
Manchuria. In 1925, the Fengtian government and the governor-general of the GGK 
secretly signed an agreement to control Korean subversives in Manchuria. This 
agreement stipulated that the crackdown on Communists and Korean independence 
forces in Manchuria should be conducted through joint efforts of the security authorities 
of Manchuria and the Japanese police. Because the Chinese officials abused their power 
in the crackdown on Korean radicals, innocent Korean farmers were sometimes killed, 
molested, arrested, or driven off from their land.
4
  
The difficulties for Korean farmers to maintain a livelihood aggravated social 
conflicts in the region. Resentment of Korean farmers against Chinese landlords and 
authorities developed into the Wanbaoshan Incident. The severe economic problems of 
Korean farmers also made Communism particularly appealing to them. At the time of 
the Mukden Incident, most Communist Party members in Manchuria were Korean 
peasants, over 800 out of a total of 1,190 in April 1931.
5
 The politically active Koreans 
in the area caused deep concern to the Japanese authorities. They complained that 
Chinese officials were so lax that adequate security measures were impossible to apply. 
In 1930, they asserted that one-tenth of the adult Korean population in Manchuria could 
 e accounted “Communist or sympathetic to the Communists.”6 
After the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931, the Kwantung Army 
confronted armed insurgency organised by several forces. These insurgent forces 
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consisted of Communists, former warlord armies under the former  hang Xueliang’s 
regime and local bandits. Among these forces, the Northeast People’s  evolutionary 
Army (dongbei renmin gemingjun) organised by the CCP and the Anti-Japanese 
Volunteer Armies under the leadership of General Ma Zhanshan played prominent 
roles.
7
 The former consisted of small guerrilla units, while the latter consisted of a 
num er of former mounted  andits and soldiers of the army under  hang Xueliang’s 
regime. In February 1934, the Central Committee of the CCP issued specific 
instructions to infiltrate the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Manchuria, and formed 
alliances with these groups.
8
 In   34, the Northeast People’s  evolutionary Army was 
reorganised into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army (dongbei kangri lianjun). 
The Communists took over the leadership of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army, 
which eventually encompassed the entire guerrilla movement in Manchuria.
9
 The 
Communists gradually absorbed all other forces including bandits and warlord armies 
into their organisational structures. The reason for the growth in strength of the 
Communists lay in their superior skills and close ties with the masses. In contrast, the 
non-Communists was weaker because they paid less attention to the building of bonds 
with the masses.  
The insurgent forces were fighting organisations regardless of their ideological 
and organisational features. The resistance groups organised their activities throughout 
Manchuria. Their weapons and ammunition were obtained by disarming the Manchukuo 
army, police and self-defence units. The structure of command in these organisations 
was hierarchical. The head had ultimate control over its internal functioning including 
organising raids and disturbing arms. The Communist and former warlord armies 
consisted of guerrilla units, intelligence units and divisions of platoons, squads and 
troops. Bandit gangs consisted of chiefs, deputy-chiefs and other roles. The authority in 
the groups of Communist and warlord armies was based on ideological and military 
disciplines, while the authority in the gangs was structured along brotherhood.
10
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The Communist and non-Communist forces both organised widespread guerrilla 
activities in the rural areas of Manchuria, in which the Communists played a more 
prominent role.
11
 The Manchurian Committee of the CCP began to show interest in 
esta lishing a “united front” with non-Communist forces as early as 1932. They sought 
to bring their struggle against Japanese imperialism in line with the interests of the 
general masses. Since 1933, the Manchurian Committee of the CCP began to adjust its 
policy of  uilding a  road united front  y following the Comintern’s directives of 
collaborating with anti-Japanese forces of all social backgrounds. The united front was 
formally established in 1935 and operated under the guidance of the Manchurian 
Committee. The united front consolidated the strength of the anti-Japanese forces by 
streamlining the command structure of guerrilla activities and by improving their 
relations with the general masses.
12
 
 
The Threat of Insurgency  
The guerrilla insurgency had several deterrent effects to the Japanese rule over 
Manchuria.  First, the guerrilla warfare weakened the strength of the Japanese army. 
The insurgents engaged in guerrilla activities on a small scale. They organised small 
units to destroy railways, cut telegraph and telephone wires, and attacked collective 
hamlets, small cities and towns, and Japanese and Manchukuo security establishments. 
Their tactics of minimising losses and exhausting the Japanese forces weakened the 
strength of the Japanese suppression forces. 
Second, the insurgents, in particular the Communists, established alliance with 
the masses through propaganda. The propaganda appealed to the farmers by fostering 
nationalism in the masses. The masses demonstrated favourable feelings towards the 
insurgents and they offered the insurgents material and intelligence support. According 
to Okamoto Goichi, a Japanese prosecutor in Okayama District Court, the attitude of the 
masses towards the anti-Japanese forces led by the Chinese Communists was highly 
favourable:  
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The population in the base area tends to welcome the insurgents, either because 
they have accepted the propaganda or because they wish to avoid being harmed by 
them. Some young men are voluntarily joining the insurgent groups. On the whole, 
the people have favourable feelings towards the insurgents and have been helping 
them….There is a strong tendency for the masses to reply on the insurgent groups 
for the protection of their lives and property because the power of the authorities 
does not extend to their area. The relations between the insurgents and the people 
are very intimate, and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other.
13
   
 
Third, the guerrilla activities threatened the Japanese strategic and economic 
interests in Manchuria. The regions occupied by the guerrillas were of vital importance 
to the Japanese authorities for security and economic reasons. Some of the guerrillas 
occupied areas adjacent to the Soviet border, where the Japanese began to fortify against 
the Soviet army. Others occupied areas where the agrarian and industrial resources were 
vital to the economic development of Manchuria.  
The intensity, scale and effect of popular resistance organised particularly by the 
Communists in rural areas, however, should not be overestimated for several reasons. 
First, land reform pushed by the Communists could not have achieved much effect in 
practice. As a main component in the Communist strategies of winning popular support, 
the land reform appealed to landless farmers by the slogan of the equal distribution of 
land. However, farmers did not find the radical land reform to be very appealing 
because their conditions were not desperate and rural Manchuria with vast arable land 
and low population density still provided them with opportunities for upward mobility 
in the early 1930s. A study by Ramon Myers shows that in the Manchurian villages 
settled in 1909, one out of three families that moved into the villages as tenant farmers 
had already moved upward to landlord and owner-cultivator status by the early 1930s, 
and a third of 82 families migrating to these villages had become tenant households.
14
 
Second, the land reform stood against the interests of landlords. The call of the land 
reform for the confiscation of the land and property of the landlords damaged the 
interests of landlords, so it could not have received support from them. Third, the appeal 
for land reform was no more than an ideal that could be obtained only by overthrowing 
the Japanese rule in Manchuria. Apparently, this ideal was unachievable in the early 
1930s, because the Communists at this time were short of funds and weapons to 
organise massive armed resistance. Therefore, although the anti-Japanese sentiments 
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were heightened among farmers and landlords in rural areas resulting from Japanese 
invasion and Communist propaganda, the defect in the Communist strategies and the 
socioeconomic conditions in rural areas impeded the establishment of massive armed 
resistance in rural areas.    
 
The Japanese Perception of Security Conditions  
The Kwantung Army perceived the reasons for the social disorder accompanying the 
Japanese military takeover of Manchuria to have rested not only in the socioeconomic 
conditions of Manchuria, but also in the rise of Communism in the region. First, 
Manchurian agriculture had been characterised by low-level farming technology, small-
scale management, conflicts between farmers and landlords, and the deterioration of 
agricultural economy. These characteristics constituted the social basis for the rise of 
insurgents.
15
 Second, the rise of Communism added a political and ideological character 
to the social disorder of rural areas. In contrast to bandits who were relatively easier to 
suppress, the Communists remained a durable resistance force. They produced 
propaganda directed towards the general masses to oppose the Japanese rule.
 16
  
The Kwantung Army applied the word “bandits” indiscriminately to all armed 
groups that opposed the Japanese rule. These armed groups included simple marauders, 
secret societies, village defence forces, and the patriotic guerrillas. The Kwantung Army 
classified “ andits” into Communist, political and mounted bandits. Communist bandits 
were those who were engaged in guerrilla activities against the Japanese under the 
leadership of the CCP; political bandits referred to the former soldiers of Zhang 
Xueliang’s regime; and mounted  andits were those who committed criminal acts 
without any political or ideological inclinations.
17
 Communist and political bandits were 
regarded as the most threatening to the stability of the new regime, and therefore 
became the main target of Japanese suppression. In fact, only mounted bandits among 
the three categories could be perceived as real bandits in the conventional sense; the 
categories of Communist and political bandits were a political stigmatisation as a result 
of the Japanese perception of the security conditions of Manchuria.  
The Kwantung Army believed that changes occurred in the conditions of anti-
Japanese resistance forces. The main changes were the decline of “political  andits” and 
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growth of Communist forces. The Japanese perception of changes was evident in a 
police report prepared by the Japanese military in 1938:   
The insurgent groups in Manchuria underwent distinct changes in their 
characteristics after the establishment of Manchukuo. The first transitional period 
was marked by the strategic merger of the native bandits and the rebellious troops 
from the local armies, who had maintained distinct identities. The second 
transitional period was characterised by absorption of these bandits by the CCP on 
the one hand, and the establishment of political insurgent groups supported by 
influential political figures in China on the other. The third and final transitional 
stage was marked by the unification of all insurgents in the territory under the 
Communist hegemony operating with the slogan of “Oppose Manchukuo and 
 esist Japan.”18 
 
The Japanese Military Operations  
The primary Japanese response to the anti-Japanese resistance was launching large-scale 
military operations. These operations were joint efforts of the Kwantung Army, the 
Manchukuo Army (Ma           ) and the Manchukuo police forces. The 
Manchukuo Army was reorganised on the basis of the personnel of the Northeastern 
Army (dongbeijun) of  hang Xueliang’s regime. The Northeastern Army was a Chinese 
army that lacked discipline and efficiency. Soldiers often rebelled or deserted and many 
soldiers barely had any military training and were addicted to opium.
19
 The Kwantung 
Army was concerned with the strength of this army in military operations, so they 
reorganised this army and placed Japanese military advisors in it. In the early period of 
1932 to 1935, the role of the Manchukuo Army expanded gradually from maintaining 
public order to stabilising national defence. From September 1932, the Kwantung Army 
required the Manchukuo Army to take partial charge of the maintenance of peace and 
order in Manchukuo. From 1934, the Manchukuo Army began to engage in the national 
defence of Manchukuo.
20
 By 1935, the Manchukuo Army consisted of twenty-six 
infantry brigades and eight cavalry brigades.
21
  
The Manchukuo police forces were composed partly of members of the Chinese 
police forces of Zhang Xueliang’s regime, and partly of new recruits. Japanese officers 
and advisors also worked in the police system of large towns. In the period of 1932 to 
1937, the Manchukuo police forces engaged in not only the general police functions, but 
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also military functions to eliminate insurgents.
22
 The Kwantung Army involved the 
police forces in their military operations against insurgents because it did not possess 
sufficient manpower to launch the military operations by itself. In comparison with the 
number of insurgents, the personnel strength of the Kwantung Army was very limited. It 
is estimated that the Kwantung Army controlled military manpower of only 10,400 men 
at the most by 1931, and there was a shortage of materials and personnel.
23
  
There were three distinct periods of Japanese military operations against 
insurgents. The first period was between March 1932 and October 1933. The operations 
concentrated on annihilating the anti-Japanese troops of leaders who supported Zhang 
Xueliang, the troops of the warlords in Dongbiandao, and the troops in Rehe. In these 
operations, the Kwantung Army took the leadership role with the assistance of the 
Manchukuo Army. This arrangement was necessary because the Manchukuo Army was 
still taking shape in its early stage. The second period began in October 1933 and lasted 
for three years, in which the Japanese troops were deployed in various parts of 
Manchuria, the Manchukuo Army was trained and deployed, and the police forces were 
reinforced. Due to their growth under the sponsorship of the Kwantung Army, the 
Manchukuo Army and police forces became the main forces involved in the military 
operations, and the Kwantung Army was only playing a secondary role. The main 
objective of the Kwantung Army in this period was to exterminate the political bandits. 
The third period starting in October 1936 was characterised by the growth of 
Communist forces due to the establishment of the united front against Japanese rule in 
Manchuria.
24
  
The Japanese Kwantung Army along with the Manchukuo Army and the 
Manchukuo police forces succeeded in destroying large-scale organised resistance by 
November 1933. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of resistance forces 
exterminated by the Japanese military suppression, but the Japanese official claims give 
a rough estimate. The number of resistance forces killed between 1932 and 1933 was 
over 16,000 and the wounded exceeded 7,000. By the spring of 1933 many of the 
principal leaders of the resistance had fallen in battle, surrendered, or fled to China or 
                                                          
22
 Jihong Che, Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, 
60. 
23
 Alvin D. Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” in The Japanese Informal Empire in 
China: 1895-1937, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989, 408. 
24
 For a brief introduction of the military operations undertaken in these three periods, see 
Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, Ma           :  a     , 311-25. 
53 
Siberia.
25
 The number of insurgents declined further from 50,000 in 1934; 40,000 in 
1935; 30,000 in 1936; 20,000 in 1937 and 10,000 in September 1938.
26
  
The decline in the number of anti-Japanese forces indicates the positive effect of 
the Japanese military operations indeed, but it is not to say that the anti-Japanese 
resistance forces had been exterminated completely, nor does it mean that the threat of 
resistance forces in rural areas ceased to exist. Rather, there was a strong tendency for 
the anti-Japanese elements to resort to guerrilla activities against the Japanese military 
suppression. Although only fractions of the originally active anti-Japanese forces were 
still in arms by the end of 1934, those who remained had been toughened by their 
experience in fighting Japanese armies. They had obtained rich knowledge of 
insurgency tactics and skills of survival, and they resorted to guerrilla tactics in 
mountains to avoid confrontation with the Japanese forces. Because the mountains and 
forests of Manchuria lacked transport facilities, large military operations of the Japanese 
armies became dysfunctional. As a result of the change in the terrain of military 
operations, the guerrilla activities continued to exhaust the Japanese counterinsurgency 
operations and the security threat continued to exist in Manchuria.  
    
The Village Programs  
In the early 1930s, the Japanese authorities enforced several village programs to combat 
the insurgency in Manchuria. These programs included the creation of safety villages 
and collective hamlets by the GGK and the Manchukuo government under the guidance 
of the Kwantung Army. The aims of the village programs were primarily security and to 
a lesser extent economic development. By enforcing the village programs, the Japanese 
authorities believed that it would defeat the anti-Japanese insurgency. The following 
section will examine the background and structure of these programs in the framework 
of Japanese security operations, and evaluate the effect of these programs in the 
Japanese strategies of counterinsurgency.   
 
The Programs of the GGK 
After the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, a large number of Korean farmers 
abandoned their homes in the hinterland of Manchuria and fled to the safe zones along 
the South Manchuria Railway lines. The number of Korean farmers increased from 
2,948 in early October 1931 to 5,843 in late November and 9,428 at the end of 
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December. The number further amounted to 19,304 in mid-February 1932.
27
 The 
Japanese authorities believed that these displaced Korean farmers could potentially join 
the anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, so immediate measures had to be taken to 
accommodate them. In dealing with this situation, the GGK requested the MFA to take 
measures for the relief of the Korean farmers. The GGK consulted with the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs and the MFA, which was put to the expense for resettling the Korean 
farmers, and made two broad decisions. The first decision was concerned with the 
provision of financial assistance to the Korean farmers for them to return to their 
original places of residence. The second decision was to construct villages to 
accommodate the Korean farmers who were unable to return home.
28
 The first decision, 
however, did not reach the expected outcome. The majority of Korean farmers still 
remained in urban areas. One reason for the Korean farmers to stay was the widespread 
Chinese nationalist sentiments against Koreans in Manchuria. At this time, Chinese 
considered Koreans in Manchuria as the accomplice of Japanese imperialism, and 
subjected them to killing and plunder. Another reason was the floods that occurred in 
many areas of Manchuria in July 1931. As a result of the floods, Korean farmers lost 
their homes in rural areas and had nowhere to go.
29
  
 
Table 2.1. Safety Villages Constructed by the GGK between 1932 and 1935 
 
Village Name Year Location 
September 1935 December 1940 
Household Population Household Population 
Tieling 1932 
Tieling County, 
Fengtian Province 
269 1,235 383 925 
Yingkou 1933 
Yingkou County, 
Fengtian Province 
1,035 5,461 1,870 4,176 
Hedong 1933 
Zhuhe County, 
Binjiang Province 
789 3,372 728 1,825 
Suihua 1934 
Suihua County, 
Binjiang Province 
337 1,314 446 1,142 
Sanyuanpu 1935 
Liuhe County, 
Fengtian Province 
--- --- 172 335 
Total 2,430 11,382 3,639 8,423 
 
Source   enhe Piao, “‘Manshū’ ni okeru Chōsenjin ‘Anzen nōson’ ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu- Chōsenjin 
imin issei he no kikitori chōsa wo tsūjite,”H   a d  da  a   da  a      y         y      y , no. 106, 
December 2008, 105. 
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It was against the background of the concerns of the GGK over the 
socioeconomic conditions of the displaced Korean farmers and the security threat they 
could potentially bring about to the region that the village program was implemented. 
This program served two functions. Politically, the construction of villages would 
prevent Korean farmers from having physical contact with the anti-Japanese elements. 
Economically, it would also provide a form of “protection” to the Korean farmers for 
them to be self-reliant. The program of accommodating Korean farmers included two 
parts: the creation of safety villages and collective hamlets. Safety villages were 
constructed as agricultural production units, while collective hamlets were built as rural 
security units exhibiting a paramilitary character. Between 1932 and 1935, the GGK 
built five safety villages throughout Manchuria in a division of three periods. During the 
same period, it also constructed twenty-eight collective hamlets in the Jiandao region. In 
collective hamlets, the main crops were soybeans, millet, potatoes and rice.
30
  
 
Table 2.2. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the GGK in Jiandao 
 
 
Construction 
Projects 
Date of 
Completion 
Number 
of 
Hamlets 
Primary 
Goals 
Time of Entering 
Hamlets 
Year 1936 
Household Population Household Population 
First 
Period 
September, 
1933 
9 Refugee Aid 885 4,670 857 4,580 
Second 
Period 
March, 
1934 
16 
Security 
Maintenance 
1,373 ---- 1,538 8,148 
Third 
Period 
May, 
1935 
5 
Security 
Maintenance 
478 2,466 478 2,357 
Total 2,706 --- 2,873 15,285 
 
Source:  Yongzhe Jin, ‘Ma        ’                   j   Ma              a  , Kyoto, Shōwadō, 20 2, 
33-4;  heng, “ iwei shiqi dong ei Chaoxianzu ‘jituan uluo’ yanjiu,” 5 -2. 
 
The supply of funding for the construction of safety villages and collective 
hamlets came from different sources. In the case of safety villages, the main source of 
funds was the GGK and the East Asia Development Company (T a  a  y  
kabushikigaisha, EADC). The EADC was the largest firm with land and immigration 
operations in Manchuria. By 1930, it had become subsidiary company of the SMRC. In 
1931, the GGK and the SMRC signed an agreement to supply funding for the program. 
According to this plan, subsidies of 100, 000 yen and 200, 000 yen would be endowed 
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to the program annually by the GGK and the EADC respectively as of 1931.
31
 Funding 
for constructing the collective hamlets came mainly from the GGK and the Oriental 
Development Company (T y   a        kabushikigaisha, ODC), but the Japanese 
Kwantung Army also provided some financial support. Headquartered first in Seoul and 
then in Tokyo, the ODC was established as a state enterprise of Japan in 1908. The 
company’s operations in Manchuria started in    8 when the company set up a branch 
office in Jiandao region.
32
  
 
Table 2.3. The Supply of Funding for the Construction of Collective Hamlets (unit:yen) 
 
Funding Period The GGK The ODC 
April, 1933 96,000 96,000 
April, 1934 68,000 --- 
April, 1935 33,000 63,000 
 
Source   heng, “ iwei shiqi dong ei Chaoxianzu ‘jituan uluo’ yanjiu,” 50. 
 
The police forces and self-defence corps enforced strong surveillance in the safety 
villages. Japanese consular police officers and recruited soldiers were stationed in the 
villages.
33
 The number of police officers assigned to the villages was as follows: 18 in 
Yingkou, 30 in Hedong, 2 in Tieling, 15 in Suihua, and 200 in Sanyuanpu.
34
 The self-
defence corps was the village militia. Its organisation was intended to relieve the regular 
army forces from static defence duties and perform internal security function within 
villages. The annual report of the GGK in 1935 described the defence within hamlets as 
follows:   
 
Under the protection of self-defence corps … [inha itants] engage in farming and 
other businesses. When sunset comes, [they] return to their home in the mud wall. 
At night, [they] shut their doors and stand sentry. [They] take precautions against 
the attack of bandits. [They] defend themselves and cultivate their land.
35
    
 
The safety villages and collective hamlets were located in different areas. Safety 
villages were primarily constructed in fortified zones with accessible transport in 
southern and northern Manchuria. They were scattered along railway lines and around 
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urban areas where peace and order had been largely maintained. The collective hamlets 
were constructed only in Jiandao where the anti-Japanese resistance was active in 
Manchuria. Due to the conditions of public security in Jiandao, the Japanese authorities 
made strict criteria for the construction of collective hamlets. The construction was 
required to conform to the following standards: first, the hamlets had to be close to the 
areas where Japanese police were stationed; second, there had to be 300-400      36 
farming land in the vicinity of collective hamlets; third, construction materials had to be 
easily accessible; fourth, the area had to have the potential to be developed as a base for 
accommodating Japanese immigrants on their arrival; and fifth, the area had to be close 
to means of transport and its land could be used for building roads in future.
37
  
Safety villages and collective hamlets were both designed to have strong physical 
structures for the purpose of defence and surveillance, but there were also differences. 
Safety villages were designed as relatively open structures with mud walls and 
blockhouses built for defence purposes, an administrative office in the village centre 
and the stationing of police forces. The average number of households of safety villages 
was 650 households. The average acreage under cultivation was 1685      . 38 
Collective hamlets were smaller in scale and more compact in their physical structure. 
Each hamlet accommodated only one hundred households on average.
39
 Collective 
hamlets were designed to have the following features: the area of hamlet itself was 
5,776 tsubo.
40
 The hamlet was surrounded by defence walls and ditches on its exterior, 
occupying an area of 460 tsubo; the defence walls were seven shaku
41
 high and six 
shaku wide; the ditch was three shaku wide and three shaku deep; the distance between 
defence walls and ditches was two shaku; blockhouses accommodating five people were 
set up in the four corners of the hamlet; no obstruction objects were allowed to be 
placed on the road between the hamlet entrance and hamlet houses; the distance 
between hamlets and defence wall was five ken
42
; twenty-five households composed a 
residential unit and a hamlet consisted of four residential units; residential units were 
constructed around a square; two households shared a house as a unit; the hamlet head 
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lived on the edge and had his own house without sharing it with anyone; and the 
distance between houses was six ken.
43
  
Collective hamlets and safety villages took different patterns of administration. 
Under the guidance of the GGK and Japanese consuls, the Korean Residents Committee 
(Chosŏn inminhoe) within the hamlets directly administered collective hamlets. The 
Korean Residents Committee was an organisation established by the Japanese 
authorities in Manchuria in 1913. It was involved in a wide range of enterprises 
including the construction of educational and medical facilities for the Korean 
community and assistance for the Japanese authorities in consular affairs and population 
registry. The Japanese authorities placed its administration under the direct control of 
the MFA.
44
 Administrative and security affairs of the collective hamlets were managed 
separately. The former was handled by the hamlet head, while the latter was handled by 
the self-defence corps in the hamlets. The self-defence corps was governed by the 
county magistrate at the local level of administration of the Manchukuo government.
45
 
The Korean Famers Association (nongmugye), a self-governing body in which thirty 
farmers were organised as a unit, carried out the administrative activities of safety 
villages. The GGK funded the Korean Famers Association in the areas of public welfare, 
education, medical care and self-government training programs.
46
 After 1937, the GGK 
transferred the administration and facilities of safety villages to the Manchukuo 
government.
47
 
 
The Manchukuo Government Program  
The major problem encountered by the Japanese army after 1933 in subjugating the 
guerilla groups, particularly the Communist guerrillas, was the existence of a close 
relationship between the general masses and the guerrillas.
48
 The Communists were 
using propaganda to mobilise support from farmers in rural areas. The Communist 
propaganda achieved the effect of appealing to farmers to oppose the Japanese rule. 
According to the diary of Ishigaki Teiichi who served as the vice-governor of Huanren 
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County in 1939, the strength of the the propaganda efforts carried out by the Communist 
guerrillas was their effective exploitation of farmers’ grievances.  
 
The farmers are ignorant, but they are not so ignorant as to be unaware of the 
destitute condition they have fallen into. The Communists have been appealing to 
the masses by stressing this fact. The farmers will never follow the Communists 
blindly on the basis of emotional appeals that are detached from actual life, but 
when their livelihood, unremitting collective revolt may occur…. We are not afraid 
of Communist propaganda, but we are worried because the material for propaganda 
can  e found in farmers’ lives.49  
 
The collective hamlet program emerged from the concerns of the Kwantung Army 
over the threat of guerrilla activities in Manchuria. In rural areas, the guerrillas had 
established a network in which farmers and anti-Japanese societies could provide 
material supplies and intelligence for the guerrillas. In the view of the Kwantung Army, 
it would be most effective to institute a program in rural areas on the model of village 
programs of the GGK.  
The initiative of the Kwantung Army to build collective hamlets was quite similar 
to the initiative of the GGK. It flowed from the principles that the problem presented by 
guerrillas was political in its essence; that an effective counterinsurgency plan must 
provide the civilians and villages with protection and physical security, and that 
counter-guerrilla forces must adopt the same tactics as those used by the guerrilla 
himself. The difference was that the Kwantung Army’s program lacked an initiative of 
social relief for farmers. A document complied by the Manchukuo Ministry of Defence 
Advisory Department illustrated the position of Kwantung Army on collective hamlets 
as follows:  
  
The close organisational connection  etween “Communist  andits” and “civilians” 
is the only feature seen in Communist activities…practices of  the construction of 
collective settlements, consolidation of self-defence force, geographical 
segregation of bandits and civilians by force alone would be very effective [in 
containing] general bandits and political bandits.
50
  
 
The Yanji Branch of the Government Office of Jilin Province formally proposed 
the program of creating collective hamlets in 1933. A conference was subsequently held 
in April 1934 by the Manchukuo government and the Kwangtung Army to discuss the 
feasibility of instituting the program. The MFA of Japan only showed lukewarm support 
for the program because a number of problems had emerged from the execution of the 
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program. These problems included the difficulty of selecting hamlet inhabitants, the 
establishment of a defence system, and lack of funding.
51
 The Kwantung Army wanted 
to make the program established in a hasty manner regardless of the difficulties in 
practice. They strongly demanded the execution of the program promising that the 
Manchukuo Army would provide necessary support for the construction of collective 
hamlets.
52
 The strong position of the Kwantung Army was derived from their concerns 
for public security. They believed that in areas infested by insurgents, it was essential to 
neutralise the masses and create physical separation of the guerrillas from the masses in 
villages. They expected from the construction of collective hamlets that the farmers 
would be placed in the guarded confines of collective hamlets in order to separate them 
from guerrillas.  
 
Table 2.4. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the Manchukuo Government in Jiandao 
 
Construction 
Project 
Year Yanji Helong Wangqing Hunchun Antu Total 
First Period 1934 6 6 6 7 --- 25 
Second Period 1935 10 6 5 7 --- 28 
Additional 
Construction 
for the Second 
Period 
 5 --- 1 --- --- 6 
Construction 
Subsequent to 
Special Public 
Security 
Operations 
 --- --- 5 --- 7 12 
Third Period 1936 5 5 5 3 6 24 
 
Note: the data of the year when the project was launched is taken from Jin, “Ma        ”             
      j   Ma              a  , 45-6.  
Source: Jin, “Ma        ”                   j   Ma              a  , 43. 
 
The Kwantung Army’s position in the execution of the program resulted in the 
enactment of an edict promoting the construction of collective hamlets by the MCA of 
the Manchukuo government in December 1934, marking the official commencement of 
the collective hamlet program. The civilian authorities of the Manchukuo government, 
rather than the Japanese military, engaged in the execution of the program. They 
assumed the responsibilities of relocating the homeless farmers to hamlets.  By the end 
of 1934, 36 hamlets had been completed in Jiandao. From 1935, hamlets began to be 
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constructed throughout Manchuria. The number of collective hamlets amounted to 
1,136 in 1935 and 9,355 by the end of 1937. By 1939, 13,451 collective hamlets had 
been constructed.
53
 The construction of hamlets slowed down only after the end of 1938 
when the security conditions of Manchuria had greatly improved. The Manchukuo 
government decided that the construction work on collective hamlets could gradually 
cease in pacified areas from 1938.
54
  
Compared with the hamlet program of the GGK, the program of the Manchukuo 
government was larger in scale. GGK’s program focused only in the region of Jiandao, 
 ut the Manchukuo government’s program expanded from Jiandao to other provinces in 
southern and northern Manchuria. The collective hamlet program was a huge project 
that forced relocation of large numbers of the population. About one million households 
or five million people were mobilised and relocated by the collective hamlet program. 
This figure accounted for over 14 percent of the total population of Manchukuo.
55
  
 
Table 2.5. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the Manchukuo Government in Manchuria  
 
Province 
Number of 
County 
Established 
by April 
1936 
Planned for 
1936 
Planned for 
1937 
Planned for 
1938 
Total 
Binjiang 28 48 514 880 17 1,459 
Jilin 12 767 618 254 178 1,817 
Jiandao 5 101 24 --- --- 125 
Fengtian 13 51 120 34 11 216 
Andong 8 49 100 50 16 215 
Longjiang 6 13 709 15 14 751 
South 
Xing’an 
1 330 11 --- --- 341 
Sanjiang 13 --- 83 --- --- 83 
Jinzhou 6 --- 23 --- --- 23 
Total 92 1,359 2,202 1,233 236 5,030 
 
Source  Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, Tokyo  Kyokutō kenkyūjo 
shuppankai, 1969, 28. 
 
Although the program was enforced in areas of different geographical and 
economic conditions, its criteria in the selection of hamlet location and residents were 
generally uniform. Taking the case of Jiandao for example, the criteria were as follows: 
the location was in an area where fuel and building materials were easily attainable. An 
average of five to ten acres of land per family was available within a distance of five li
56
 
from the location. The site for the hamlet was in the centre of the farmland; it was not 
                                                          
53
 Che, Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 159. 
54
  i, “‘Bandit Suppression’ in Manchukuo,”  33. 
55
  i, “‘Bandit Suppression’ in Manchukuo,”  34. 
56
 One li is an equivalent of approximately 500 metres. 
62 
skewed to either side. The hamlet was located on high ground and the land should be 
dry and safe from flood. It also supplied potable water. The position was advantageous 
for defence against the attacks by bandits. The villagers had actual experience of 
agricultural cultivation and were qualified to serve as self-defence corps members.
57
  
The Manchuria Central Bank (Mansh            , MCB) funded the 
construction of hamlets. Their funds were distributed in the areas of moving and 
constructing houses, training and clothing for self-defence corps members, purchase and 
transport of weapons, ammunitions and sundry items, and general administrative 
management.
58
 A proportion of the total funds was provided to farmers in the form of 
loans. These loans were generally used to assist the farmers in relocation and 
constructing new houses. Loans were generally given in either cash or kind, and interest 
rates were generally 8 to 10 percent a year, with no repayment required for one to two 
years and with principal and interest payable in instalments for the third and fourth 
years.
59
 Those who had received loans and were negligent in repayment wilfully or 
through carelessness would be charged with overdue interest in addition to the fixed 
interest.
60
  
 
 Table 2.6. The Number and Accommodation Conditions of Collective Hamlets   
 
Construction 
Projects 
Launching 
Date 
Number of 
Hamlets 
Total Number 
of Families to 
be 
Accommodated 
Average 
Number of 
Families to be 
Accommodated 
per Hamlet 
Actual Number 
of Families 
Accommodated 
First Period 1934 25 2,504 100 2,397 
Second Period 1935 28 3,650 130 3,032 
Additional 
Construction 
for the Second 
Period 
 
 
7 --- --- --- 
Construction 
Subsequent to 
Special Public 
Security 
Operation 
Autumn 1935 12 --- --- --- 
Third Period 1936 24 2,650 110 --- 
 
Source: Lee, Counterinsurgency in Manchuria, 99. 
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As indicated in Table 2.6, an average hamlet contained approximately one 
hundred households. Yet the total number of small households with fewer than twenty 
households was 40 percent of the entire farming households.
61
 In Jiandao alone, there 
were 3,588 villages of fewer than twenty households throughout Yanji, Hunchun, 
Helong and Wangqing counties.
62
 When such a great number of farmers abandoned the 
naturally formed villages and congregated in collective hamlets of one hundred 
households each, it would be reasonable to believe that shortage in land and food would 
have occurred. In fact, a corrective measure was taken to ease this problem. Small 
villages of ten to fifty households were built in the Dongbiandao area. They were either 
within the defence parameter of the regular hamlets or within the cordon connecting 
various hamlets.
63
  
In hamlets, the police forces and self-defence corps who were equipped with 
weapons and ammunition enforced a joint defence system. In general, more than ten 
police officers would be stationed in one hamlet.
64
 The membership of self-defence 
corps was compulsory for all males aged between eighteen and forty years. The head of 
the hamlet headed the corps. They were on full-time duty and rotated on shifts. The 
number of police officers and corps members occupied a substantial position in the total 
number of hamlet inhabitants. In Jiandao for example, there were an average of fifteen 
corps members in the first group hamlets. The number increased to twenty-nine in the 
second group hamlets.
65
Taking the most conservative figure that a hamlet generally 
accommodated an average of one hundred families, the assignment of ten police officers 
and fifteen corps members in one hamlet suggests strong concerns of the Japanese 
authorities with security.     
 
Table 2.7. The Pattern of Land Ownership in Zhongping Village, Yanji County in 1937 
 
Status of Land 
Present Acreage 
(tsubo) 
Percent of 
Total 
Acreage before 
Settlement  (tsubo) 
Percent of 
Total 
Self-Owned 231,000 32 320,800 40.8 
Rented 493,500 68 465,100 59.2 
Total 724,800 100 785,900 100 
 
Source  Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, 46. 
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One prominent feature of the land relations in collective hamlets was the 
increase of rented land and tenant farmers. As shown in Table 2.7, 68 percent of the 
land cultivated by the farmers of hamlets was rented. In comparison with conditions 
before the construction of hamlets, the farmers who tilled land on their own decreased 
from 40.8 percent to 32 percent and the tenant farmers increased from 59.2 percent to 
68 percent. As revealed by Table 2.8, a trend for farmers to degenerate into tenant 
farmer status is clear. The self-employed farmers decreased from 27.6 percent to 15.5 
percent. In contrast, partial tenant farmers who owned land on their own but rented land 
from others increased from 18.4 percent to 25.2 percent, and pure tenant farmers 
increased from 51.7 percent to 59.3 percent.   
 
Table 2.8. The Status of Farmers in Zhongping Village, Yanji County in 1937 
 
Landownership 
Status 
Present 
Number 
Percent of Total 
Number before 
Settlement 
Percent of Total 
Self-Employed 
Farmers 
16 15.5 24 27.6 
Partial Tenant 
Farmers 
26 25.2 16 18.4 
Pure Tenant 
Farmers 
61 59.3 45 51.7 
Agricultural 
Labourers 
--- --- 2 2.3 
Total 724,800 100 785,900 100 
 
Source  Manshūkoku Gunsei u Gunji Chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, 47. 
 
Table 2.9. Labour and Tax in Zhongping Village, Yanji County by 17 September 1936 
 
Labour and Tax 
Cumulative Total Average per Household 
Present 
Before 
Settlement 
Present 
Before 
Settlement 
Compulsive 
Labour (days) 
3,598 700 49.3 9.6 
Hamlet Dues 
(yen) 
1436.58 594.60 19.68 8.15 
Public Imposts 
other than the 
above (yen ) 
321.51 441 4.4 6.04 
 
Original note: this study investigates the exact figures of hamlet expense, taxes and the number of days of 
compulsory labour after settlement of farmers of 73 households in a selected collective hamlet. 
Source  Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, 50-1. 
 
Compulsory labour and public imposts increased remarkably in collective 
hamlets. As shown in Table 2.9, the number of compulsory labour days for farmers 
increased about fivefold over the number of days they had to work in the villages of 
their original residence. Farmers were forced to pay dues and taxes to the hamlets, the 
65 
amount of which was much higher than before.
66
 Changes in the demand for labour also 
occurred in collective hamlets. Compared with the conditions of the original villages of 
the farmers, the demand for permanent labour decreased from two men to one man, but 
the number of days of temporary hired labour increased almost threefold from 80 days 
to 203 days in collective hamlets.
67
 This change indicates that there was a trend towards 
the diversification of labour and shortage of manpower in farming in the collective 
hamlets. This trend may also suggest that the labour that farmers had to provide was not 
necessarily limited to farming, but included communal construction of the public 
facilities of hamlets. The trend of the engagement of farmers in labour other than 
farming for the hamlets might have reduced the scale of agricultural farming and the 
demand for permanent labour. In consequence, farmers might have hired day labourers 
to fill the need in busy farming seasons and contributed to the increase in the demand 
for temporary labour.   
Surveillance was strongly exercised within collective hamlets. One form of 
surveillance was the implementation of a census.
68
 Each inhabitant must be registered in 
the official record and given an identity card. Family booklets were issued to each 
household in order to facilitate house-to-house control. Family heads were made 
responsible for reporting any change as it occurred. The census was a source of 
intelligence. It was an important piece of information because it would show relations 
of inhabitants in villages where human relations was generally based on family ties, 
property and income. The Japanese authorities also registered the fingerprints of male 
inhabitants aged between sixteen and sixty. In addition, police bureaus within the 
jurisdiction of villages issued a series of documents to village inhabitants who were 
older than twelve or fifteen years of age. The documents included residence certificates, 
travel permits, and shopping and carry-on goods permits. Village inhabitants were 
required to present these documents to the Manchukuo army officers and Japanese 
military police officers for inspection when requested. Those who failed to do so would 
be considered as collaborators of guerrillas and be subject to the penalty of confiscation 
of their possessions.
69
 In the case of shopping permits, the Japanese police set restriction 
on the amount of goods inhabitants were allowed to purchase. Sellers were prohibited to 
sell goods to those whose order exceeded the permitted amount or to those who failed to 
present shopping permits in the actual transactions. Restricted goods were divided into 
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four categories: food, clothes, tobacco and opium, and weapon and ammunitions. This 
type of categorisation was made on the Japanese military assumption of what the 
guerrillas would most likely to request for the assistance of village inhabitants in 
material supply.
70
 The primary goal of restricting the amount of goods that the village 
inhabitants could purchase was to cut off the material provision by village inhabitants to 
the guerrilla forces. In addition, measures of blocking material supply were also taken to 
restrict the area of farming and cultivation of certain types of crops. The land for the 
purpose of cultivation in hamlets was reclaimed only within four kilometres on the 
outskirts of the collective hamlets. There were also areas where the cultivation of crops 
was prohibited. These crops were normally potatoes, millet and beans that could be 
immediately consumed.
71
  
The construction of collective hamlets varied from region to region, depending 
on the topography and economic conditions of the area selected for construction. Firstly, 
hamlets were generally much smaller in mountainous areas than those in the plains. The 
reason was that in mountainous areas it was very difficult to construct irrigation and 
flood-control facilities or means of transport to connect the farmers’ homes to their 
farms. Hamlets were usually constructed near roads or at points close to means of 
transport. Secondly, different priorities were given to the hamlets constructed in the 
plains and those in mountainous areas. The hamlets constructed in the plains were 
strategically established as economic units, while those in mountainous areas were 
established primarily for security reasons. For example, in Fengtian Province where 
there was a large area of plain, considerations of economic factors were prioritised over 
security concerns. In contrast, in highly mountainous areas such as Andong and Jiandao, 
the construction was primarily concerned with security and only perfunctory attention 
was paid to economic factors. In addition, there was also a difference in funds allocation. 
While large hamlets received considerable sums of funds for construction, little or no 
funds were allocated to the construction of small hamlets.
72
  
There is no data indicating whether the collective hamlet program was 
successful in segregating the people from the insurgents. Evidence hardly exists to 
suggest that there was a direct link between the improvement of the security conditions 
and the execution of the collective program in Manchuria. The effect of collective 
                                                          
70
 A case study of village surveillance in Dongbiandao in northern Manchuria gives a list of 
restricted goods, see Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, 361-
6. For the list of goods assumed to be requested by guerrillas, see Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji 
chōsa u, Ma      y  a           y -2, 374-7.   
71
 Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, Ma           :  a     , 335. 
72
 Lee, Counterinsurgency in Manchuria, 139-40.  
67 
hamlets on the improvement of the security conditions of Manchuria could only be 
assessed from the security facilities and administrative structure of the program. Then it 
would be adequate to suggest only from the physical characteristics and surveillance of 
the collective hamlets that the program established a front line in the contest between 
the Manchukuo government and the guerrillas. It is likely that the program strengthened 
the presence of the Manchukuo regime in villages by congregating farmers in fortified 
settlements and restricting the access of guerrillas to the public.  
There seems to be adequate evidence to suggest that the economic effect of the 
program was negative. This was especially true to those farmers who were forced to 
relocate to hamlets constructed in the mountainous areas where bandits were rampant 
and the degree of house concentration was high. The small area of cultivation on 
mountains inevitably led to a shortage of cultivated land, working animals and farming 
equipment. The increased proportion of families without working animals and farming 
equipment would have forced the poorer families to depend on others for cultivation 
and transport, or resulted in the harsher use of human labour and primitive agricultural 
practices. These situations could have resulted in the reduction in the scale of farming, 
in the size of landholdings of the farmers, and in the increasing hours of compulsory 
labour. Thus, it is suggested that the collective hamlet program had an adverse effect on 
the agricultural economy of Manchuria. The negative effect of the collective hamlet 
program on the economy could also be evaluated from the conflicts of the timing of the 
agricultural harvest, farmers’ attitude towards relocation and hamlet location. Farmers 
maintained their existence by cultivating their fields. When they were driven out from 
their land and forced to move into hamlets, they usually found little land to reclaim 
there because many hamlets were built in mountainous areas. Further, the considerable 
distance to the hamlets would have required long hours of commuting. It would have 
been difficult to expect crop production within the same year of their relocation, 
because a long period would have been required to reclaim the land.
73
  
 
Conclusion  
The Japanese military takeover of Manchuria in September 1931 brought about anti-
Japanese resistance throughout the territory of Manchuria. The acts of resistance 
threatened the Japanese strategic, political and economic interests in the region, and 
constituted a significant undermining of the Japanese authority. The insurgents fought 
guerrilla wars to exhaust the strength of the Japanese army. Deeply concerned with the 
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intensity and scale of the insurgency, the Japanese authorities focused much of their 
attention on carrying out counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria. In doing so, they 
engaged in large-scale military operations to suppress the insurgency. The Japanese 
authorities also implemented hamlet programs to segregate the civilians from the 
insurgents. As the components of the broader framework of Japanese counterinsurgency 
in rural Manchukuo, the hamlet programs included two parts that were initiated by the 
GGK and by the Manchukuo government. Both programs employed a mixture of 
military, economic and political measures, but the objective was largely military.  
The use of military suppression was the principal means of directly reducing the 
influence of insurgency forces, and it served as the promoting force behind the hamlet 
programs. Instituted by different actors, under different circumstances and at different 
timing, the Japanese military operations and hamlet programs demonstrated 
coordination in the Japanese strategic thinking of counteracting insurgency. The 
Japanese authorities developed their counterinsurgency strategies on the basis of the 
assumption that in order to achieve the maximum effect of counterinsurgency 
operations, the employment of physical force must be supplemented by the physical 
segregation of civilians from insurgents. The intense and organised Japanese 
counterinsurgency reveals the increasing concerns of the Japanese authorities over 
security conditions and the significance of social stability in the Japanese rule over 
Manchuria. 
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Chapter Three: The Baojia System 
 
After the Kwantung Army succeeded in eliminating the majority of insurgent forces and 
segregated the guerrillas from the farmers, the remaining major task was to detect and 
prevent the infiltration of guerrillas into villages and the flow of communications and 
supplies between the guerrillas and their sympathisers. Because the Japanese authorities 
were only beginning to establish their power in the Manchurian villages, and the 
administrative system of Manchukuo was still at a rudimentary level, these problems 
posed a considerable challenge.
1
 The Japanese believed that effective rule should reply 
on not just physical force, but also on the capacity within village traditions for people to 
govern themselves. Against this background, the Japanese authorities revived the baojia 
system as a control mechanism in the villages of Manchuria. This chapter examines the 
application and nature of the baojia system by taking into account its legal and 
organisational structure and actual practice. It argues that the baojia as a tool for social 
control primarily served a temporary purpose of security and defence in the Japanese 
control logic and practice in Manchukuo.  
 
Precedents – the Baojia in the Chinese and Early Japanese Empires   
Historically, the baojia was a Chinese system of local control that detected criminals 
and collected taxes in villages. In this system, a number of households were grouped 
into a pai, a number of pai were grouped into a jia, and a number of jia were grouped 
into a bao. The number of both bao and jia varied according to the locality. Each jia and 
bao had its leaders, who were elected by household heads.
2
 The origin of the baojia 
system may  e traced to  ang Anshi’s reform movement in the late eleventh century, 
but it reached its definitive form in the Qing period.
3
 The major functions of the baojia 
were security guarding, taxation and household registration.
4
 The limited authority of 
the central government in villages necessitated the application of the baojia in villages. 
The central government had no formal administrative control over the villages, and they 
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only exercised a supervisory function over the administration of villages. The central 
government had to rely on the baojia system for the purpose of local administration.  
The baojia was utilised by the Japanese as an auxiliary policing system in the 
colonial administration of Taiwan and the KLT. The Japanese authorities used this 
system because of their perception that the baojia could only be conveniently and 
profitably deployed in a territory where the Chinese constituted an overwhelming 
majority of the population. In Taiwan, the Japanese applied the baojia system only to 
the Chinese, not to the aboriginal populations. All the baojia officers had to report 
periodically the number and mobility of their residents to the local police who were 
stationed in villages. The Japanese also used the baojia to enforce their public health 
programs, to eradicate opium smoking, to repair roads and bridges, and to draft labour 
for large-scale works. In the KLT, the baojia was initially organised as a 
countermeasure to com at local “ andits” in June   0  in Jinzhou and Pulandian, the 
rural region of KLT.
5
 All baojia units in the KLT, as in the case of Taiwan, were placed 
under the direction of the local police officers.
6
 
 
The Baojia in Manchukuo  
For the Japanese authorities, security was a prerequisite to the economic and social 
development of Manchukuo. At the time of Manchukuo’s esta lishment, security 
conditions in rural areas were not effectively maintained by the police forces. As early 
as March 1932, the Japanese authorities established the Police Bureau (keimushi) under 
the MCA as the central organ in charge of public security. In rural areas, the Japanese 
established a police enforcement system by setting up many police stations. Initially 
most staff in these stations were former police officers in the previous Chinese 
administration, and they were directly under the authority of the county governor. 
However, the police system in rural areas at this stage was limited and inefficient, in 
part because it had not developed into a unified national organisation, and in part 
 ecause the police officers who were recruited from the former  hang Xueliang’s 
regime were often unskilled, illiterate and opium-addicted.
7
 The efficiency of the police 
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system in rural areas led to problems in integrating the police system with local 
communities and in governing them effectively. The solution to this problem was 
achieved by installing the baojia system, a Chinese system of self-policing long used by 
the Chinese authorities in China and by the Japanese authorities in colonial Taiwan.  
The baojia system was a three-level structure consisting of pai, jia and bao, each 
of which was headed by a headman and deputy headman. Ten households formed a pai, 
all the units of a pai formed a jia, and all the units of a jia formed a bao.
8
 Therefore, a 
village was usually a unit of a jia, and several villages were a unit of a bao. In general, a 
household consisting of family members as well as hired employees if there were any 
was the basic unit of the baojia system. A jia was an equivalent of a village and a bao 
was an equivalent of a ward (qu) within the police jurisdiction.  
The heads of bao, jia and pai were charged with similar responsibilities, 
including the maintenance of peace and order, the making of budget plans and the 
collection of tax. They were often the head of the local self-defence corps (ziweituan) 
and were directly involved in the operation of the self-defence corps. Meanwhile, the 
family head was responsible for reporting on security conditions in the locality in which 
he lived to the heads of bao, jia and pai.  
Pai, jia, and bao were placed under the direct supervision of the police. Police 
inspectors were authorised to supervise the baojia leaders and to approve their 
appointment to the positions in the baojia system. The head of pai was elected by the 
head of each household in that pai; the head of jia and deputy head of jia were elected 
by the head of pai in that jia; and the head of bao and deputy head of bao were elected 
by the head of jia in that bao.
9
 The head of pai, jia and bao each was assisted by a 
deputy head who would play an acting role when the head was away for sickness or 
other reasons.
10
 On normal occasions, the baojia officers would work with the police in 
the prosecution of criminals. On special occasions such as village festivals when thieves 
were active, the baojia officers would assist the police in a joint effort to prevent 
burglaries.  
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The baojia system in practice relied heavily on the mediating role of local elites 
and it reinforced the position of those elites. These elites were usually landlords or rich 
peasants who had the experience of working as officials in county government, 
businessmen, educators and police officers. They shared a set of values based on their 
acknowledged status and established trust with the rest of society. Under the baojia 
system, local elites usually assumed the positions of the head of bao, jia and pai.
11
  
The idea of introducing the baojia system into the villages of Manchukuo seems 
to have originated from the concerns of officers of the Police Bureau a out “ andit” 
incidents in rural areas. As early as May 1932, the baojia system was mentioned in the 
Police Bureau’s guideline concerning the construction of Manchukuo’s police forces. 
According to this guideline, in order to achieve a sound effect of peace preservation, it 
was not necessary for the moment to rush to improve the police system at county levels; 
rather it was essential to coordinate relations with local officials and to develop such 
institutions already in existence as the baojia system.
12
 The importance of introducing 
the baojia system as a means of improving public security was also realised by Nagao 
Kichigorō, the first director of the Police Bureau who once served in the Kwantung 
military police. At the first conference of police affairs held in October 1932, Nagao 
stressed that the baojia system could be used as a means to improve public security in 
rural areas:  
 
… However, the land of our country is greatly vast, and transport and 
communications are not convenient either; further, the police forces are not 
developed yet, from which difficulties of the maintenance of peace and order 
would  e inevita le.… But the conditions [of  andits] cannot  e neglected, and the 
policing functions must be fully demonstrated. [We] must endeavour to study local 
conditions and be aware of threat in advance so as to implement preventive and 
suppressive measures. …as a means of preserving peace and order in local society, 
the baojia system may be an effective approach. [I] expect it to be enforced on the 
basis of study.
13
  
            
The utilisation of the baojia as a self-policing system to com at “ andits” was 
also evident in a report which was sent by the Kwantung Army to the Ministry of War 
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(          ) in Tokyo for review in October 1936. This report stressed the frequency of 
“ andit” incidents and the need to adopt the baojia system as follows:  
 
…although the Manchukuo state has  een founded, the aftermath of the [Mukden] 
Incident is still unsettled. Yet the state finances are meagre and state institutions are 
not developed. Particularly in the area of the maintenance of order, no matter how 
[hard] the Japanese army [tries] to maintain it in sincerity, given either the 
limitation of their geographical location and financial expenses, or the instigation 
of anti-Japanese elements, many people have turned to bandits out of [their] self-
centeredness and discontent, and also the Russian Communists instigated them to 
become so, the establishment of the state [of Manchukuo] has become an existence 
of name only but not of reality. In view of this, it would be the best policy to rely 
upon the baojia system, the self-governing organisation of peace preservation that 
has a long history.
14
 
 
The laws and ordinances for the organisation and operation of the baojia was 
formulated by the Central Committee for the Maintenance of Public Order (        a  
ijikai), a security apparatus established by the Kwantung Army in June 1933. The 
committee was primarily charged with the investigation, drafting and reviewing of laws 
regarding peace preservation in Manchukuo. It was directly administered by the 
Kwantung Army and its chairman was directly appointed by the commander in chief of 
the Kwantung Army.
15
 At the end of December 1933, the first law known as the 
Provisional Baojia Code (zanxing baojiafa) was promulgated by the MCA as the basic 
law setting principles for organisation the baojia system. To supplement this law with 
necessary adjustments, several sets of more detailed working rules were produced 
thereafter. The MCA promulgated the Rules of the Implementation of the Provisional 
Baojia Code (zanxing baojiafa shixing guize) on 17
 
January 1934, followed by the 
Understanding of the Implementation of the Provisional Baojia Code (zanxing baojiafa 
shixing xinde) and the Standards for the Baojia Rules (baojia guiyue biaozhun) on 3 
February the same year.  
It appears that the Japanese authorities did not have a long-term plan for 
introducing the baojia system and that they only adopted the baojia as an ad-hoc 
measure for control over the villages of Manchuria. A report issued by the MCA of 
Manchukuo revealed the temporary nature of the baojia: 
 
To make the baojia law a provisional one means that the baojia system is not 
necessarily to become a permanent institution. It is expected that alongside the 
development of the nation’s political and ethical thought, the progress of culture, 
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the improvement of the police system and the perfection of control laws, the time 
when such institution becomes unnecessary will come. It is our earnest desire that 
through the concerted efforts between government and people, the time of the 
abolition of this law will come as soon as possible.
16
 
 
During the period of 1932 to 1934, the Kwantung Army were overall pessimistic 
in their expectations of the baojia system. In the same report sent in October 1936, the 
operation of the baojia system was descri ed with comments such as “practical 
achievements were really few” and “there was no considerable progress in the first two 
years after the enforcement of the baojia system.” 17  
 
Table 3.1. The Organisational Structure of the Baojia System  
 
Province 
Year of 
Investigation 
Bao Jia Pai 
Self-
Defence 
Corps 
Self-Defence 
Corps Member 
Paid 
Non-
Salaried 
Standing 
Member 
Non-
Salaried 
Reserve 
Member 
Jiandao March, 1936 56 621 7,278 505(4) 55 31,556  
Jilin March, 1936 172 3,232 54,546 664  59,761  
Andong July, 1936 204 864 32,029 647 1,609 8,551 240,839 
Fengtian 
December, 
1935 
304 3,491 134,724 2,871 881 124,478 704,725 
Sanjiang 
December, 
1935 
116 1,401 13,534 616 881 4,676 8,254 
Tonghua 
The End of 
1939 
121 875 8,571 --- --- --- --- 
 
Source  Hwi-t ak Yun, Ilche ha  Manjuguk  y n gu  hangil mujang t ujaeng kwa ch ian sukch ng 
kongjak, Seoul: Ilchogak, 1996, 204.   
 
The Manchukuo government attempted to improve the effect of the baojia 
system in practice. The first attempt was to strengthen the police role in supervising the 
operation of the baojia system. In December 1934, the Kwantung Army set up judicial 
divisions (      a) in the Police Bureau of the Manchukuo government and provincial 
police departments to administer the operation of the baojia. The second attempt was to 
make a three-year plan in which a certain number of counties were designated for the 
introduction of special programs. According to a plan carried out by the MCA in July 
1935, the government designated fifty counties in the country as the special regions for 
the implementation of the baojia and assigned professional officials to these counties to 
oversee the enforcement of the baojia. The third attempt was to expand the ideological 
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effect of the baojia system. During the period of 1935 and 1937, the Manchukuo 
government organised workshops for training police officers in the country. In the 
meantime, the government produced propaganda with messages of the basic 
instructional introduction of the baojia directed towards the general public.
18
 This 
period was also the heyday of the development of the baojia system. As shown in Table 
3.1 and Table 3.2, the number of bao, jia, pai and self-defence corps had amounted to 
significantly large numbers by the late 1930s. The number of pai for example, exceeded 
440,000 in 1935. Assuming that 10 households constituted a unit of pai, then the 
households under the direct control of the baojia system would have amounted to 
4,400,000 in 1935. This figure was a significant proportion of the total population of 
Manchukuo.  
 
Table 3.2. The Extent of the Baojia System in Manchukuo at the End of 1935 
 
Province/ 
Special City 
Bao Jia Pai 
Self-Defence 
Corps 
Jilin 140 2,122 54,207 793 
Longjiang 199 2,943 29,231 702 
Heihe 20 118 1,092 41 
Sanjiang 116 1,401 13,534 616 
Binjiang 216 5,204 59,842 2,078 
Jiandao 52 196 6,907 320 
Andong 105 952 33,539 708 
Fengtian 340 3,482 134,742 2,817 
Jinzhou 94 870 53,938 692 
Rehe 89 1,755 37,102 648 
Xinjing 33 281 7,972 102 
Harbin 12 279 4,907 280 
North Manchuria 
Special Region 
33 296 3,202 64 
Total 1,458 19,900 440,197 9,861 
 
Source: Endō, “Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai,” 43. 
 
Collective Responsibility   
Collective responsibility was a central element in the structure of the baojia system in 
Manchukuo. Collective responsibility was a form of mutual obligation whereby other 
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household members would be held jointly responsible for the misdeed of an individual 
of the household, whether or not they had been directly concerned in the misdeed in 
question, because of their overall duty of supervision, which might or might not involve 
direct action. In some cases, the police inspector within whose jurisdiction the crime 
was committed was also held responsible.  
The practice of collective responsibility ruled out the possibility of asserting 
complete independence of action. Jurists adopted this concept that responsibility for a 
given act extended beyond the individual actor in legal practices. According to this view, 
the illegal action of a single person could lead not only to the punishment of that person, 
but also to the punishment of many others held guilty merely by virtue of their 
association with the wrongdoer. Given the institutional centrality of the family, kinship 
was the base for the imputation of collective responsibility.
19
  
The main crimes in which collective responsibility was most frequently invoked 
involved offences that directly affected the state and public security. Specifically, 
collective responsibility was attached to civil strife; abetting outsiders in troublemaking; 
endangering the public; violations of laws on national security. Sanctions incurred as 
the result of collective responsibility were imposed in the form of a fine. The fine would 
be imposed on the family head of the wrongdoer and the amount of the fine would be 
under two yuan. The amount of the fine was a huge sum of money, accounting for 
approximately 7 percent of the farmers’ annual income.20 However, the fine might also 
be reduced or waived in the following cases: inhabitants had informed the local police 
of the occurrence of crimes; or inhabitants had prevented harm caused by crime from 
happening; criminals have confessed to the local police before they were discovered.
21
  
The application of collective responsibility in the baojia system mirrored the 
developmental nature of Manchukuo’s legal practices. After the founding of 
Manchukuo, a variety of actors in Japan and Manchukuo sought to make use of law as a 
civilising agent, as a tool for the reform of thought, custom, and spirit. A modern legal 
system developed quickly on the models of laws of Japan, and colonial Taiwan and 
                                                          
19
 Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Collective  esponsi ility in Qing Criminal  aw,” in The Limits of the 
Rule of Law in China, eds. Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman, and R. Kent Guy, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2000, 112. 
20
 According to the Japanese investigation of 569 households of ten villages in ten counties in 
southern Manchuria in the mid-1930s, the average annual income of a farmer was 27.87 yuan. 
See Manshūkoku jitsugyō u rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, H    a   a  a        j   a      a 
         :   z      a    , Shinkyō  Jitsugyō u rinji sangyō chōsakyoku,   3 , 340. 
21
 See Article Nine in the Provisional Baojia Code in Che, Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 
240; Manshūkoku minsei u, H       d   a      , 34-40.   
77 
Korea.
22
 Although modern legal institutions were established by the Manchukuo 
government, their underdeveloped nature left laws inherently weak. Collective 
responsibility was one of the developmental features of the legal practices of 
Manchukuo. It was functionally utilised as a deterrent to crime and sedition. The 
Japanese authorities exercised collective responsibility as an instrumentalist tool 
because they were unable to keep sufficient surveillance of a village community to be 
able to detect individuals and because they had little faith in the sympathy of the 
Manchukuo population towards their rule. 
 
Household Control 
When the baojia system was in place, the Manchukuo government neither applied any 
law on population registry nor had any official record of its population. It was not until 
1940 that the Manchukuo government implemented a law on the registration of its 
nationals.
23
 The absence of legal institutions concerning population made it difficult for 
the Manchukuo government to manage the demographic structure of the state, and 
perhaps more important, to monitor the identifying information and mobility of rural 
population in a period of social instability. In order to investigate the conditions of 
population, the Manchukuo government promulgated a series of ordinances as the legal 
basis for the investigation. On 7
 
February 1934, the MCA issued an ordinance for 
carrying out a household registry. On 3
 
August the same year, the ordinance was revised 
but not until 22
 
September did the Manchukuo government officially announce the 
ordinance to the public.
24
 
As a legal supplementary agency of the local administration, the baojia system 
functioned to assist the police in registering households of villages. In carrying out the 
household registry, the police was to be the main force and the heads of bao, jia and pai 
of villages were to assist the police. The head of a village was to keep a record on the 
households and residents of his community. If a change in household members or 
structure was reported to them, they would report the change to the police officer in 
charge.  
The household registers in the possession of the police were the basic records of 
local population and served as the basis for a modern population census. As a 
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comprehensive source of intelligence on the local population, the household registers 
included the following information of the household members: name, current place of 
residence, occupation, place of birth, original place of residence, ethnicity, religion, and 
relationship to the household head. In addition, the government made a detailed list of 
people whom they considered to constitute a threat to the public security of the state and 
to be necessary for the special attention of the police. These people included those who 
were descri ed as “politically active” and “morally corrupt”.25 The household registry 
was normally carried out more than once in every six months. However, the police 
would carry out the household registry more than once in a month if they found the 
local security conditions to be unstable.
26
  
 
Tax and Finance in the Baojia System  
In the early period after Manchukuo’s esta lishment, the state control over tax 
collection was very limited. The remittance of tax and the communication between 
different levels of government on tax collection were both poorly organised.
 27
 It was 
not until 1934 that the Manchukuo government put in place a tax collection system. By 
1934, two organs had been established by the Manchukuo government for the purpose 
of tax collection: the Tax Collection Bureau (shuijuanju) and the financial affairs 
department in county government offices. The former was responsible for the collection 
of state tax, while the latter was charged with the collection of county and village tax. In 
fact, the financial affairs department of many county government offices also collected 
state tax.
28
  
The Manchukuo government commonly levied three categories of tax from 
villages: state tax, county tax and village tax. State tax included land tax and other taxes 
on livestock, grain and agricultural produce. County tax comprised a variety of business 
and sales taxes including butchering taxes on meat and fish, and a stunning array of 
taxes levied against establishments such as shop taxes and entertainment fees. The 
Manchukuo government also expanded their revenue sources by levying surcharges on 
state and county tax. Although the type and rate of state and county tax varied from 
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region to region, they were generally formalised by the government and placed under 
the control of the bureaucracy. Legal sanction was particularly given to the practice of 
making land taxes the main revenue of government. In contrast to state and county tax, 
more liberty was given to setting the criteria for village tax, so its type and rate was 
unfixed and varied from village to village. In general, the main component of village tax 
was the baojia dues, followed by self-defence corps fees, crop-watching fees, household 
fees and other miscellaneous fees. There was variation in the basis on which tax was 
collected. The baojia dues were collected on the basis of the acreage of landholdings. 
The more extensive the landholdings one owned, the more tax would be collected from 
one. Some other types of taxes were collected as a flat levy from households in villages. 
In such cases, each household would be burdened with the responsibility for an even 
share of tax payment.
29
 The type and rate of village tax also varied considerably in 
villages. Some types of tax were collected in some villages, but not in others. The tax on 
crop watching, for example, was not collected in areas along railway lines where public 
security was well maintained.
30
  
Village tax seemed to have made up the largest proportion in the three categories 
of tax. Two sets of data support this conclusive remark. The first set of data is the tax 
conditions of Nanhuangdi village in 1934. It shows that while the total amount of tax 
was 740.63 yuan, village tax alone was 485.69 yuan.
31
 The second set is the data of 
villages of Yongji County in Jilin in 1936. It shows that the total amount of tax was 826, 
38 yuan, with 399, 482 yuan for the baojia dues, 200, 947 yuan for state tax and 225, 
451 yuan for county tax.
32
  
The budgetary plan of villages was made by the bao heads. For the plan to be 
implemented, the approval of the county governor and the supervision of the police 
inspectors were necessary. The main sources of revenue in villages were the baojia dues 
levied on land, houses and business enterprises. In the villages of Yongji County, the 
annual revenue budget of 1937 was 399,482 yuan, while the budget of the baojia dues 
alone was set as 387,042 yuan.
33
 The baojia dues were paid by the owners of land and 
house properties, and business investors. The socially disadvantaged in villages 
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including the aged, the widowed and victims of natural disasters were usually exempted 
from paying the dues.
34
 The jia and bao heads were the crucial figures in the collection 
of the baojia dues. First, the jia heads would collect the dues from households within 
his jurisdiction, deduct a certain proportion from the amount collected for the expenses 
of bao, and deliver the remainder to the bao heads. The bao heads would then pay the 
budgetary expenses from the collected dues delivered by the jia heads. When there was 
a surplus, the bao heads would deposit the surplus in banks or other corporate 
establishments. Upon the collection of dues, receipts would be issued to payers, 
delivered to the county treasury department and kept in bao as records. The collection 
period of baojia dues varied from once a month and once a season to three times a year 
and twice in spring and autumn respectively. The police inspectors were charged with 
the supervision of the collection of dues. However, their supervisory role was just a 
formality and seldom put into practice.
35
  
The main activities of villages that required financial support were the 
maintenance of self-defence corps, the local administration, crop-watching, public 
welfare and education. The majority of village expenditure were made in these areas. 
The largest proportion of spending went to the area of self-defence corps and 
administration of bao and jia. It included salaries of the corps members and 
administrative employees of bao and jia, the expenses of maintaining corps facilities 
and of training corps members. The expenditure on security within baojia was a central 
component of the Japanese attempt to bring local areas under control. In the case of 
Yongji County, over 50 percent of the expenditure went to the area of security. In the 
villages of Yongji County, the annual total expenditure in 1937 was 288, 863 yuan; the 
expenditure to maintain self-defence corps alone was 154,500 yuan, followed by the 
administrative expenses of bao and jia which were 84,230 yuan and 30,734 yuan 
respectively.
36
 The significant position of expenses in the maintenance of security is an 
indicator of the nature of the villages in the baojia system that security was prioritised 
over any other areas of spending in villages.  
There is no question that peasants were made by the baojia system to bear the 
burden of paying substantial fees to the government and the village administrations. 
Peasants were the largest contributor of the baojia dues. On the assumption that the 
amount of dues to be paid was determined by the acreage of landholdings, most dues 
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would have been collected from landlords. In fact, the payment of dues for landlords 
was reduced to a lesser amount, so the burden of paying dues was transferred to self-
cultivating farmers and tenants who only had small portions of landholdings in 
villages.
37
 Peasants were also the largest contributor of tax. The data based on the 
conditions of tax payment of forty-seven households in Nanhuangdi village in 1934 
suggests that self-cultivating farmers contributed 20 percent of the total tax, followed by 
landlord-tenants contributing 15.11 percent, landlords 13.17 percent, self-cultivating 
tenants 10.28 percent, tenant farmers 10.09 percent and agricultural labourers 8.5 
percent.
38
   
 
The Self-Defence Corps  
The central component of the baojia system was the self-defence corps, a village 
defence force that played an important role during times of natural calamities and 
occurrence of crimes and insurgencies. The main task of the self-defence corps was to 
assist local police to combat guerrilla insurgents. The self-defence corps was originally 
organised as an auxiliary instrument of the police within the baojia system. It was 
stipulated in the baojia code that the self-defence corps was only to be organised when 
emergency arose or when it was deemed as necessary by police inspectors. Given its 
defence nature, the self-defence corps was organised throughout the regions where the 
baojia was applied and constituted the central activity of the baojia system. The 
organisational structure and the number of members of the self-defence corps depended 
on the local conditions of security. In areas where peace and order was well maintained, 
the crops members tended to be very few and the corps training tended to be not 
mandatory.
39
  
The self-defence corps consisted of a headman, a deputy head and 
approximately thirty to forty corps members. In principle, a company commander 
(tuanzong) and a deputy company commander (futuanzong) headed the self-defence 
corps in each bao. A company head (tuanzhang) and a deputy company head 
(futuanzhang) headed the self-defence corps in each jia. However, there were also 
exceptions that more than one deputy company commander and deputy company head 
were assigned to manage the self-defence corps as necessitated by local conditions. The 
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leaders of each self-defence corps was selected mutually by corps members. Police 
inspectors approved their appointment.  
Village inhabitants who met the following criteria would automatically become 
members of the self-defence corps: male adults of eighteen to forty years of age and 
having a place of residence in jia for more than one year. However, the physically 
disabled and public servants excluding clerks (yakuin) of bao, jia and pai were 
ineligible.
40
 The responsibilities of corps members included wearing uniform and 
armbands, participating in the defence for public security and disaster prevention, 
participating in the suppression of armed resistance and performing village patrols. 
When emergencies arose, they would immediately notify the Japanese police and assist 
them in responding to the situation. The corps members worked in shifts, and they dined 
and were accommodated in the corps headquarter. They were equipped with telephones 
so that they could report intelligence to and receive assignment from their higher 
authority in the county. In actuality, two types of members existed in the corps: standing 
members and reserve members. Standing members were charged with participation in 
the main activities of the corps. They were further categorised into armed and non-
armed members. Armed members were equipped with weapons and worked in 
collaboration with police officers, while non-armed members attended to the general 
affairs of the baojia and corps. The appointment of the corps members was not 
necessarily fixed and they worked in shift on a monthly basis.
41
  
The Manchukuo government reorganised the structure of the self-defence corps as 
early as 1934 primarily to reduce the expenses of the baojia system because the 
government found the corps to be too much of a financial burden to the villages. This 
attempt was aimed to reallocate funds used in self-defence corps to the construction of 
village security facilities. On 3 February 1934, the MCA promulgated a revised version 
of the baojia rules, in which amended provisions of the self-defence corps were 
provided. According to the new provisions, the outstanding individuals among corps 
members were to be selected to work for the police forces; the rest were to return to 
their original farming or other business; the members who left the corps were to be 
compensated with special allowances; salaried service in the corps was transformed into 
unsalaried and compulsory service; and the expenses saved from the total budget by 
reforming the self-defence corps would be reallocated to building policing 
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infrastructure.
42
 In addition to the financial factor, the security factor also played in a 
part in the government effort of reorganising the corps. As a result of the Japanese 
military operations against insurgencies, the security conditions of villages had 
significantly improved by the end of 1935. The necessity of the reorganisation is 
evident in the guideline for the reorganisation of the self-defence corps issued by Yongji 
County in January 1936. The thrust of the guideline shows that given the improvement 
in the local security conditions, it was necessary to change the nature of the service in 
the self-defence corps from salaried employment to voluntary labour:  
 
 However, the strengthening of the county police forces has not achieved a degree 
of thoroughness. Hence, it is needless to say that the activities of the self-defence 
corps members must act in accordance to the baojia code to cooperate with the 
police forces. To date, the bandit suppression that is the primary mission of the 
self-defence corps has almost approached to an end alongside the establishment of 
public security. Hereafter, the greatest mission [of the self-defence corps] is 
exclusively self-policing in villages….To date the pu lic order has  een 
established all over the country, the reorganisation of the salaried self-defence 
corps members shall now be implemented and obligatory self-defence corps shall 
be consolidated on the other hand, in an attempt to reduce the baojia dues and the 
burden of bao and jia residents and to allot the surplus of the reorganised self-
defence corps to augment the security facilities.
43
  
 
In the case of Yongji County, the reorganisation of the self-defence corps was 
significant in scale. After the county government enforced the plan of reorganisation in 
February 1937, aged members of the corps were eliminated and standing members of 
the corps were demobilised.
44
 By March 1937, the number of standing members had 
been reduced from 1,591 to 935.
45
  
It is difficult to assume that farmers of villages were positively motivated to serve 
in the self-defence corps. In general, farmers were more directly concerned with 
protecting their homes and managing their agricultural production than with helping the 
government to suppress “ andits”. The self-defence corps members were young farmers 
who served as the main labour force in farming. In busy farming seasons, the needs of 
farming allowed them hardly any time off from their work. It would be natural to 
assume that financial rewards could have been a useful way to motivate the farmers to 
work for the corps. A talk given by Yonemitsu Sakuta from the government office of 
Jiutai County in Jilin Province at a conference on the baojia system suggests that 
financial reward was the primary motive of farmers to serve the self-defence corps. 
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According to Yonemitsu, the salaried service of the self-defence corps was an important 
factor that motivated farmers to work and the ineffectiveness of the baojia system was 
attributed to the unsalaried service of the self-defence corps. 
 
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Baojia Code in late 1933, the baojia 
system has also been promulgated in Jiutai County accordingly. If we were to 
speak of its outcome, however, there has been no effect at all. I have given it a lot 
of thought. I conclude that the baojia spirit and the obligatory self-defence corps as 
prescribed in the baojia code are unreasonable. It is a fact that the nationals of 
Manchukuo have a relatively weak sense of state. Bearing this in mind, I have tried 
to explain to them about loyalty and patriotism but there is little effect. In this sense, 
I have decided not to demand for [the organisation of] self-defence corps as 
specified in the baojia code. In my county, we did not follow the baojia code and 
[we] organised the [system of] salaried self-defence corps. Its effect has improved. 
It is my belief that in recent days the best public order has been achieved in Jiutai 
County in Jilin Province.
46
 
 
Given the significant financial expenses in salary payment for the corps members, 
the Manchukuo government attempted to turn service in the corps into a compulsory 
duty after 1936. Although the compulsory service as an unpaid service must have 
discouraged farmers from serving in the corps, it appears that the attempt of the 
government to turn service in the corps into an unpaid and voluntary one was not 
strictly observed in practice. This point is shown in the case of Maohao jia of Fugui bao 
in Taonan County. When service in the self-defence corps was already unsalaried in 
Taonan County in 1937, the government employed two villagers to work for the self-
defence corps. Their salary consisted of two parts. One part was deducted from the 
baojia dues of the village. The other part was contributed by landholding villagers.
47
 
Aside from the fact that the rule on salary was not strictly observed, the working shift 
system of the self-defence corps was also very flexible in practice. A report by the 
authorities of Haicheng County indicates the flexibility of the shift system of the self-
defence corps:  
 
In principle, villagers work as standing members of the self-defence corps in shifts. 
When there are many villagers whose age is suitable [for the service in the corps], 
their working days should be shortened. In actuality, however, various kinds of 
inconvenience would be caused if training is not properly carried out. It would 
[also] be very inconvenient for corps members to work in shift within a short time. 
Furthermore, because it would also be a lot of pain for farmers to work frequently 
for the purpose of training in busy farming seasons, the corps members must tend 
to be specified. So, though there are not many such cases at the moment, there are 
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still cases in which farmers pay a certain amount of compensation to certain people 
to work for them [in the corps].
48
 
 
The Scope of the Baojia  
As a rule, the baojia system was to be applied to the entire territory of Manchukuo. The 
only exception was Xing’an Province in Inner Mongolia, the region where the majority 
of the Mongolian population of Manchuria was concentrated. Initially, Xing’an 
Province consisted of three sub-provinces  East Xing’an, North Xing’an and South 
Xing’an. On 10 May 1933, the Manchukuo government established another province 
known as West Xing’an. On 1 December 1934, as part of a more general provincial 
reform, the four sub-provinces of Xing’an Provinces raised to independent provinces.49 
When the baojia system was introduced into the local administration of Manchukuo in 
  33, the Kwantung Army found the security conditions of Xing’an Province to  e 
quite manageable, and they pursued a policy that placed the Mongols in a special 
category distinct from their Chinese and Korean counterparts.
50
 The Japanese 
authorities adopted a distinct policy for the administration of the Mongols primarily 
because the Mongols showed little resistance to the Japanese rule. The population of 
Mongols in Xing’an Province was one million, accounting for only 3 percent of the total 
population of Manchukuo. More important, due to the Japanese benevolent attitude 
towards Mongol inhabitants of Manchukuo in the early 1930s by granting them some 
autonomy
51
 and the antagonistic attitude of Mongols towards Chinese rule, the 
Mongolian resistance against the Japanese rule was much milder than that of the 
Chinese and Koreans. A few years later, the baojia system was partially implemented in 
Xing’an Province. A baojia law was promulgated in South Xing’an in   36 and took 
effect the following year. In addition, Kailu and  inxi Counties of  est Xing’an 
introduced the baojia system in 1937. In the same year, the previous two counties along 
with Tongliao County of South Xing’an were assigned by the Manchukuo government 
to be the key counties for the enforcement of the baojia system.
52
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In practice, the baojia was applicable fully to Chinese, conditionally to Koreans 
and not at all to Japanese.
53
 There was an exception to this arrangement in practice. In 
the areas of the Japanese consular jurisdiction in Jiandao, both Japanese and Koreans 
were subject to the control of the baojia system. Koreans in this area accounted for 60 
percent of the entire Korean population of Manchuria by the end of June 1934. In the 
Hunchun area, for example, initially the Japanese policy was to subject Koreans to and 
exclude Japanese from the application of the baojia. However, modifications were later 
made to include Japanese in the baojia system because the Japanese authorities were 
concerned that the practice of excluding Japanese from the baojia system might involve 
public criticism. According to a report of the Japanese consul-general in Jiandao in May 
1935, the baojia system was merely formally organised and no activities took place in 
the Japanese residential communities.
54
  
The implementation of the baojia system in practice was consistent with the 
Japanese security policy in Manchukuo to subject Chinese and Koreans to and exclude 
Japanese from the rule of the baojia in practice. Several factors account for this practice. 
First, the adoption of the baojia system primarily served the purpose of eliminating the 
anti-Japanese elements. It was reasonable to subject Chinese and Koreans to such 
system because they constituted a threat to the Japanese rule. There was no reason to 
include the Japanese nationals in the system whom were considered to be of no threat to 
public security. Second, Japanese nationals still enjoyed extraterritorial rights in 
Manchukuo when the baojia was put in place. The rights of the Japanese nationals 
guaranteed their special legal status in Manchukuo. Third, the views of Japanese 
administrators in Manchukuo might also have played a part in the decision of excluding 
the Japanese nationals from the baojia. Some Japanese administrators believed that the 
enforcement of collective responsibility in the baojia system was a pre-modern and 
uncivilised practice and that the high level of civilisation of the Japanese nationals 
should not be subject to punishment as severe as collective responsibility.
55
 This 
argument mirrored the Japanese logic of governing Manchukuo on the basis of racial 
and cultural hierarchy in which the Japanese were placed in a superior, civilised and 
modern position, while the non-Japanese were treated as inferior, barbarian and 
primitive subjects.
56
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The inclusion of Japanese and Koreans in the baojia system in practice was at 
odds with their legal status as Japanese nationals residing in Manchukuo. Although 
there was no provision in the baojia code as to who should be subject to the rule of the 
baojia, it would be reasonable to assume that only the Manchukuo nationals were the 
subject to whom this law was applicable because the baojia system was enforced in the 
state of Manchukuo. However, no nationality law had been ever enacted in Manchukuo 
that could grant Manchukuo citizenship to the Japanese and Koreans living there. As a 
result of the absence of a nationality law, the Japanese and Koreans in Manchukuo still 
remained Japanese nationals. In addition, the Japanese nationals were recognised to 
have extraterritorial status in Manchuria and to be accountable only to the law of Japan 
by an agreement signed between Japan and the Republic of China in 1915. The legal 
status of Japanese was also given to Koreans living in Manchuria on the grounds that 
they were Japanese nationals. The extraterritorial status of the Japanese nationals 
remained in effect after the establishment of Manchukuo. From a legal perspective, 
under no conditions should the Japanese nationals have been subject to the baojia 
because the baojia was applicable only to the Manchukuo nationals. Therefore, there 
was no legal basis on which to subject the Japanese and Koreans, Koreans in particular, 
to the application of the baojia. 
57
  
However, it may not be sufficient to suggest that the inclusion of Koreans in the 
baojia system was completely at odds with their status as Japanese nationals. This is 
because the nationality of Koreans in Manchukuo was unsettled when the baojia system 
was in place. First, some Koreans in Manchuria held dual citizenship. The Japanese 
Nationality Law, which was passed in 1899, did not acknowledge dual citizenship. On 
the one hand, once a Japanese national acquired foreign citizenship, he or she would 
automatically lose his or her Japanese nationality. However, the Japanese Nationality 
Law was never introduced in practice in colonial Korea. The non-recognition of dual 
citizenship, which was applicable to Japanese, was thus not applicable to Koreans. A 
Korean who had registered in the household registry in colonial Korea would be treated 
as a Japanese colonial subject and could not renounce or lose his or her Japanese 
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nationality. In this sense, those Koreans who immigrated to Manchuria were considered 
as Japanese nationals by the Japanese law. The practice of making the Japanese 
Nationality Law inapplicable to Koreans, and particularly of prohibiting Koreans from 
renouncing their Japanese nationality, was for the convenience of exercising full control 
over the Korean population. On the other hand, it was stipulated in the provisions of the 
Nationality Law of the Republic of China in 1929 that foreign nationals were allowed to 
be naturalised into Chinese citizenship without renouncing their original nationality. 
This provision acknowledged the possibility for Koreans in Manchuria who already had 
obtained Japanese nationality to acquire Chinese nationality. As a result, many Koreans 
in Manchuria became holders of Chinese and Japanese nationalities. Second, many 
Koreans in Manchuria had no nationality. They had resided in Manchuria for decades 
without leaving any legal record in the household registry of either Manchuria or 
colonial Korea. The cost of returning to Korea to enter the registry prevented many 
Koreans living in Manchuria from going back, making it difficult for them to acquire 
Japanese nationality. The increasing ethnic and political tensions of the 1920s made it 
difficult for these Koreans to enter the Chinese registry in Manchuria either. Further, the 
subsequent creation of the Manchukuo state turned unregistered Koreans into illegal 
stateless aliens. While estimates vary, the number of unregistered Koreans in Manchuria 
was approximately 500,000 to 700,000 in the early 1930s.
58
 
 
Conclusion  
The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo in the early period of Manchukuo was 
characterised by the utilisation of the baojia system. The baojia was a community-based 
system of social control that ena led the government’s a ility to extend control  elow 
the lowest level of the centralised bureaucracy into the heart of local communities. In 
other words, the baojia served the government’s purposes in a range of situations in 
which formal mechanisms of the state for control were inadequate. The structure of the 
baojia of Manchukuo was modelled on the structure of the earlier Chinese baojia 
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systems. In the context of Manchukuo, the baojia system was primarily organised as an 
auxiliary police organisation to maintain order in villages. The baojia was neither aimed 
at legal and institutional construction of the state, nor was it intended to be instituted as 
a permanent control system. Its application was of a temporary nature and served the 
purpose of security and defence. Meanwhile, it would be reasonable to view the baojia 
codes issued by the Manchukuo government as ordinances, rather than a set of 
established laws playing significant roles in the legal apparatus of the state.  
Collective responsibility placed a strong emphasis on the punitive dimensions of 
criminal justice to ensure the prevailing social order on a basis of deterrence. It imposed 
joint liability on household members in local communities for criminal offenses. The 
practice of collective responsibility did not seem to have represented much official 
effort of integrating the baojia into the modern legal system of Manchukuo. The 
utilisation of collective responsibility in the practice of rural control shows that although 
Japan was the model for building the legal apparatus in Manchukuo, the legal practice 
as in the case of collective responsibility still embodied certain characteristic features of 
the Chinese legal tradition.  
It is likely that the baojia system brought little change in the class structure of 
villages. To a certain extent, the baojia may have consolidated the class division in 
villages. The Japanese authorities did not attempt to change the original structure of 
village leadership and they hoped to utilise the village heads as collaborators or agents 
to exert great influence on local affairs and the peasants. In doing so, the Japanese 
authorities normally appointed the rural gentry or clan leaders to take the top positions 
in the baojia system. In some cases, the village leaders chaired multiple positions in 
village administration and defence. As a result, the local elites in villages remained the 
ruling class of villages after the enforcement of the baojia.  
It is difficult to evaluate precisely the effectiveness and utility of the baojia 
system in the Japanese rule over villages. It may be safe, however, to suggest that the 
presence of this system of police control in the countryside must have had some 
deterrent effect and worked to discourage the anti-Japanese insurgencies. The effect of 
the baojia can be observed primarily from the organisation of the self-defence corps. 
The operation of the self-defence corps might have subjected peasants to a 
disadvantaged socioeconomic position. Members of self-defence corps were mostly 
peasants aged from eighteen to forty years who served as the major labour force in 
farming. Peasants were in general uninterested in assisting the state to achieve the goals 
of eliminating insurgents, so it would be reasonable to assume that they did not feel 
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obliged to serve the self-defence corps. In addition, most positions in the corps were 
salaried, which placed a financial burden on the budget of the baojia system. Because 
the main source of income of the baojia system was tax, the tax burden would in turn 
have been imposed on peasants and have subjected them to difficult financial situations. 
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Chapter Four: The Local Self-Government in Towns and Villages 
 
Following the improvement of security conditions in 1936, the central direction of 
Japanese policy shifted from public security to the integration of local administration 
into the state administrative apparatus for efficient control. The Japanese authorities 
sought to reshape local administration. Their efforts were first made in the abrogation of 
extraterritoriality and administrative reform. Following the administrative reform, they 
sought to formalise local administration. The Japanese authorities integrated the baojia 
system into a new local administrative apparatus called the jiecun system. The transition 
between these two systems was a landmark in the evolution in the Japanese policy on 
local government. The jiecun system was idealised in official rhetoric as the harbinger 
of self-government administration. Although the Japanese authorities were publicly 
committed to the idea of self-government for Manchukuo, in practice they ceded 
relatively little power to local administrative authorities.  
This chapter examines the origins of local self-government in Manchuria and 
Japan, the abrogation of extraterritoriality and administrative reform in Manchukuo as 
the background against which the jiecun system was instituted, along with the 
administrative functions and the finance conditions of the jiecun system. This chapter 
argues that although the initiative of local self-government attempted by the Japanese 
authorities embodied a certain degree of local administrative independence, the 
government at central level still retained organised control over local bureaucracy and 
finance. 
 
The Origin of Local Self-Government in Manchuria  
The jiecun system, or the system of towns and villages, was a local administration 
system formally established by the Manchukuo government in December 1937. Jie 
refers to towns and cun refers to villages. In this system, a town consisted of over 
20,000 households and a village consisted of approximately 1,000 households.
1
 The size 
of a town was approximately the size of a bao and the size of a village was 
approximately the size of a jia in the previous baojia system. The jiecun system was 
fully implemented in southern Manchuria. In northern Manchuria, the jiecun system 
was only partially implemented and the baojia system remained in operation until the 
late 1930s. The administrative structure including personnel and territory of jurisdiction 
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in towns and villages remained similar to that of the baojia system, so the jiecun system 
could be perceived as a form of continuation of the baojia system.   
The jiecun system was not a new attempt at local self-government in Manchuria. 
Its structural origins may be traced to the qucun system implemented in Fengtian 
Province from 1925 to 1928.
2
 The qucun system consisted of qu and cun, both of which 
were local administrative units. Qu means ward and cun means village. The qucun 
system was part of the administrative reform promoted by Wang Yongjiang, who served 
as the acting civil governor of Fengtian Province on behalf of Zhang Zuolin.
3
 His 
initiative of local self-government materialised the Charter for the Separate 
Implementation of Ward and Village Agreement (yiding qucunzhi danxing zhangcheng) 
and the Provisional Law for Prefecture and Ward System in Fengtian Province 
(Fengtian sheng gexian quzhi shixing guize), promulgated by the Fengtian provincial 
government in August and October 1922 respectively. These regulations laid out the 
structure of local administration in which the territory of Fengtian Province was divided 
into administrative units of wards and villages. Each ward was placed under the 
jurisdiction of a county government and each village under the jurisdiction of a ward in 
the hierarchy of local administration. A head was assigned to the ward by the county 
governor as his direct agent for local administration. A head and a deputy head were 
assigned to the village. The ward head was charged with general administrative 
responsibilities within his territory of jurisdiction. His major role was to supervise the 
village head in such affairs as household registration, bandit elimination and public 
service for the local community. The village head was charged with assisting the ward 
head for a wide range of responsibilities including the maintenance of public order and 
the management of local finance.
4
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The structure of organisation and authority of the qucun system shows a certain 
degree of independence in local government. This form of independence was a relative 
one, compared with the previous conditions of local administration. Before the 
introduction of the qucun system, the local rural elites exercised domination through 
individual and corporate control of social resources. In contrast to the elite control over 
local communities as a private form of authority, the authority structure of the qucun 
system exhibited a strong public and official character. The qucun system established an 
official apparatus of government equipped by administrative offices and staffed by 
regular employees. The qucun law specified provisions about the appointment and 
dismissal of administrative personnel. Its finance was also organised in a way that a 
regular source of income was secured and the areas of expenditure were specified. In 
addition, its functions including the construction of local medical and educational 
facilities were not assigned by higher authorities, but organised on local initiatives.
5
  
 
The Local Self-Government in Japan  
The jiecun system was also patterned after the system of local self-government in Japan 
with historical variation and local adaptation. In Japan, the local administration system 
was termed “local self-government” (      j    ). The Japanese local self-government 
system was not aimed at much decentralisation of authority from the central 
government to the local level, and it reserved to the various central authorities a 
considerable measure of administrative control over local affairs. Local self-government 
in Japan was recognised by law as both an administrative organisation and a public 
legal body at local level.  
In the tradition of Japan, rural communities comprised various social entities of 
different size and scale such as tonarigumi, buraku, mura, koaza and  aza. A hamlet 
(buraku) normally consisted of several neighbourhood groups (tonarigumi), and a 
village (mura) included several hamlets.
6
 Although it is difficult to assign a priority to 
any of the above unit or level as being basic to rural social organisation, it may be 
reasonable to use buraku as the model for ease of analysis. Buraku consisted of a 
number of scattered settlements, and each cluster of houses was surrounded by fields. 
Buraku was a community with marked solidarity where every member household joined 
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in cooperative endeavour in the maintenance of the irrigation system, roads, paths and 
ditches, and where every wedding and funeral was attended by a representative of every 
household. Buraku voted as a unit in local elections, each casting its ballots for 
candidates previously agreed upon as the one most likely to represent the interests of 
buraku politics. A form of self-government was developed in buraku  y the residents’ 
efforts of maintaining internal harmony and public interests.
7
  
The early Meiji government enforced laws concerning the amalgamation of 
villages in an attempt to improve the administrative efficiency in rural communities. As 
a result, larger political and administrative units were created through village 
amalgamation in rural communities.
8
 Following the amalgamation of villages, the Meiji 
government instituted the system of towns and villages known as the      n system 9 in 
local administration by promulgating and enforcing laws concerning local self-
government in 1888 and 1889. The law underwent a minor revision in 1911 and a major 
one in 1926. The        system was created specifically for extending state control into 
local administration. Towns and villages had councils and chief executive officers. The 
chief executives of towns and villages were elected by the assembly, but their 
appointment had to be ratified by higher authorities. The head of a town and village was 
honorary. The village assembly was directly elected by a restricted electorate, which 
was divided into two classes according to their taxpaying ability.
10
  
 
Institutionalising the Jiecun System  
A basic factor that contributed to the establishment of the jiecun system was the 
inefficient operation of the baojia system. The Japanese authorities found that the 
baojia system was institutionally unable to adapt to the needs of local administration. 
According to Takayama Kazumi, the head of the judicial department of the Police 
Bureau, the baojia was flawed in its structure, and its operation in practice reflected the 
disjuncture between theory and reality.   
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…in fact, if we look at the expansion and establishment of the baojia system in this 
place [Binjiang Province], it did not work well. Its reasons, as I said earlier, are as 
follows: although the law was made in the second year of Datong [1933], since at 
that time, the spirit of law was not fully understood and it was urgent to make only 
the shape on the basis of law rather than out of the [needs] of reality, therefore, if 
we take a look at local [conditions] of bao and jia, we can see that they are tied to 
the fixed rules that ten households formed a pai and ten units of pai formed a jia. In 
fact, when bao, jia and pai were designated, perhaps I should say the society that 
developed naturally, the traditional society did not fit well for the life of the society 
[that has existed] in the mind of the people. In addition, it [the traditional society] 
has broken down. Now, the system of baojia, the institution of collective 
responsibility as well as the institution of self-defence corps, had no power to 
achieve the mission of the Baojia Code.
11
  
   
Takayama implied that the administration of the baojia system had to be 
reorganised to accommodate the social change of Manchukuo. In order to make 
the system work, he suggested that the administrative structure of the baojia had 
to be reorganised:  
 
So, first we started to correct this actual situation. That is to say, at first we had a 
clear picture of the traditional society existing in the mind of people as a society, in 
other words, the conditions of neighborhood. We organised six, ten or twenty 
households into a pai, and amalgamated pai where there was collective 
consciousness [among inhabitants] together into a jia. After that, in future we will 
make [pai] become a unit of village, in other words a unit of administration, and 
make pai in which various activities could be organised to develop into a bao.
12
  
  
The Japanese authorities considered local administration to be directly tied to the 
development of the solidarity and association among local inhabitants. They showed 
interest in replacing the baojia with the jiecun as the form of local administration. This 
direction of the Japanese policy was evident in a guideline issued by the MCA in May 
1936. According to this guideline, the aim of governing local communities lay in the 
consolidation of the spiritual association of people in local communities and that the 
jiecun system could serve as the means of achieving this goal:  
 
The foundation of the baojia system lies in the spirit of neighbourhood fraternity. 
Its purpose lies in security and self-government. It is connected with the real life of 
people. Efforts shall be made to organise and consolidate such connection. In other 
words, the objective is to integrate it [the jiecun system] into the baojia system in 
places where the jiecun self-government organisation, or the basic institution of 
general administration, exists. In places where it [the jiecun system] has not been 
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established yet, [we shall] provide guidance as we did for its original predecessor 
[the baojia system].
13 
 
The Japanese authorities intended to pursue in Manchukuo a gradualist approach 
to local self-government. They planned the integration of the jiecun into baojia to be an 
incremental process, rather than a radical transformation. Initially they implemented the 
system in southern Manchuria and subsequently expanded the system to northern 
Manchuria. The incremental approach to the implementation of the jiecun system is 
evident in the writing of Murata Fukujirō, the chief officer of local affairs in the MCA. 
Murata was an influential figure in the preparation of laws on the local self-government 
of Manchukuo. Before he was assigned to work on the project of local self-government 
of Manchukuo, Murata served as an officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(naimus  ) in the Japanese government responsible for drafting laws on local self-
government in Japan.
14
  
 
The territory of our Manchukuo is wide. Ethnic issues and other situations vary. 
Therefore, institutions should comply with the local situation and must have 
flexibility. In order to avoid a nationwide unified institution, the government has 
been making a careful study of this matter pertaining to the establishment of this 
institution [the jiecun system]. After 1937, the system was incrementally 
implemented in regions with good social order and high level of civilisation. The 
current baojia system shall be its replacement in regions where the jiecun system is 
not implemented.
15
 
  
The Manchukuo government experimentally introduced the jiecun system into the 
local administration of Fengtian Province as early as 1935. In February 1935, the Civil 
Affairs Department (         ) of Fengtian Province organised a committee to 
investigate the local administration in Manchukuo. The department also sent a group of 
officers on investigation tours to Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In Japan, they visited Kyoto, 
Osaka, Nara, Aichi, Niigata and other prefectures to study the Japanese        system. 
They visited local villages and attended briefings about the construction and 
implementation of the        system. Fengtian Province enforced a provisional form of 
the jiecun system in twenty-four counties within the province in 1935.
16
  
In 1936, more provinces such as Jiandao, Jinzhou, Andong and Rehe followed 
Fengtian Province in implementing the jiecun system. The Manchukuo government 
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officially instituted the jiecun system in the local administration in December 1937 by 
promulgating a series of laws including the Fundamental Guidelines for the 
Establishment of the Jiecun System (jiecun zhidu queli jiben yaogang), the Rules for the 
Enforcement of the Jie System and Cun System (jiezhi cunzhi shixing guize) and the 
Self-defence Law of Jie and Cun (jiecun ziweifa). In 1939, the Guidelines for Nurturing 
Jie and Cun (jiecun yucheng yaogang) was promulgated providing that towns and 
villages would be the basic units for industrial development, education, health care and 
sanitation at the local level of administration. In the meantime, the guideline also 
provided that towns and villages as local administrative units collaborate with other 
local organisations for the purpose of smooth administration.
17
  
 
The Abrogation of Extraterritoriality and Administrative Reform  
The timing of the establishment of the jiecun system was directly relevant to the 
Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality and the administrative reform of the 
Manchukuo government in 1937. Japan established extraterritoriality in Manchuria as 
early as 1905 following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. They did so primarily on 
the grounds of the vast differences between the Japanese and Chinese standards of 
justice and punishment. The extraterritorial system proved to be of value to Japan 
because it not only provided legal form of protection for Japanese nationals against the 
laws and punishments enforced in Manchuria under the late Qing, but also worked as a 
vehicle for the expansion of their strategic interests in the region through the stationing 
of the army, the establishment of police and the exercising of consular jurisdiction. 
Under this system, the Japanese authorities gradually developed commercial enterprises 
and secured political control. After the creation of Manchukuo, however, this system 
restrained the efficiency of the Japanese administration because it allowed various 
actors including the SMRC, the MFA and the Kwantung Army to exercise power within 
their sphere of influence.  
The Kwantung Army adopted the policy of the abrogation of extraterritoriality 
principally because of the following factors: first, by 1936 Japan had already established 
firm control over the state affairs of Manchukuo, so extraterritoriality was of no actual 
effect in practice. Second, extraterritoriality as a form of protecting Japanese special 
rights in Manchukuo would only serve to invoke public criticism and Chinese 
nationalism. Third, the abrogation would increasingly exclude the influence of Western 
imperialistic powers that exercised extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. After the 
                                                          
17
 Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, Ma           :  a     , 188-9.  
98 
creation of Manchukuo, a total of fourteen Western powers including Britain, the 
United States, Switzerland, Spain and so forth retained extraterritorial rights in the new 
state. The extraterritoriality exercised by the Western powers constituted a threat to the 
Japanese interests in Manchukuo. The Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality would 
serve as a gesture of Japanese respect for the territorial sovereignty of Manchukuo to 
induce the Western powers to abolish their extraterritorial rights in the state. And fourth, 
the abrogation of territoriality would consolidate the Japanese rights in the SMRC zone 
by transferring the administration of this area directly to the Manchukuo and Japanese 
police. Before the abrogation of territoriality, the Japanese consular police administered 
the SMRC zone, but this police force was institutionally too weak to administer the 
entire area. Involving the Manchukuo police in the administration of the SMRC zone 
would greatly expand the Japanese capacity in protecting Japanese rights in the area.
18
  
The abrogation was carried out in two phases. The first phase took place in 1936 
after Ueda Kenkichi, the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army, and Zhang 
Yanqing, Foreign Minister of the Manchukuo government, signed an agreement on the 
tax system and industry of Manchukuo on 10 June 1936. The agreement primarily 
served the purpose of increasing tax collection for government revenue. The agreement 
also made Manchukuo’s industrial and taxation laws applica le to the Japanese su jects 
in areas outside the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The second phase primarily served 
to abolish the Japanese judicial rights and symbolised the final abrogation of Japanese 
extraterritoriality in Manchukuo. On 9 November 1937, Ueda and Zhang signed another 
agreement to abolish Japanese judicial rights. In addition, this agreement also abolished 
the Japanese extraterritorial rights in areas of police, finance, tax, post, and 
communications.
19
 Terms and clauses of this agreement were also applied to the SMRC 
zone.  
The initiative of abrogation of extraterritoriality represented the increasingly 
direct administration of Manchukuo by Japan and the legal enshrinement of the special 
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rights that Japanese interests had already enjoyed in Manchukuo.
20
 As a formal 
recognition of Manchukuo’s claim to territorial jurisdiction, the Japanese abrogation of 
extraterritoriality was fundamental to shaping a unified administrative apparatus in the 
political structure of Manchukuo. The Japanese officials who worked for the 
administration of the SMRC zone entered the Manchukuo government. In consequence, 
the number of Japanese officials increased rapidly, and Japanese officials replaced 
Chinese officials to occupy all the important positions in judicial and police 
departments. For example, 5,000 police officers were absorbed into the police system 
and 3,500 of them were Japanese. Other government organs such as tax, post and local 
administration departments also absorbed a substantial number of Japanese officials.
21
 
The abrogation of extraterritoriality also consolidated the Japanese economic interests. 
It reduced the administrative expenses of the SMRC. Before the enforcement of the 
abrogation, the SMRC was burdened with huge expenses on the security, education and 
infrastructure construction of the SMRC zone. Alongside the transferal of the 
administration of the SMRC zone to the Manchukuo government, the SMRC was 
discharged from the financial burden in the construction of the SMRC zone.  
In effect, the abrogation of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchukuo paved the 
way for the reform of the administrative organisations of the Manchukuo government in 
1937. The correlation between the abrogation of extraterritoriality and administrative 
reform was emphasised by Hoshino Naoki, the director-general of the GAB. Hoshino 
believed in the correlation between the abrogation of extraterritoriality and the 
administrative reform of the central and local governments of Manchukuo. His views 
are expressed as follows:  
 
As mentioned previously, in response to the reorganisation of central organisations, 
it is only natural that the reorganisation of local administrative organisations would 
be necessary. The traditional local administrative organisations are generally 
delayed in their development and remarkably over-standardised. It is for this reason 
that I felt that I was unable to expect a complete transformation of administration. 
According to the reform this time, I believe that a complete reorganisation and 
consolidation of the organisations that respond to local conditions and maintain 
close relations with the central government could be realised. With regards to 
details, however, it [the reform] is also directly relevant to the issue of the 
abrogation of extraterritoriality and the transfer of the administration of railway 
zones.
22
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It may be claimed that the series of administrative reforms carried out in 1937 
were the extension of Japan’s a rogation of extraterritoriality  ecause it furthered the 
Japanese attempt at reorganising the administrative structure at central and local levels 
of government. The reform was officially implemented on 1 July 1937, preceded by the 
promulgation of a guideline on 8 May 1937. The reform was intended to achieve the 
political and economic integration of the state. Its objective was articulated in the 
official rhetoric as “to improve the administrative efficiency of government, to 
coordinate relations between military and police, to consolidate institutional support for 
the economic control polices, to strengthen the government control over villages, to 
consolidate the relations between central and local governments and to develop local 
self-government.”23 The reform was initially implemented at the level of the central 
government. It focused primarily on centralising the administration in the State Council. 
The reform kept the GAB intact, leaving it as the central organ of state administration. 
The reform diminished the system of checks and balances of government by abolishing 
the Inspectorate Yuan and the parliamentary function of the Cabinet; it strengthened the 
role of the GAB by setting up three bureaus in charge of foreign, internal and 
Mongolian affairs; it streamlined the administration of the State Council by reducing its 
original number of departments from nine to six; and it unified the functions of the 
military and police in defence and security by integrating the Ministry of Military 
Affairs and the Police Bureau within the MCA into one single department known as the 
Ministry of Public Order.
24
 In addition to the reform at the central level, the reform also 
expanded to the local level at the same time. The local reform of administration was 
termed the construction of local self-government. According to the reform guideline, the 
construction of local self-government had economic and political dimensions. 
Economically, the government would establish cooperatives as a means of consolidating 
the economic status of villages in the state economy. Politically, the government would 
institutionalise the jiecun system as a form of local administration.
25
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The Administrative Organisation of Towns and Villages  
The administrative structure of the jiecun system included heads, assistant heads and 
accountants, secretarial clerks and technical assistants. The most important task of local 
government was the collection of taxes and fees. This task was conducted by local 
heads. They would collect taxes and fees imposed by the higher authorities and also 
make advance payments personally when the collected sum did not reach the required 
sum set by the central government. Local heads were also in charge of local 
construction projects and self-defence. The local bureaucracy was established by 
appointment, rather than by popular election. The appointment of chief executives of 
towns and villages was arbitrarily made at the will of the authorities in the central 
government. In effect, the appointment of chief executives followed the pattern as 
follows: the county governor would first organise a selection committee comprising 
three to five members; and then these members would recommend three candidates 
from among local inhabitants. The eligibility of candidates was limited to males over 
twenty-five years of age and who had held residence for at least two years within the 
territory of the town or village. The real decision of who was to be the executive officer 
was reserved to the county governor.
26
  
The central government interfered in the administration of towns and villages in 
the form of “supervision”. The supervising authority for towns and villages was county 
governor in the first instance and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo in the second 
instance. Towns and villages had authority over their inhabitants only as the agents for 
the central government. A national law or ordinance was the only instrument through 
which respective functions to towns and villages could be assigned. The aim of 
arranging supervisory authority for towns and villages was to permit interference by the 
higher levels of government in the administration of lower levels.  
The administration of towns and villages adopted the principle of greater jiecun 
(dajiecun zhuyi). Greater jiecun was the administrative practice of village amalgamation. 
The amalgamation resulted in the administrative, rather than physical, integration of 
several villages into one village. In most cases, the public offices previously scattered in 
several villages would be concentrated into one village along with the administrative 
personnel. The implementation of the principle of greater jiecun greatly reduced the 
number of villages in rural Manchukuo. In Fengtian Province, for example, the number 
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of villages was 3,236 in 1935. The number decreased to 1,356 in 1936 and to 939 in 
February 1938. Despite the fact that the actual number of villages varied in different 
provinces, the number of villages as administrative units decreased to one fourth of the 
total number of the original villages.
27
 In Beizhen County of Fengtian Province alone, 
there were 108 villages when Manchukuo was founded in 1932. The number decreased 
dramatically to 32 in 1938. After 1940, the Japanese authorities continued to merge 
villages and the number decreased to only 20. In 1945, these twenty villages were 
further amalgamated into twelve.
28
  
There is no direct evidence showing how and why the principle of greater jiecun 
was adopted by the Japanese authorities. The general assumption is that the principle of 
greater jiecun derived from the concern that small units of village could not adequately 
perform their tasks with limited resources of money and personnel; that the maintenance 
of a separate administrative apparatus for a small number of people seemed a wasteful 
endeavour; and that amalgamation would increase administrative efficiency and reduce 
the cost of management. Since village amalgamation was a common practice adopted 
by the government of Meiji Japan, the Japanese example could then shed some light on 
the case of Manchukuo. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Meiji 
government enforced the compulsory forced amalgamation of villages in rural Japan. 
The purpose was exactly to enhance administrative efficiency. Village amalgamation 
created a functional division between old villages and new villages as a result of the 
amalgamation. Old villages remained units of natural rural settlement, and new villages 
began to concentrate on exercising local administrative functions. As Steiner writes, the 
mass amalgamations split the governmental and the social functions into the new and 
old villages respectively. The new village was an artificial unit created for the 
decentralisation of power of the new Meiji government; the old village was both a unit 
of self-government and an “association for cooperative living.”29 It may therefore be 
suggested that the village amalgamation in Manchukuo was also attempted to achieve 
the purpose of reducing administrative cost and of enhancing administrative efficiency.  
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The Characteristic Features of Towns and Villages  
In the jiecun system, the concept of the honorary post (meiyoshoku) was important in 
the rights and obligations of inhabitants and the administration of towns and villages. 
An honorary post was a legal duty and service performed by local inhabitants on an 
unsalaried basis. It was widely applied in the local administration in Japan.
30
 The origin 
of the honorary post may be traced to the Japanese concept of local self-government:  
 
According to the idea of local decentralisation of authority, administrative affairs 
are assigned to the local level and people share [the responsibility of] public affairs. 
To make self-government a reality, professional or full-time positions should be 
assigned. Apart from the obligations of their positions, it is generally required that 
the local people perform their duty on an unsalaried basis and that performing such 
duty is the obligation of local people. It is a duty for people to perform, one that is 
similar to the conscription in which young men should serve.
31
   
 
As we can see from the above quote, public service in local administration is tied 
to the rights and obligations of local people. Because rights were granted to people, and 
obligations were assumed by them, an analysis of the law’s provisions relating to the 
people at the local administrative level may be useful. In the Japanese ch son system, 
there was a clear distinction between inhabitant (j    ) and citizen (     ). Inhabitant 
was defined as an individual who lived within the territory of town and village 
regardless of their sex, age, race, nationality or living conditions. They were entitled to a 
common use of the public establishments and property, and were subject to the duty of 
sharing the common burdens according to the law. Citizenship was limited to 
independent males of over twenty-five years of age who had lived in the town or village 
for more than two years. Citizens were entitled to the privilege of voting in the local 
elections, but inhabitants were denied this privilege. Only citizens could perform the 
honorary post. Sanctions would be incurred if citizens resigned from honorary posts 
without proper reasons. Sanctions normally involved a suspension of citizenship and an 
increase of tax payment.
32
 It was precisely because citizens were granted rights in the 
first place that they had the franchise, obligation and duty to serve the state without 
receiving payment.  
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In contrast to the application of these concepts in practice in the        system, 
no clear specification was made in the jiecun system about the rights and obligations of 
people, nor was there any distinction made between inhabitants and citizens. There is no 
direct evidence of why Japanese authorities made this decision, but it is likely that there 
was no legal basis on which people at local government level could exercise their rights 
and obligations and that their relations with the state were blurred and ambiguous. 
Given the absence of a legal basis for the rights and obligations of people, public 
service positions in towns and villages were usually not honorary posts, but salaried 
positions. Heads, assistant heads and administrative employees in town and villages 
were all salaried positions. The county governor decided their level of salary. In some 
cases, the local government took the initiative to increase the salary of local officers. 
For example, when the jiecun system was established in the towns and villages of 
Tieling County in 1937, the local government increased the salary of local officers as an 
incentive for the local officers to improve their administrative performance.
33
 
Considering that there had not been much price inflation in the local economy and that 
there was shortage in the local finances in Manchukuo by 1937, the salary increase of 
local bureaucrats should be perceived as a form of incentive rather than as an 
administrative response to the general local conditions of economy and finance.  
Towns and villages exercised two types of functions: internal affairs (  y  j   ) 
and delegated affairs (inin jimu). Internal affairs were functions that the local entities 
were empowered to deal with on their own initiatives. These functions were largely 
concerned with managing local property and police affairs, maintaining the household 
registry, and building schools and medical facilities. Internal affairs were functions 
within which local authorities were their own masters in deciding local issues locally. 
Delegated affairs were functions assigned by the central or provincial governments to 
towns and villages or to town and village heads.
34
 The delegated assignments created 
links between towns and villages and the departments of central government concerned 
with the assigned functions, so the higher authorities could ensure control over local 
administration. The most important category of delegated affairs was collecting taxes 
and fees. The central and provincial governments determined all types and rates of taxes 
and fees. Town and village administrators were simply delegated with limited authority 
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to collect them. In spite of the division of functions in legal terms, internal affairs and 
delegated affairs were not clearly separated in practice. The scope of activities delegated 
by the state often expanded into many areas that were considered as local internal 
functions.  
The assignment of functions may be seen as serving economical and practical 
ends. Because many functions such as building roads and bridges often exceeded the 
responsibilities of army and police, it would be practical to assign these responsibilities 
to the local administrators. It was also a matter of administrative efficiency that local 
issues could usually be better understood and resolved at the local level. Therefore, the 
assignment of functions was actually largely based on the assumption of what services 
were in the local interests and what services were in the state interests, rather than as a 
mark of respect for local rights.  
An important feature of local self-government in towns and villages was the 
organisation of local councils. These councils had a formal existence based on a vague 
notion that a legislature of this kind might contribute to a smooth operation of local 
administration. In other words, the councils served primarily the purpose of ensuring 
greater participation of people and more effective implementation of rural programs. 
However, the Japanese authorities had no intention of making town and village councils 
into legislative organs with full-fledged functions of enacting laws, determining local 
budgets and expenditure, deciding on the creation and management of local properties 
and electing local leadership. Rather, their attitude towards the councils was ambiguous 
and their effort in establishing councils only served a temporary purpose.  
Local councils were established at town and village levels selectively in different 
periods and forms. First, the councils organised in the towns with relatively high level 
of social and economic development were called shigikai. The members of these 
councils were elected by local inhabitants, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister 
of Manchukuo. Membership was honorary, and the duration of service was two years. 
The number of members ranged from five to ten. Councils convened a general meeting 
monthly or bimonthly. The meeting discussed local matters of finance, construction and 
security. Financial matters appeared to have been the main part of the agenda of local 
councils. Specifically, these matters included making budgets, raising local loans, 
drafting labour, and collecting fees and charges.
35
 It is noteworthy that even though the 
fiscal matters were the main agenda of the general meetings, they were confined to 
discussing the way by which the money could be efficiently collected and submitted to 
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the treasury of higher authorities. The councils did not have much authority beyond 
collecting fees and charges.  
At the end of 1940, the Japanese authorities abolished the town councils and 
integrated their functions into the executive committee (j    a ) of the local branches 
of the Concordia Association. The purpose was to reduce the cost of local 
administration and enhance the administrative efficiency. The CA was a mass political 
organisation established shortly after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932.
36
 When the 
local councils of towns and villages were dissolved in 1940, the CA had already 
established a complex network of human and material resources in towns and villages. 
The association absorbed a large local population into its organisation and its 
membership increased rapidly. J mukai within the organisational structure of the CA 
were not only a local administrative apparatus, but also a platform for communication 
between the government and local people. Each j mukai had a committee constituted by 
members of a range of social backgrounds. Local elites, members of the local branches 
of the CA and farmers associations were all on board. Thus, j mukai represented the 
interests of a wider public.  
Second, the councils set up in towns with low levels of socioeconomic 
development and in villages were called ky gikai. When local self-government was 
instituted in the local administration in 1937, the Japanese authorities did not show 
much interest in establishing councils in these places. As mentioned previously, they 
only established councils, or shigikai, in a limited number of towns. Not until 1939 were 
ky gikai conditionally established and they were usually replaced by j mukai in places 
where the branches of the CA were established.
37
 The ky gikai was organisationally and 
functionally similar to shigikai, but its location was restricted to villages and 
economically underdeveloped towns.  
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Finance as the Economic Function of Towns and Villages  
The conditions of local finance show the extent to which local finances were 
independent from central control. The dependency of local finances on the control of the 
central government can be examined from investigating the following questions: what 
were the sources of local revenue? How much local revenue was raised locally and how 
much was received from the central government? How free were local governments to 
determine how revenue was expended? How much of local revenue was used on local 
projects and how much was used for the central government?  
I will begin with a consideration of local revenue. The revenue of towns and 
villages was categorised as regular revenue and irregular revenue. A considerable share 
came from regular revenue, while irregular revenue accounted for only a very small 
portion of the total. According to the law, the primary source of local revenue was to be 
the income produced by collaborative labour by local residents, the income produced by 
personal properties, service charges and so forth. Only in the case of shortage was 
income to be derived from taxation.
38
 In reality, tax was the most important source of 
the central government’s revenue. If the decentralisation scheme of delegating power 
from central government to local government had included decisions on tax matters, the 
arrangement would have seriously limited the central government’s capacity in fiscal 
matters. In consequence, the Japanese authorities had no intent to delegate to local 
governments their authority to determine the types and rates of tax. Governments below 
province level were given the authority only to collect tax. Local governments set up 
offices in towns and villages and employed regular staff to take charge of tax collection. 
As mentioned in Chapter three, the tax system of Manchukuo consisted of village tax, 
county tax, state tax and surcharges to these taxes. Rural population were required to 
pay not only county tax and state tax, but also village tax. Village tax was levied on land, 
houses, household and so forth. Land tax occupied the largest portion in village tax. The 
other sources of village tax were rents for the use of properties, service charges, 
negligence fees, loans and allocated charges for establishments benefiting only a part of 
the locality.
39
  
State tax, county tax and village local tax were set at different rates. The rate of 
village tax was the highest, followed by that of county tax and state tax. A comparison 
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of county tax and village tax with land tax that is a common category of state tax shows 
this difference. In Fengtian Province, land tax varied from 0.1 yuan to 1.4 yuan per 
xiang. County tax varied from 0.67 yuan to 1.46 yuan per xiang. Village tax varied from 
4.05 to 7 yuan per xiang. In general, the rate of county tax was 40 percent higher than 
land tax, and rate of village tax was four times of that of land tax. In Jilin Province, land 
tax was 0.615 yuan per xiang and county tax was 1.21 yuan per xiang. The rate of 
county tax was twice of that of land tax. In Heilongjiang Province, land tax varied from 
0.0014 yuan to 0.357 yuan per xiang. County tax was 0.84 yuan per xiang. The rate of 
county tax was twice of that of land tax.
40
 A comparison of town tax and village tax in 
several provinces shows that the government levied more taxes in villages than in towns. 
In Jinzhou Province, town tax was only 2.43 yuan per xiang, but village tax was 6.49 
yuan per xiang. In Andong Province, town tax was only 0.66 yuan, but village tax 
amounted to 9.80 yuan per xiang. In Jiandao Province, town tax was 1.24 yuan per 
xiang, but village tax was 1.93 yuan per xiang.
41
 In the case of land tax, rates were set 
according to the natural conditions of land and subdivided into complex categories. The 
rates were not fixed and varied from province to province. In general, the rates ranged 
from 0.1 yuan per xiang to 2 yuan per xiang. The most complex subdivision of tax rates 
was in Fengtian, where land tax was segmented into nine categories. Following 
Fengtian was Heilongjiang where there were three categories of land tax.
42
  
The Manchukuo government greatly increased the amount of tax and non-tax 
sources of revenue between 1937 and 1942. As shown in Table 4.1, between 1937 and 
1942, the revenue increased threefold from 34 million yuan to 115 million yuan. The 
revenue that was raised from taxation between 1937 and 1942 accounted for roughly 
77.2 percent in the total revenue of local governments. The increase of local revenue 
may not be surprising because it was natural for the central government to place 
emphasis on taxing land for the purpose of increasing local revenue in a society like 
Manchukuo where agricultural farming played a significant role in the economy. What 
might be more interesting is that the increased revenue would have permitted greater 
government activities and greater government influence on the local economy. Table 
4.2 also shows that between 1937 and 1942, there was a decrease of the proportion of 
tax and an increase of the proportion of other sources in the total local revenue. The 
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revenue raised from tax decreased from 88.48 percent to 72.02 percent; while the 
revenue from other sources increased from 11.52 percent to 27.98 percent. This trend 
indicates that the local government was becoming less dependent on taxation as a 
source of local revenue.  
Taxes were levied on an unfair and arbitrary basis. This point is well illustrated 
in the case of land tax. Land tax was levied in the form of flat tax rather than 
progressive tax.
43
 This means that the land tax was levied at a fixed rate, regardless of 
the income of taxpayers. It puts the heaviest burden on the poor because they pay just as 
much as the rich. In consequence, taxpayers of all social classes including landlords, 
rich, middle and poor peasants paid the same fraction of their income in taxes. The 
unfair practice of tax payment is evident in Table 4.2 that shows the conditions of land 
tax payment by different classes in villages. Poor peasants owned 11.92 percent of land 
but paid 12.4 percent of the total tax take. Extremely poor peasants owned 5.46 percent 
of land but paid 8.1 percent of the tax take. In addition, the payment of village tax 
within different peasant classes was also an unfair practice. Poor and extremely poor 
peasants tended to pay more than did rich and middle peasants. As shown in Table 4.3, 
in contrast to the 53.2 percent by rich peasants and 57.2 percent by middle peasants, 
poor peasants paid 60.8 percent and extremely poor peasants paid 68.3 percent of 
village tax. Because village tax was levied at a much higher rate than rates of county 
and national tax, it is assumed that the amount paid by poor and extremely poor 
peasants was significantly higher than the amount paid by rich and middle peasants.  
 
Table 4.1. Revenue of Towns and Villages   (unit: 1000 yuan) 
 
Year Tax Percentage Non-Tax Percentage Total 
1937 30,402 88.48 3,957 11.52 34,359 
1938 32,484 78.99 8,638 21.01 41,122 
1939 46,872 75.16 15,489 24.84 62,361 
1940 58,548 75.94 18,550 24.06 77,098 
1941 69,394 72.31 26,574 27.69 95,968 
1942 82,883 72.02 32,204 27.98 115,087 
 
Source: Xiang Chen, “‘Manshūkoku’ no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai,” PhD diss., Niigata University, 
2011, 58. 
 
A comparison of the local revenue and price index shows that the increase in the 
revenue of towns and villages over the period of 1937 and 1941 was slightly sharper 
than the increase of the cost of living and prices of goods. As shown in Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.4, while the revenue of local government increased 3.35 times from 1937 to 
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1941, the price of public goods only increased roughly twofold in the same period. The 
index of wholesale price increased from 118 to 234; the index of retail price increased 
from 100 to 226; and the index of cost of living increased from 107 to 250. The faster 
increase of local revenue compared to market prices indicates that either the local 
governments might have received more authority from the central government in 
dealing with local financial affairs or the local administrative apparatus was becoming 
more functionally organised and efficient.  
 
Table 4.2. Comparison between Land Acreage and Tax Amount 
 
Class Category 
Land Acreage 
(mu) 
Percentage of 
Total Acreage 
Tax Amount 
(yuan) 
Percentage 
of Total Tax 
Paid 
Large Landlord 432 2.49 141 1.3 
Middle Landlord 489 2.83 126 1.2 
Small Landlord 96 0.55 24 0.2 
Rich Peasant 6,647 38.36 4,150 38.5 
Middle Peasant 5,438 31.40 3,358 31.2 
Poor Peasant 2,064 11.92 1,333 12.4 
Extremely Poor peasant 947 5.46 879 8.1 
Hired Peasant 1 0.02 13 0.1 
Others 1,202 6.94 757 7 
Total 17,321 100 10,795 100 
 
Source  Takeo Sekiguchi, “Manshūkoku chihō zaisei no seikaku,” Mantetsu c   a g pp , vol. 19, no. 2, 
1939, 30. 
Note: 1). One mu is an equivalent of 666.7 square meters; 2) the table only reflects the conditions of the 
main landholding classes in villages, and other classes such as labourers and non-employed are excluded.  
 
Table 4.3.   The Proportion of Tax Payment by Peasants 
 
Tax Type 
Rich 
Peasant 
Middle 
Peasant 
Poor 
Peasant 
Extremely Poor 
Peasant 
Hired Peasant 
National Tax 19.3% 15.2% 13.8% 10.4% 4.8% 
County Tax 27.5% 27.6% 25.4% 21.3% 43.9% 
Village Tax 53.2% 57.2% 60.8% 68.3% 51.3% 
 
Source  Sekiguchi, “Manshūkoku chihō zaisei no seikaku,” 3 .  
 
Table 4.4. The Market Price Index of Xinjing between 1937 and 1941 
 
 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
Wholesale 118 141 171 213 234 
Retail 100 112 145 207 226 
Cost of living 107 124 158 215 250 
 
Source  Yūzo Yamamoto, “Dai tōa kyōeiken” keizaishi kenkyū, Nagoya  Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 
2011, 64. 
Note: the price index was based on the investigation of the market price in Xinjing by the MCB. 
    
Tax was a heavy burden to village residents. According to a Japanese 
investigation about 569 households of ten villages in ten counties in southern 
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Manchuria, the annual income of each household was an average of 180.53 yuan and 
the tax that each household was required to pay amounted to 18.97 yuan. This data 
suggests that tax accounted for approximately 10 percent of the annual income of 
residents.
44
 Another Japanese investigation conducted in 1934 and 1935 covered the 
entire area of Manchuria. This investigation shows that the total annual income of each 
household in the villages of Manchuria ranged from 150 to 200 yuan. Village tax 
accounted for less than 5 percent of their annual income.
45
  
Provincial and county governments were normally given subsidies by the 
national treasury, but the subsidies given to towns and villages from the national 
treasury were very limited. The local revenue of towns and villages was largely raised 
locally and thus was independent from the central or provincial government. In 1938, 
the financial aid given to towns and villages by provincial government accounted for 
only 2 percent of the local revenue. The aid slightly increased to 3 percent in 1940.
46
 In 
comparison with the revenue raised from taxation, the income from the government aid 
was very insignificant.  
 
 Table 4.5. The Total Annual Expenses of Towns and Villages   (unit: yuan)  
 
 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 
Public 
Administration 
10,066,673 12,310,971 19,296,704 26,298,691 38,183,724 50,015,805 
29.3% 29.94% 30.94% 34.11% 39.79% 43.46% 
Self-Defence 
7,685,167 4,850,395 4,736,446 4,377,200 4,414,428 4,066,747 
22.37% 11.80% 7.60% 5.68% 4.60% 3.53% 
Education 
7,711,710 9,962,441 14,703,085 11,905,626 17,966,433 18,865,346 
22.44% 24.23% 23.58% 15.44% 18.72% 16.39% 
Public Works 
997,368 1,236,277 4,154,860 3,531,099 4,307,790 3,455,175 
2.90% 3.01% 6.66% 4.58% 4.49% 3.00% 
Building and 
Repairing 
1,358,590 2,478,329 3,052,724 9,975,744 6,766,217 6,926,653 
3.95% 6.03% 4.90% 12.94% 7.05% 6.02% 
Industrial 
Development 
626,884 912,426 1,528,077 1,878,170 2,012,240 2,088,092 
1.82% 2.22% 2.45% 2.44% 2.10% 1.81% 
Sanitation 
340,091 575,452 1,137,027 1,832,814 2,402,202 2,710,609 
0.99% 1.40% 1.82% 2.37% 2.50% 2.36% 
Public Loan 
-- 68,647 211,617 78,747 77,598 69,875 
0 0.20% 0.51% 0.13% 0.10% 0.07% 
Other 
5,573,247 8,726,956 13,540,861 17,228,218 19,837,332 26,887,976 
16.22% 21.22% 21.71% 22.35% 0.07% 23.36% 
Total 
34,359,730 41,121,894 62,361,401 77,106,309 95,967,964 114,586,278 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Source: Chen, “‘Manshūkoku’ no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai,” 55.  
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The main areas of local expenditure were public administration, self-defence, 
and education. The revenue also went into the areas of maintaining and developing local 
infrastructure facilities, public health and so forth.
47
 Table 4.5 shows the major areas of 
local expenditure: administration, defence and education. There was a sharp increase in 
the expenditure of local administration and a sharp decrease in the expenditure on local 
defence. Expenses in public administration increased fivefold and their percentage of 
the total expenditure increased from 29.3 percent to 43.5 percent. There was a slight 
decrease in expenses on local defence; their percentage decreased by only 3.35 percent 
in 1942. The expenses in education increased almost threefold, but its proportion in the 
total expenditure actually decreased from 22.4 percent to 16.39 percent.  
The governments only had a small degree of freedom to determine what tasks 
they wanted to undertake and finance. We already know from the blurred division of the 
functions of local self-government that there was a high level of control from the central 
government over the areas in which the local government had financial freedom. The 
patterns of local expenditure also indicate a low level of local financial independence. 
The level of financial independence can be observed from the functions of the main 
areas of expenditure. As shown in Table 4.5, most of the areas such as administration, 
education, construction and self-defence to which local expenditure went were 
nationally assigned functions. Most of the expenses used for exercising the nationally 
assigned functions were likely to be of a mandatory nature, and there was hardly any 
function that was based on local initiatives. Once the compulsory expenses were paid, 
there would have been hardly any money left for local governments to spend on projects 
that they might have wanted to attend to on their own initiative. It is reasonable to 
assume from the conditions of local finance on the expenditure side that there was a 
strong tendency of control by the central government over local finance.  
We can see from the area of revenue and expenditure that the local finance in 
towns and villages was characterised by a high level of submission to national 
administration. On the revenue side, the government depended largely on tax as the 
most important source of revenue. The authority for setting rates and types of taxes was 
retained by the central government, and governments at town and village levels were 
denied the authority to make important decisions on local finance. On the expenditure 
side, the local finance was not devised to provide revenues for local activities, but to 
ensure that there would be sufficient funds expended in areas serving the interest of 
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state. The conditions of local finance indicated the impotence of local governments. The 
local self-government in towns and villages was entangled in a mesh of restrictive 
legislation and financial disability.  
 
Conclusion  
The jiecun system organised local administration from the county government down to 
the town and village level. Towns and villages became the basic units in the hierarchy 
of the state bureaucracy. Towns and villages took on both administrative and economic 
functions. The administrative functions included the maintenance of public services, 
such as building schools, roads and bridges, and the securing of local law and order. 
The economic functions were concerned with the management of local fiscal policies 
and taxation. Economic functions outweighed administrative functions and dominated 
the activities of these bodies in towns and villages. This imbalance was due to the 
priority of the Japanese interests in towns and villages. In fact, the Japanese authorities 
were concerned about stabilising their fiscal base from levying taxes, fees and charges.   
There was a certain degree of administrative independence of towns and villages 
from the central government in the jiecun system. The system acknowledged the status 
of towns and villages as local public groups and their self-governing jurisdiction within 
a certain area of government activity, within which they took the initiative to plan and 
execute finances and their councils and officials were to some extent responsible for the 
local interests.  
Although towns and villages had a structure of a given territory and population 
organised for local legislative or administrative purposes, their authority in important 
matters such as enacting laws and making financial plans was considerably constrained 
by the central government. The authority of the central government over the 
administration of towns and villages remained comprehensive and firm. There was 
hardly any sign of relaxation of central control over local bureaucracy and finance, 
making the bureaucratic structure of towns and villages rigid and leaving little room for 
local improvisation.  
The extent to which towns and villages in the jiecun system could be viewed as 
local self-governing entities may also be observed from the degree of interference by 
the central government in local public affairs. The activities of the towns and villages 
were limited to those that were designed to enhance the welfare of the inhabitants but 
did not require the exercise of governmental authority over them. The authority of 
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making decisions on important matters such as finance was still entrusted to the central 
government, and the authority of local government in such areas was highly limited.  
 It is thus reasonable to suggest that the jiecun system supported an authoritarian 
hierarchy of control from the state in which the socioeconomic relations of towns and 
villages were regulated in terms of duties towards the state and that their basis of local 
government was the fulfilment of the needs of the state. 
115 
Chapter Five: The Logic and Strategies of Agrarian Reorganisation 
 
The Japanese authorities relied on the agriculture of Manchukuo for the supply of food 
for local consumption and for the provision of raw materials for industrial growth. The 
Japanese authorities also relied on agrarian products for export to sustain the economic 
growth of Manchukuo. Soybeans, as the premier crop of the region, for example, 
supported the foreign trade of Manchukuo in the early 1930s and served as an important 
source of food for domestic consumption in Japan after the outbreak of the Pacific War 
in the 1940s. In the course of fourteen years of Japanese domination of Manchukuo, the 
Japanese authorities extended their control over agricultural production and circulation 
through a network of policies, capital penetration and administrative intervention.   
Agrarian control was highly relevant to the state coercion exercised by the 
Japanese authorities to manage the economy of Manchukuo. Since the early 1930s, the 
Japanese authorities had pursued a policy of organising the Manchurian and Japanese 
economy into a single bloc. This policy promoted the practices of constructing 
Manchukuo into a base of food supply for Japan through control over agrarian 
production and circulation.
1
 
This chapter examines Manchukuo’s agrarian structure and the Japanese 
strategies of agrarian control that encompassed the reorganisation of grain warehouses, 
the creation of cooperatives, the establishment of control organisations and the 
enforcement of crop delivery. This chapter argues that although these strategies were 
not intended to change the basic structure of agrarian relations in rural Manchukuo, they 
enhanced the Japanese capacity to extend control to the agrarian production, circulation 
and rural life in Manchuria. 
 
The Conditions of Agriculture in Manchuria  
The structure of agrarian production in Manchuria was characterised by the cultivation 
of cash crops for export and subsistence crops for local consumption. The most 
important cash crops were soybean and wheat, and the most important subsistence crops 
were sorghum, millet and maize.
2
 Soybean trade occupied a central place in the agrarian 
economy of Manchuria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Throughout 
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this period, soybeans occupied 70 to 80 percent of Manchuria’s exports. In   30, 
Manchuria accounted for 60 percent of global production and a corresponding share of 
world trade in soybeans.
3
 The market for Manchuria’s soy ean export extended from 
Japan and China to Europe. Prior to 1905, soybeans produced in Manchuria were 
exported to only Japan and China. After the end of the First World War in 1918, the 
soybean export extended to the European market. As shown in Table 5.1, soybean 
accounted for 28.3 percent of the region’s entire crop output in 1932. The growing of 
soybean extended throughout Manchuria. Production was slightly greater in southern 
Manchuria than in northern Manchuria. Second to soybeans was wheat. In 1932, the 
acreage of wheat was relatively small, amounting to 7.4 percent of the total acreage 
under cultivation. Wheat growing was concentrated in northern Manchuria, where 90 
percent of the total wheat output of Manchuria was produced.
4
 Sorghum, millet and 
maize were cultivated primarily for the purpose of local consumption. Maize was 
chiefly used as a staple food. Sorghum and millet could be used not only as staple food, 
but also as raw materials for industrial production.   
After 1931, the drop of prices and the restriction of foreign market, Japan and 
Germany in particular, as a result of the Great Depression greatly hit the agrarian 
economy of Manchuria and produced serious distress in rural areas. Many farmers fled 
the countryside and abandonded their land. The depressed agriculture robbed farmers of 
incentives to produce for market and encouraged them to produce for self-
consumption.
5
 Change also occurred in the structure of crop cultivation in Manchuria. 
Between 1931 and 1936, there was a decrease in the output of soybean and wheat for 
export. In contrast, the output of sorghum, millet and maize for local consumption 
slightly increased. Figures in Table 5.1 show that between 1931 and 1936, the output of 
soybean and wheat dropped from 36.6 percent to 30.3 percent and the output of 
sorghum, millet and maize increased from 49.6 percent to 56.4 percent. It was not until 
1936 that the total agricultural output showed a considerable recovery, but the output 
was still below that of 1931.  
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Table 5.1. The Volume and Percentage of Total Agricultural Output (unit for output: thousand tons) 
 
 Soybean 
Other 
Beans 
Sorghum Millet Maize Wheat 
Paddy 
Rice 
Upland 
Rice 
Other 
Grains 
Total 
1929 
4,855 377 4,678 3,350 1,612 1,302 137 156 1,823 18,289 
26.5% 2.1% 25.6% 18.3% 8.8% 7.1% 0.7 0.9 10.0 100% 
1930 
5,360 370 4,771 3,299 1,589 1,384 154 158 1,780 18,865 
28.4% 2.0% 25.3% 17.5% 8.4% 7.3% 0.8% 0.8% 9.4% 100% 
1931 
5,227 313 4,497 2,960 1,706 1,530 159 163 1,853 18,458 
28.3% 1.7% 24.4% 16.0% 9.2% 8.3% 0.9% 0.9% 10.0% 100% 
1932 
4,268 278 3,729 2,615 1,542 1,133 110 137 1,550 15,363 
27.8% 1.8% 24.3% 17% 10.0% 7.4% 0.7% 0.9% 10.1% 100% 
1933 
4,601 304 4,022 3,184 1,759 863 166 143 1,804 16,847 
27.3% 1.8% 23.9% 18.9% 10.4% 5.1% 1.0% 0.8% 10.7% 100% 
1934 
3,398 277 3,470 2,123 1,503 643 200 126 1,046 12,935 
26.3% 2.1% 26.8% 16.4% 11.6% 5.0% 1.5% 1.0% 8.1% 100% 
1935 
3,859 327 4,103 2,968 1,903 1,015 296 147 1,106 15,962 
24.2% 2.0% 25.7% 18.6% 11.9% 6.4% 1.9% 0.9% 6.9% 100% 
1936 
4,147 341 4,241 3,187 2,072 959 442 155 1,093 16,830 
24.6% 2.0% 25.2% 18.9% 12.3% 5.7% 2.6% 0.9% 6.5% 100% 
1937 
4,352 327 4,315 3,226 2,240 1,126 549 140 1,069 17,515 
24.8% 1.9% 24.6% 18.4% 12.8% 6.4% 3.1% 0.8% 6.1% 100% 
 
Source: Yasushi Iitsuka and Hideto Kazama, “Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu,” in N                      
Ma         a : 1 -            w            , eds. Kyōji Asada and Hideo Ko ayashi, Tokyo  Jichōsha, 
1986, 435-6. 
 
Declining exports, low bean prices and curtailed agricultural production called 
for stronger government intervention in agriculture. In March 1933, the Manchukuo 
government drew up an economic construction program prioritising the expansion of 
agricultural output and the cultivation of cash crops in the state agenda.
6
 In February 
1934, the Manchukuo government started to investigate such alternative crops as wheat 
in northern Manchuria and cotton and hemp in southern Manchuria.
7
 In the meantime, 
the Manchukuo government encouraged the use of chemical fertilisers, enhanced the 
quality of seeds, improved irrigation, enriched soil, cultivated new lands, and introduced 
modern agricultural implements into farming.
8
 They also tried to stimulate export, 
facilitate market growth, and promoted agricultural commercialisation.
9
 In addition, the 
Manchukuo government began to exercise systemic control over the channels of 
agrarian distribution by reorganising grain warehouses and establishing agrarian control 
organisations in rural areas.   
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Grain Warehouses 
Grain warehouses (liangzhan) were small Chinese companies that bought grain and 
beans directly from the farmers and sold to millers, distillers, or larger wholesalers. The 
typical grain warehouse was a partnership, formed by several men who together 
contributed the capital, labour, and connections required to run the business.
10
 Grain 
warehouses emerged in the urban and rural areas of Manchuria in the late Qing period. 
The commercialisation of soybeans after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 greatly 
facilitated the growth of grain warehouses in Manchuria. Grain warehouses developed 
rapidly along the South Manchuria Railway lines in southern Manchuria and at Harbin 
in northern Manchuria. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, 95 percent of 
soy eans that reached Manchuria’s major ports passed through grain warehouses.11 At 
the end of the Qing, there were six hundred grain warehouses operating in Manchuria.
12
 
The largest grain warehouses in terms of the scale of capital and operation were known 
as official grain warehouses (guanshang liangzhan).
13
 The official grain warehouses 
were the subsidiary enterprises of the chief native banks in Manchuria that provided 
funding for their business operations.
14
 Small grain warehouses were usually privately 
owned and operated by petty merchants. By 1932, grain warehouses had directly 
controlled the purchasing and selling of agrarian products to domestic and foreign 
markets in Manchuria.  
Grain warehouses accumulated huge commercial capital through their marketing 
activities. Grain warehouses played the role of the intermediary between farmers and 
market. Petty merchants usually worked as the agents for grain warehouses. They 
bought grain and soybeans directly from farmers. Their transactions were made at prices 
set by grain warehouses. The petty merchants charged a handling fee on behalf of grain 
warehouses. The vertical arrangements between grain warehouses and petty merchants 
maintained the flow of capital into the rural areas and the removal of agricultural 
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products to the market. Grain warehouse also functioned as a venue for the stocking and 
safekeeping of grain and soybeans. A handling fee was charged for the stocking of 
agricultural products. In southern Manchuria, products were stocked in yards; while in 
northern Manchuria, the products were often stocked in an area close to the railway. The 
proximity of grain warehouses to the railway facilitated the delivery and transport of 
grain and soybeans to market. In addition, grain warehouses generated profits for 
themselves by granting credit to farmers. When farmers were in need of money for their 
own purposes, they often turned to grain warehouses to borrow money. Grain 
warehouses loaned out their capital to make profits by earning interest. The interest rate 
of loans was two or three fen per month in most cases, but it sometimes could be very 
high.
15
  
Grain warehouses established a dominant status in the trade of grain and beans 
through close ties with local business associations and government authorities 
horizontally and with petty merchants vertically. Grain warehouses established 
membership with local commercial associations and guilds. They received support from 
local authorities who designated them to act as brokers to command markets. Grain 
warehouses also controlled petty merchants by forging ties with them through debts and 
contractual obligations. Petty merchants who were short of capital often turned to grain 
warehouses for loans. Grain warehouses forwarded capital in return for securing their 
stocks in advance and tried to contract petty merchants as agents to buy grains on their 
behalf.
16
 The binding of petty merchants by grain warehouses through debts and 
contracts tied merchants and farmers to engage in commercial activities with grain 
warehouses.  
In the early period of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army attempted to consolidate 
Japanese capital in the Manchurian economy. The Japanese authorities established new 
banks by nationalising all the previous banks including their subsidiary enterprises and 
put the banking and credit system of the state under their control. These financial 
organisations included the MCB established in June 1932, the Chōsen Bank (       
     ), the Yokohama Specie Bank (s           ), the Shōryū Bank (s   y       ), 
and the Mitsui and Mitsubishi Bank (M      M               ).17 The flow of Japanese 
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capital from banks to grain warehouses increased dramatically from 63 million yuan in 
1933 to 89 million yuan in 1934 and 170 million yuan in 1935.
18
  
 
Table 5.2. The Conditions of Grain Warehouses in Southern Manchuria (unit: 1000 yuan) 
 
Year 
Number of Grain 
Warehouses 
Total Capital 
Capital per Grain 
Warehouse 
1937 919 23,529 26 
February 1943 1,382 68,280 49 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 38 and 47. 
 
 
Table 5.3. The Conditions of Grain Warehouses in Northern Manchuria (unit: 1000 yuan) 
 
Year 
Number of Grain 
Warehouses 
Total Capital 
Capital per Grain 
Warehouse 
1937 1,073 15,187 14 
February 1943 517 26,577 51 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 38 and 50. 
 
After the founding of Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities rationalised the 
operation of grain warehouses. In 1933, warehousing facilities were built specifically 
for the stocking of agricultural products. The construction of warehousing facilities was 
aimed to reduce the total volume of grain coming into grain warehouses so that the 
activities of grain warehouses in stocking agricultural products could be restrained.
19
 In 
May 1933, the Manchukuo government demobilised the official grain warehouses and 
only allowed privately owned grain warehouses to continue their commercial activities 
in the circulation sector.
20
 The attempt to retain the commercial activities of privately 
owned grain warehouses rather than eliminating them completely was made primarily 
because the Japanese considered grain warehouses as being of vital importance to 
maintain the soybean trade. In the eyes of Japanese policymakers, the soybean trade was 
closely connected to the income of farmers, and the sta ility of farmers’ income was the 
precondition for rural security. The economic control enforced by the Manchukuo 
government in 1937 expanded the capital of grain warehouses in the circulation sector. 
During this period, the commercial capital of grain warehouses grew rapidly. As shown 
in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the total capital of grain warehouses increased almost 
threefold in southern Manchuria and almost twofold in northern Manchuria from 1937 
to 1943 in spite of the changes in the number of grain warehouses. 
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In the late 1930s, grain warehouses, in particular those with meagre capital, 
engaged actively in commercial activities in the black market. The government capacity 
to extend control over the market had been greatly restrained by the commercial 
activities taking place in the black market. The rationing controls and price restriction of 
government enforced by laws and regulations in the late 1930s gave rise to the 
proliferation of the black market.
21
 Under these laws and regulations, only government 
was entitled to distribute crops to farmers in rationed amounts. The limited ration quota 
could not meet the lowest nutrition standards to maintain subsistence. For example, the 
government quota of daily commodities in Tongliao County in 1941 only reached one 
third of the volume demanded by farmers.
22
 However, the government continuously 
adjusted the rationing standards to meet the deteriorating conditions of the supply of 
daily necessities. In consequence, farmers had to buy daily commodities in the black 
market. In addition, the government set prices for almost all consumer goods to prevent 
inflation. The government prices were the lowest prices at which sellers could sell their 
products. The low and fixed price set by the government greatly discouraged farmers 
from selling their crops to the government and encouraged them to sell their crops to the 
black market.  
Village heads also played an important role in facilitating the expansion of the 
black market. Village heads held the power to receive from the government rationed 
goods and to distribute them to farmers. Because the government had little power to 
supervise the operation of village politics, village heads often turned the distributed 
materials into their own possession and sold them in the black market to make profits.
23
 
A broad array of daily commodities ranging from foodstuffs to clothing was 
available in the black market at much higher prices. In Haicheng County in 1942 for 
example, the prices of the daily commodities sold in the black market was at least twice 
the government prices. In most cases, the commodities sold in the black market were 
five times more expensive.
24
 
The commercial activities of the black market propelled the Manchukuo 
government to re-rationalise grain warehouses for agrarian control. In 1940, the 
Manchukuo government appointed grain warehouses as the government agents for the 
delivery of agricultural products. The Manchukuo government established grain 
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warehouse partnerships ( y  a      a ) to expand government control over the 
activities of grain warehouses in September 1940. The grain warehouse partnerships 
were larger organisations that merged the capital of individual grain warehouses. 
Partner grain warehouses engaged in the purchase and sale of agrarian products and 
other circulation-related activities. The pattern of grain warehouses in forming 
partnership was divided into voluntary partnership (   ’      a ) and investment 
partnership (shusshi kumiai). In the former arrangement, the partnership itself had no 
legal personality and it had limited liability for the debts of the partnership. In the latter 
arrangement, the partnership had a legal personality and member grain warehouses took 
active roles in the management of the partnership.
25
 As shown in Table 5.4, the number 
of grain warehouses formed through investment partnership increased rapidly within 
two years from March 1941 to February 1943. In March 1941, the number of grain 
warehouses formed through investment partnership was only 30, accounting for 
approximately 20 percent of the total number of grain warehouse partnerships. In 
February 1943, the number rose to 70, accounting for approximately 45 percent of the 
total number of grains warehouses formed through partnership. In May 1944, the 
number of grain warehouses in investment partnerships further increased to 117, 
accounting for 87.3 percent.
26
    
 
Table 5.4. The Conditions of Grain Warehouse Partnerships in 1941 and 1943 
 
Year 
Investment Partnership Voluntary Partnership Total 
Number of 
Partnership 
Number of 
Member 
Grain 
Warehouses 
Number of 
Partnership 
Number of 
Member 
Grain 
Warehouses 
Number of 
Partnership 
Number of 
Member 
Grain 
Warehouses 
March 1941 30 962 123 3,757 153 4,719 
February 1943 70 1,161 84 1,116 154 2,277 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 208 and 214-5. 
 
Table 5.5. The Capital Scale and Structure of Grain Warehouses between 1940 and 1942  
(unit: yuan and percent) 
 
Year -10,000 -30,000 -50,000 -80,000 -100,000 100,000- 
1940 --- 1,262 6,667 --- --- 23,714 
1941 4,720 2,085 997 30 363 58,386 
1942 7,272 1,713 1,450 9,308 3,333 50,000 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 202. 
Note: The data applies to the conditions of grain warehouses in twenty-one counties in Manchuria.  
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In addition, the Manchukuo government also selectively provided credit to grain 
warehouses after 1940. This credit concentrated primarily on small and large grain 
warehouses in terms of commercial capital holdings. As shown in Table 5.5, the credit 
issued by the government to the large grain warehouses with capital of more than 
100,000 yuan increased twofold from 1940 to 1941; the same can also be said of grain 
warehouses with capital of less than 30,000 yuan. The government took this initiative 
because the grain warehouses of small and large sizes had fast return rates and 
investment would be worthwhile.  
 
The Financial Cooperative Association  
In order to lift agriculture out of the depths of the Great Depression, the government 
programs of Manchukuo evolved over several years into a complex policy regime of 
farming support and government credit. Beginning in 1933, the MCB enforced a 
program of short-term relief credit known as spring ploughing credit (chungeng 
daikuan) to farmers. The credit was a low-interest, at 0.8 percent a year. In 1933, the 
credit was granted to farmers in Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces. In 1934, 
farmers of Rehe Province were also included in the program as the recipients of the 
credit. The credit amounted to a total of 28 million yuan in 1933 and 1934. However, 
the credit was unable to have a decisive impact on the agricultural recovery and the 
majority of it was unreturned.
27
  
The agricultural recovery of Manchuria demanded long-term investment in 
agriculture. The scale of credit services provided by the MCB was incapable of 
supplying the volume of funds for the agricultural recovery of the agricultural 
depression. The Manchukuo government found it urgent to establish financial 
organisations to invest in agricultural development. In September 1934, the Manchukuo 
government established the Financial Cooperative Association (   y   a  a    a, FCA). 
The cooperatives were placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance 
(keizaibu), and followed the principle that one cooperative was to be established in 
every single county of the state. As shown in Table 5.6, from 1934 to 1939, the number 
of FCA grew rapidly from 48 to 145; the number of its employees increased from 
15,000 to 874,000; and the number of households joining the FCA increased from 2,590 
to 5,949.   
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Table 5.6. The Growth of the FCA between 1934 and 1939 
 
Year 
December 
1934 
December 
1935 
December 
1936 
December 
1937 
December 
1938 
December 
1939 
Number of 
FCA 
48 82 103 107 126 145 
Number of 
Employees 
15,000 87,000 150,000 300,000 514,000 874,000 
Number of 
Households 
2,590 3,737 4,457 4,949 5,623 5,949 
 
Source: Yoshimasa Shi ata, “‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai: gassakusha wo chūshin ni,” 
            y    pp , no. 408, 1981, 30.  
 
The central figure in the management structure of the FCA was the director (riji). 
The director retained the authority of making the most important decisions regarding the 
operation of the FCA. Each FCA had an elected president (  a   ) and a vice president 
who supervised the daily administration of the cooperative. Each cooperative also had 
an inspector (kanji) and five trustees ( y     ) who sat on the board of administration. 
The position of director was always reserved for Japanese officials. Chinese officials 
could only take up the positions of president, inspectors and trustees. The Chinese in the 
management level of the FCA were usually landlords and rich peasants.
28
 
As the largest provider of financial services for farmers, the FCA was primarily 
involved in the distribution of loans to farmers. Most of the loans were secured and 
issued on a short-term basis. Land, livestock and farming implements were usually 
secured as the collateral for short-term loans.
29
 The loans were granted in the form of 
both cash and kind. In addition to cash, the FCA also provided seeds, fertiliser, and 
farming implements as the form of loans.
30
  
Initially, the cooperatives favoured a policy that enabled easier access to loans 
for landlords and rich peasants. Almost all the loans were secured with tangible assets 
and the process of evaluation was strict. As a result of such restrictive terms and 
conditions, middle and poor peasants could hardly receive any loans from the FCA. In 
1936, the FCA relaxed the terms and conditions of loan application and set a special 
loan program intended for middle and poor peasants. The following year, the FCA 
began to issue special loans to peasants. To receive the loan, it was mandatory that 
peasants have no collateral for security and that they organise themselves into a group 
of five to apply. The limit of the loan was fifty yuan per person and its interest rate was 
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identical to the interest rate of a short-term loan.
31
 This program encouraged peasants to 
use loan services provided by the FCA. From June 1937 to June 1939, the proportion of 
secured loans in the total loans of the FCA significantly decreased from 76 percent to 51 
percent. At the end of July 1939, the special loan accounted for 26 percent of the total 
loans provided by the cooperatives.
32
  
The funding source of the FCA and government supervision constrained the 
activities of the cooperatives. First, among the bodies that funded the cooperatives in the 
form of deposits, government and banks contributed the greatest shares of funds. The 
deposits from FCA members accounted for only an insignificant proportion of the 
working capital of the FCA. As shown in Table 5.7, the deposits by members between 
1934 and 1939 had always been below 10 percent, while the deposits by non-members 
accounted for more than 90 percent. Second, the Ministry of Finance supervised the 
management of the cooperatives. Provincial and county governments were not 
independent in making important decisions regarding the operation of the cooperatives. 
The government gave the Minister for Finance responsibility for supervising the 
operation of cooperatives. The Minister retained the authority of approving the 
appointment and dismissal of directors. The Ministry of Finance retained the highest 
authority in deciding on the structure, operation and internal policies of the cooperatives.  
 
Table 5.7. The Volume and Percentage of Deposits of the FCA (unit: million yuan) 
 
Year 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Member 0.0 0% 0.1 9% 0.2 3% 0.4 4% 1.3 7% 3.8 10% 
Non-
member 
0.5 100% 2.0 91% 5.6 97% 10.7 96% 18.5 93% 36.0 90% 
Total 0.5 2.1 5.8 11.1 19.8 39.8 
 
Source  Shi ata, “‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai,” 30. 
Note: the original table only includes the columns of “mem er” and “total”. The data of the “non-mem er” 
column is calculated on the basis of the data of “member” and “total”.  
 
 
The Agricultural Cooperative Association 
After 1937, the Manchukuo government implemented a comprehensive agricultural 
policy that regulated not only rural finance, but also farming technology, purchase and 
sale of agrarian products. As a step to rationalise the circulation sector and increase 
agrarian output, the Manchukuo government organised the Agricultural Cooperative 
Association (  j   a  a    a, ACA) and placed it under the supervision of the Ministry 
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of Industry ( a  y   ) in July 1937.33 The organisation of the ACA was a vertical 
administrative hierarchy. On the top of its administrative structure was the Ministry of 
Finance. ACA were organised at the county level. At the level of towns and villages, 
executive cooperatives (j      a  a   ha) and offices (banshichu) were set up.34 There 
were 75 cooperatives established in 1937, 29 in 1938 and 30 in 1939. The total number 
of ACA amounted to 153, among which 19 of them were financially independent from 
government subsidies.
35
 By the end of 1939, the government had established 366 offices 
and 7,765 executive cooperatives across Manchuria.
36
 The ACA were concentrated 
mainly in the provinces of Jinzhou, Fengtian and Jilin that enjoyed higher levels of 
economic development. In 1940, the number of ACA set up in these three provinces 
accounted for 43.2 percent of the total number of ACA in Manchuria. In contrast to 
these economically developed provinces, the number of ACA set up in provinces such 
as Heihe where social instability persisted was much smaller.
37
 The main sources of 
funding of the ACA were subsidies offered by the MCB and the Manchuria Industrial 
Bank (Ma          y       ). Founded by the Manchukuo government in December 
1936, the Manchuria Industrial Bank engaged in commercial banking operations and 
extending long-term credit to industry.
38
  
Compared with the FCA, the ACA provided a wider range of services. The ACA 
were involved in the purchase, supply, distribution and manufacturing of agricultural 
products. In addition, the ACA also granted a limited amount of credit to farmers. The 
credit service of the ACA was very similar to the credit service of the FCA. Most of the 
loans issued by the ACA were short-term loans. They were issued to assist farmers in 
purchasing farming implements and fertilisers. The ACA also issued long-term loans 
for the maintenance of agricultural infrastructure.
39
  
One important function of the ACA was the operation of exchange markets 
(jiaoyi shichang). The ACA managed the exchange markets set up in various locations 
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of Manchuria. The number of exchange markets increased from 450 in 1938 to 762 in 
1940. Exchange markets regulated the transactions of agricultural commodities. The 
transactions taking place in the exchange markets were made in cash and at fixed prices, 
and no longer followed the informal rules between sellers and buyers that allowed room 
for the settlement of the price and of the delivery of agricultural products.
40
  
 
Table 5.8. The Sources of Funding of the ACA (unit: 1,000 yuan) 
 
Source 1937 1938 
MCB 646 13,620 
Manchuria Industrial Bank 846 4,810 
FCA --- 3,690 
Financial Associations --- 320 
Total 1,531 22,465 
 
Source  Shi ata, “‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai,” 32. 
 
The control over the transactions of agricultural products by the ACA through 
exchange markets attracted limited farmer participation. Although the ACA prohibited 
transactions of agricultural products to be made outside the exchange markets, farmers 
were reluctant to trade in exchange markets. The reasons were twofold. First, exchange 
markets charged expensive commission fees and set formal procedures for the 
transaction of agricultural products. Farmers often found the transactions at the 
exchange markets bothersome and inconvenient. Second, grain warehouses still 
remained competitive in attracting farmers to trade directly with them. This was 
especially true in remote rural areas where the reach of the cooperative activities was 
limited. These two factors contributed to the small scale of commercial activities that 
were taking place in the exchange markets. In 1938, the transactions of agricultural 
products made in exchange markets only accounted for 43.3 percent of the total 
transactions of agricultural products in Manchuria.
41
 
 
The Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association 
Conflicts of interests arose between the FCA and the ACA arising from their 
involvement in commercial activities. The Kwantung Army perceived the conflicts as 
threatening to weaken the effectiveness of state control over agricultural output and 
rural finance. As a solution, in October 1938 the Kwantung Army proposed to 
reorganise the two cooperative associations in operation in Manchuria. The proposal 
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was further revised in December 1938, when the government mobilised material 
resources to facilitate industrial growth and devoted energies to strengthening the state 
financial system. On 18 September 1939, the government promulgated a plan to merge 
the two cooperative associations. The merger took place in April 1940, resulting in the 
formation of the Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association (      a  a  sha, 
APCA).
42
  
The APCA was set up at the levels of central government, provinces, counties, 
towns and villages. The main organisational structure was the APCA established at the 
county level. Above the APCA was the Joint Associations (      a ) established at the 
provincial level. On the top was the highest decision-making organ known as the 
Central Committee (     a ), which was established in Xinjing. The APCA set up 
offices in towns and villages and the Agricultural Promotion Society (     a , APS) in 
hamlets.
43
  
The operation of APCA was still largely reliant upon financial support from 
public bodies. Loans issued by the public bodies accounted for more than 80 percent of 
the total funds used for the operation of the cooperatives. Among the public bodies, the 
MCB remained the largest contributor. The loans issued to the cooperatives by the 
MCB continued to increase during 1939 to 1941 and dropped slightly in 1942. In 
December 1939, the loans totalled 40,000 yuan. The figure increased to 70,000 in 
December 1940 and 74,000 in December 1941. In December 1942, the figure decreased 
slightly to 64,000 yuan.
44
 In contrast to the large share of public funds, funds 
contributed by APCA members accounted for less than 20 percent of the total funds.
45
  
The outreach of the cooperative network in rural areas developed rapidly. On 1 
August 1941, the total number of cooperatives reorganised at the county level amounted 
to 186, absorbing the former 125 FCA and 153 ACA. The new cooperatives extended to 
most counties of Manchuria, covering 88 percent of all the counties in Manchuria.
46
 At 
the end of December 1941, offices were established in 53 percent of towns and villages; 
APCA were set up in 35 percent of hamlets in Manchuria; and 49 percent of the rural 
population were APCA members.
47
 By the end of August 1943, the APCA had set up 
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offices in 75 percent of towns and villages; the APCA had been organised in 73 percent 
of villages and 69 percent of the rural population had joined the APCA.
48
  
The Manchukuo government expanded the influence of APCA on farmers by 
making the loans more accessible to farmers. Most of the loans issued by the APCA 
were short-term secured loans that served the financial needs of poor peasants. In order 
to borrow money from the cooperatives, peasants were required to apply collectively as 
a group through the local APS or through hamlets in which they lived. Individual 
application was not recognised. Normally the local APS or members of hamlets were 
collectively charged with the responsibility for using the loan. In areas where the 
association was not organised, peasants would also be required to apply for the loan 
collectively as a group. The APCA unified the daily rate of loans. The new rate was 
lower than the rates set by the previous FCA. In July 1940, the daily interest rate was 
2.8 qian per day. The rate increased to 3 qian in 1941, but it was still lower than 
previous rates.
49
  
The credit services of the cooperatives penetrated deeply into the rural life of 
Manchuria. The debt ratio of farming households in Manchuria in 1940 and 1941 
suggest that almost half of the farming households had received credit from the 
cooperatives. As shown in Table 5.9, an average of 50.3 percent of all the farming 
households had used the financial services of the cooperatives by the end of 1940. The 
ratio was particularly high among poor peasants with small landholdings. In total, 81.5 
percent of farmers whose landholdings were less than five hectares used the financial 
services of the cooperatives. The ratio of farmers with landholdings of less than three 
hectares was 62.8 percent. Despite the fact that a high proportion of farmers with small 
landholdings had received credit granted by the cooperatives, the credit that they had 
received was only for small sums of money. In contrast to the sums of money received 
by poor peasants, the sum of money received by landlords or rich peasants was much 
larger. A comparison of households with landholdings of more than 100 hectares and 
less than one hectare shows that the former received as much as twenty times the money 
that the latter did. As shown in Table 5.10, farming households which used the financial 
services of the cooperatives accounted for 41.80 percent. Non-farming households who 
used the financial services of the cooperatives accounted for 22.40 percent. It is 
reasonable to assume from the amounts of credit granted to these different rural classes 
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that cooperatives still favoured landlords and rich peasants. This policy of favouring 
landlords and rich peasants indicates that the conditions of poor peasants had hardly 
improved to an extent to which the Japanese could greatly relax the restriction of credit 
granting for them.  
 
Table 5.9. Debt Ratio of Farming Households at the End of 1940 (unit: hectare, yuan and percent) 
 
Farming 
Scale 
Debt 
Amount 
per 
Household 
Landlord Merchant Pawnshop Individual Cooperative Other 
Above 100 1,067 --- 6.3 --- 46.9 46.9 --- 
Under 100 633 4.6 1.3 3.3 43.8 47.0 --- 
Under 50 223 7.4 --- 0.5 43.8 48.7 --- 
Under 20 122 6.4 0.8 --- 56.2 36.6 --- 
Under 10 116 11.3 8.2 2.8 25.9 48.7 3.1 
Under 5 115 2.4 0.1 2.8 11.8 81.5 1.4 
Under 3 41 2.0 6.6 10.4 18.1 62.8 0.2 
Under 1 21 9.9 14.7 9.2 21.2 44.9 --- 
Non-
Management 
26 12.0 1.7 1.9 59.4 24.8 --- 
Total 
Average 
49 6.5 4.1 4.0 34.7 50.3 0.5 
 
Source: Shibata,     y         a    y      a          a , 133. 
Note: the data is based on seven villages in two counties in Longjiang Province, seventeen villages in one 
county in Jinzhou Province, ten villages in one county in Fengtian Province, nineteen villages in two 
counties in Jilin Province, and six villages in two counties in Binjiang Province. Non-management refers 
to wage labour and managerial landlords. 
 
 
Table 5.10. Debt Ratio of Farming Households in 1941 (unit: percent) 
 
Farming 
Category 
Cooperative Pawnshop 
Mutual 
Borrowing 
Landlord Merchant Other Total 
Farming 
Households 
41.80 1.55 43.68 5.76 5.36 1.85 100 
Non-
Farming 
Households 
22.40 1.36 57.87 5.08 10.46 2.50 100 
 
Source: Hamaguchi, N                 a    Ajia shaka, 198. 
Note: farming households refer to peasants. Non-farming households refer to wage labour, landlords, 
teachers, and miscellaneous workers. In this category, most of the non-farming households are assumed to 
be wage labour.  
 
In addition to the presence of cooperatives in the rural financial sector, the 
practice of informal credit granted by villagers still prevailed in the rural financial 
activities. The prevalence of informal credit was rooted in the socioeconomic structure 
of rural Manchuria, where landless wage labourers and poor peasants accounted for 80 
percent of the entire rural population.
50
 Landlords usually charged wage labourers and 
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poor peasants expensive rent and demanded arduous physical labour.
51
 This situation 
kept most of the farmers non-self-sufficient and compelled them to borrow funds from 
landlords, relatives, friends or usurers to survive. As shown in Table 5.9, an average of 
34.7 farmers borrowed funds from individuals at the end of 1940. Table 5.10 shows that 
in 1941, the farming households who relied on mutual borrowing for funds accounted 
for 43.68 percent. In the case of non-farming households, the ratio was 57.87 percent. 
The ratio of mutual borrowing in the cases of 1940 and 1941 was very high, indicating 
the heavy reliance of farmers on traditional practices of money borrowing to maintain 
subsistence. Given the prevalence of mutual borrowing in rural financial activities, it is 
difficult to claim that the reach of cooperatives into rural finance had been 
comprehensive. 
 
The Agrarian Control Organisations  
The government’s Five-Year Plan launched in 1937 diverted substantial sums of money 
into industrial production. Beginning in 1937, government appropriations for arms 
purchases had increased dramatically, and in order to divert resources away from 
civilian goods towards munitions production, the authorities introduced comprehensive 
economic controls over foreign exchange, bank loans, and production and pricing in 
selected industries. However, foreign trade worsened as a result of the war in China in 
1937. The shortage of foreign exchange restrained the ambitious plan for industrial 
development. This situation impelled the Japanese policymakers to use agriculture as 
the base to sustain the economic growth of the Manchukuo state.  
Beginning in 1937, the Manchukuo government implemented a series of laws to 
regulate the prices of main crops such as rice, wheat and millet. However, the prices of 
agrarian products rose remarkably and the laws failed to achieve any effect in practice. 
In order to force the prices down, the Japanese authorities established a state monopoly 
over agrarian products in Manchukuo. In late 1938, the Manchukuo government set up 
the Manchuria Flour Corporation (Ma        f         a , MFC) and the Manchuria 
Grain Corporation (Ma      y       a   a, MGC) to regulate the distribution of grain 
within Manchukuo. The first organisation was in charge of the distribution of wheat and 
wheat flour. The second organisation was in charge of a wider range of products 
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including wheat and other grains. In December 1939, the Manchuria Flour Corporation 
was incorporated into the MGC.
52
  
The government also began to exercise a monopoly on bean products. The 
outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 cut off the outlet for the export of 
Manchurian soybeans. In response to the loss of the European market, the Manchukuo 
government aimed to export soybeans to Japan. In September 1939, the government 
enforced an act on the regulation of bean products. As the executive organ for the act, 
the Manchuria Special Produce Monopoly Corporation (Ma          a      a      a, 
MSPMC) was organised two months later with a monopoly in the circulation of 
soybeans.  
 
Table 5.11. Agrarian Control Organisations in Manchukuo 
 
Organisation Establishment Time Controlled Materials Scale of Control 
MFC November 1938 Wheat and wheat flour 
Purchase of wheat, sale, 
import and 
manufacturing of sale 
MGC December 1939 Grain 
Production, distribution, 
pricing, import and 
export 
MSPMC 
1 November 1939 
(planned) 
Staple  produce 
Purchase and sale of 
soybeans, bean cakes 
and bean oil 
 
Source: Sangyōbu daijin kanbō shiryōka, Mansh koku sangy  gaikan, Place of publication unknown: 
Manshū jijō annaijo, 1939, 338; Iitsuka and Kazama, “Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu,” 4 4-9.  
Note: the source published in 1939 noted that the MSPMC was still under planning. Therefore, the 
information about this company might not be a reflection of real conditions.  
 
 
The government monopoly in the circulation sector also extended to the 
transport of controlled products and appointment of agents for the distribution of 
products. First, the SMRC controlled the railway transport of soybeans in Manchuria. 
At this time, railway transport accounted for approximately 70 to 80 percent of the total 
soybean traffic. The SMRC issued special securities (            ) for freight traffic.53 
The Manchuria Special Produce Monopoly Corporation only allowed soybeans that 
were purchased by the MSPMC to be transported by railway. The MSPMC was the sole 
buyer of the special securities issued by the SMRC. This practice prevented soybeans 
that were purchased by buyers other than the MSPMC to be transported by the railway 
and thus consolidated the monopoly of soybeans by the MSPMC. Second, the 
Manchukuo government appointed Japanese companies such as Mitsui & Co. Ltd. 
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(Mitsui bussan) and Mitsubishi Corporation (M             j ) as its agents to purchase 
beans directly from farmers.
54
 Farmers were required to sell their soybeans to the 
Japanese companies at the officially fixed prices, and then the agents sold the soybeans 
to the corporation and finally the corporation sold the soybeans to the exporters. The 
agents acted as intermediaries between farmers and the corporation. The volumes of 
transactions of agricultural products handled by the agents were significant, comprising 
97 percent of transactions in 1940.
55
  
 
Table 5.12. The Delivery Volume of Agrarian Products (unit: thousand tons) 
 
Crop 
Year 1938 Year 1939 Year 1940 
Quantity Index Quantity Index Quantity Index 
Soybean 3,253 100 1,258 39 1,471 45 
Sorghum 1,037 100 489 47 542 52 
Maize 876 100 529 60 729 83 
Millet 491 100 388 79 505 103 
Wheat 316 100 207 66 253 80 
Rice 448 100 322 72 351 80 
 
Source: Minami Manshū tetsudō ka ushikigaisha Shinkyō shisha chōsashitsu, Da z   y             
hensen, Shinkyō  Minami Manshū tetsudō ka ushikigaisha chōsashitsu, 1943, 94. 
 
The results of crop delivery in 1939 and 1940 were adverse. It appeared that 
farmers and local dealers were unwilling to market their crops through the control 
organisations. Their unwillingness was illustrated by the figures of delivery volume 
between 1938 and 1940. As shown in Table 5.12, the delivery of almost all the 
controlled crops decreased from 1938 to 1939 and 1940. The only exception was the 
delivery volume of millet that increased in 1940, but it was only a 3 percent increase in 
comparison with the volume of 1938.  
The reasons for the decrease in crop delivery lay in the low price policy set by 
the government and the structural change in crop acreage. Table 5.13 shows the 
proportion of production cost to purchase price of controlled products in 1939 and 1940 
in several regions of Manchuria. In the case of 1939, the purchase prices of most of the 
controlled crops except sorghum were set lower than the production cost. Soybean, the 
most important cash crop of Manchuria, was particularly cheap. Its purchase price only 
amounted to half of its production cost. Although the Manchukuo government increased 
the prices of controlled products in 1940, production cost still tended to exceed 
purchase price. The low price policy of the government largely discouraged farmers 
from supplying crops to the state and encouraged hoarding of crops. In the meantime, 
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many farmers chose to grow crops for self-consumption purposes, resulted in the 
reversion of production to subsistence crops. The changes in crop acreage structure, as 
shown in Table 5.14, indicates the decrease in the cash crop acreage and the expansion 
of the acreage of subsistence and other crops between 1939 and 1941. During this 
period, the acreage of soybean dropped by 6.37 percent and the acreage of wheat 
dropped by 2 percent. In contrast to the decrease of soybean and wheat, sorghum 
increased by 1.33 percent, maize 3.81 percent and millet 2.13 percent. The changes in 
the controlled crops are shown in the “others” section of Table 5.14, indicating that the 
acreage of unregulated crops increased by 2.1 percent.   
 
Table 5.13. The Proportion of Production Cost to Purchase Price of Controlled Products  
(unit: percent per 100 kilos) 
 
Area 
Soybean Sorghum Maize Wheat 
1939 1940 1939 1940 1939 1940 1939 1940 
Keshan 58.1 70.9 106.4 73.0 94.1 98.3 88.9 93.1 
Hulan 48.6 61.1 104.1 100.8 100.6 99.1 97.7 85.9 
Shuangcheng 44.4 47.8 107.4 67.5 84.6 85.3 104.2 --- 
Shenyang 79.1 79.8 137.1 138.2 --- 98.9 --- --- 
Liaoyang 62.8 79.0 --- 98.1 --- 101.2 --- --- 
Haicheng 57.9 76.7 --- 102.1 --- 101.8 --- --- 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 127. 
 
 
Table 5.14. The Percentage of Crop Acreage in Manchuria between 1939 and 1941 (unit: percent) 
 
 
Cash Crop Subsistence Crop 
Others Total 
Soybean Wheat Sorghum Maize Millet 
1939 26.01 8.76 21.91 17.92 11.44 13.96 100 
1940 22.10 6.17 23.28 20.91 12.21 15.33 100 
1941 19.64 5.76 23.24 21.73 13.57 16.06 100 
 
Source: Kazama, Ma        z                  y , 129. 
 
In view of the adverse results of crop delivery, the government reorganised its 
agricultural control policy in 1941. In August 1941, the government merged the three 
organisations into a single one corporation known as the Manchuria Agricultural 
Produce Company (Ma        a      a, MAPC). The company strengthened the 
monopoly of agricultural products by appointing nineteen companies with Japanese, 
local and foreign capital as its special agents (    ya       a    ) for the purchase of 
agricultural products.
56
 Agents began to engage directly in commercial transactions to 
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obtain agrarian products. In the meantime, the government also discontinued the direct 
transactions taking place between grain warehouse partnerships and the company.
57
 The 
circulation flow of agrarian products at this time was as follows. First, farmers sold their 
products at the exchange markets administered by the cooperatives. Then grain 
warehouses or grain warehouse partnerships bought the products from the exchange 
markets and delivered them to the agents.
58
 Then the company collected products and 
sold them to domestic and foreign markets. In this circulation flow, the company was 
the end of circulation. The Manchukuo government abolished the system of special 
agents in May 1944 to save expenses in the circulation of agricultural products.
 59
 After 
the abolition of special agents, the circulation of agricultural products became more 
simplified and grain warehouses became directly affiliated with the MAPC for the sale 
and purchase of agrarian products. 
The Manchukuo government directly managed the operation of the MAPC 
through administrative and financial measures. First, the government intervened in the 
administration of the MAPC by appointing officers to work at the MAPC. The officers 
were directly involved in the administration of the MAPC.
60
 Second, the government 
and government banks were the primary financiers of the MAPC. Initially, the 
government provided the capital of 70 million yuan to establish the MAPC.
61
 In later 
years, government banks became the primary financial contributor of the MAPC. In 
1943, the total sums of credit provided by banks amounted to 1,000 million yuan. The 
sums of credit increased to 1,600 million yuan in 1944.
62
  
 
Crop Delivery  
Farmers were required to deliver their harvests to the state. They were usually paid 
when their crops reached the designated marketing organisations. Village heads and 
farmers carried out the delivery of crops by carts. The delivery was usually conducted at 
a fixed time and through the routes specified by the government. In order to prevent the 
crop from flowing into the black market, police were sometimes involved in guarding 
the transport of the crop. Those who did not follow the designated routes would be 
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subject to a penalty. The government also set up inspection spots and sent patrol teams 
to supervise the crop delivery along the delivery route.
63
  
The delivery followed two patterns. In the first pattern, crops were transported 
by farmers directly to exchange markets, then delivered to the grain warehouses for 
manufacturing and packaging, and then delivered to the contracted dealers, before 
finally being distributed to the agricultural control organisations for sale or for export. 
In this pattern, farmers were not involved in the selection and packaging of their crop. 
In the second pattern, the government encouraged farmers to select and package crop on 
their own. The cooperatives would assign supervisors to villages to assist farmers in the 
process of primary manufacturing and packaging of crops. Afterwards, farmers would 
transport the crop directly to the exchange markets or the distribution centres of the 
cooperatives.
64
 The second pattern of delivery had two effects. First, it increased the 
income of farmers. Farmers were given the freedom to trade their products at flexible 
prices. They were relieved from selling their crop to grain warehouses at the fixed price 
set by the government, which was much lower than the cost of production. Second, it 
eliminated the influence of grain warehouses in controlling the market. As discussed 
previously in this chapter, grain warehouses had accumulated huge volumes of capital 
from extracting profits in their trading with farmers. The direct delivery from farmers to 
dealers that were designated by the government diminished the role of the native capital 
in controlling the local market.  
The Manchukuo government adopted several measures to facilitate the delivery 
of agricultural products from farmers. In October 1940, the government attempted to 
stimulate the rapid marketing of crops by paying farmers delivery bounties (shukka 
         ). The bounty was a significant amount of money that accounted for an average 
of 14.25 percent of the standard prices of crops in the government bounty scheme.
65
 The 
bounty scheme was a compromise between the need for raising crop prices and the low-
price policy of the government aimed at controlling inflation. The government declared 
time limits for crop delivery to encourage rapid marketing of crops. For sorghum, millet 
and maize, a short marketing period of 1 October to 15 November was set. The period 
of soybeans was set as a period of four months from 1 October to 31 January. In the 
cases of rice and wheat, the government set several periods and announced sliding 
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scales of bounties. The earlier and larger the delivery of rice and wheat was, the higher 
the bounty amount would be.
66
  
The Ministry of Agricultural Promotion abolished the bounty scheme on 6 April 
1941 and announced the enforcement of the advanced cash-payment (sakizeni) program 
for crop delivery. The program was officially launched two months later, and funds 
used for the program were supplied by the Ministry of Agricultural Promotion to the 
cooperatives. The program was applicable to the most important crops in Manchuria 
including soybeans, millet, sorghum and maize. In 1941, ten categories of crops were 
included in the program. In 1942, the number of categories increased to eleven.
67
 In the 
advanced cash-payment program, the government contracted farmers about the time and 
volume of the delivery of crops. In practice, village heads would first collect from 
farmers the volume of crops they would deliver to the state. After that, the village heads 
would report the delivery volume to cooperatives and cooperatives would contract the 
exchange markets about delivery volume on behalf of the village heads. Cooperatives 
would pay a certain amount of money to the village heads in advance, normally one 
yuan per hundred kilos. Then village heads would distribute the money that they had 
received from the cooperatives to farmers. Village heads were charged with collective 
responsibility for the delivery of crops.
68
 As a legal contract, the advanced cash-
payment program tied farmers and village heads to the liability of delivering the 
contracted volume of products.  
The advanced cash-payment program achieved only limited effect. In 1941, a 
total of 6,884,000 tons of crops were contracted through the program, but 5,482, 000 
tons were purchased. The purchased rate accounted for approximately 80 percent of the 
contracted volume. In 1942, the contracted volume of crops totalled 5,641,000 tons and 
the purchased volume amounted to 5,980,000 tons. The purchased rate rose to 106 
percent. However, the actual purchased crops were still 7.3 percent short of the 
government quota.
69
  
After 1942, the government began to exercise compulsory administrative orders 
to perfect controls over crop delivery. The administrative efforts transformed crop 
delivery from a voluntary practice into a compulsory practice. The government 
organised squads of officers in the provincial, county and local levels of government. 
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The officers visited villages, assigned delivery quota to farmers, and appointed the 
routes for the transport of crops. The government also imposed additional demands for 
crops on villages that had met the government quota of crop delivery. For example, the 
government imposed an additional 0.3 million tons of crops on the government of Jilin 
Province in 1943.
70
 In 1943 and 1944, the total volumes of additional crop deliveries 
amounted to 0.7 million tons.
71
 The compulsory delivery of crops increased the delivery 
volume in 1943 and 1944, and the actual delivery exceeded the quota set by the 
government. In 1943, the quota was 7.32 million tons, but the actual delivery amounted 
to 7.67 million tons. In 1944, the quota was 8 million ton, but the actual delivery was 
8.8 million tons.
72
 
Rent control was another measure adopted by the government to facilitate crop 
delivery. In Manchuria, the payments of land rent were either variable or fixed in rate 
and amount. In the former arrangement, landlords paid the entire or partial cost of 
fertilisers, livestock, farming implements and seeds and sometimes even provided 
accommodation for tenants, while tenants only served as the farming labour for the 
landlords. Landlords exercised control over the supply of labour by the tenants, 
determining what crops to cultivate and how they were cultivated. Landlords and 
tenants shared crops on a 30/70, or 40/60, or 50/50 basis. The proportion of 
sharecropping varied across regions. In northern Manchuria, the sharecropping was 
practised on a 40/60 basis; while in southern and central Manchuria, crops were shared 
on a 50/50 basis. In the latter arrangement, the payment was fixed regardless of the 
quality of land and harvest. Contract making, in either oral or written form, was the 
standard for the fixed rent arrangement. Contracts were usually made in spring for the 
rent to be paid in autumn.
73
  
Rent was generally collected in kind and only occasionally in cash. Sorghum, 
millet and maize were common types of crops used for the purpose of rent payment.
74
 
According to the data on rent relations in 1935 and 1936, the proportion of payment in 
kind was extremely high throughout Manchuria. Payments of variable and fixed rents in 
kind accounted for 83 percent in northern Manchuria, 97.6 percent in central Manchuria 
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and 61.5 percent in southern Manchuria.
75
 Tenancy arrangement in rural Manchuria 
indicates that barter rather than money remained the basic pattern of capital flow in the 
rural economic structure of Manchuria.  
Since kind had been commonly accepted as a form of rent payment in 
Manchuria, large volumes of agricultural products were used for rent payment but not 
for crop delivery. The volume used for the purpose of rent was substantially large, 
constituting 18 percent of the whole agricultural output.
76
 In addition, the agricultural 
products often flowed into the black market, an area beyond the reach of government 
control and regulation. Apparently, the volume of crops that did not go directly to the 
state was so considerable that the Japanese policymakers had to intervene.  
The Manchukuo government started to regulate rent relations in 1943. On 16 
November 1943, the government introduced a rent control program. The program 
restricted the form of rent payment between landlords and tenant farmers. Now only 
cash was allowed in rent payment; in-kind payment was prohibited.
77
 This measure was 
aimed at preventing agricultural products from passing through the hands of landlords 
to the black market.
78
 
The government’s initiative in regulating rent payment appeared to have been 
ineffective in practice. According to the data on the pattern of rent payment in 1943, 
rent payment was still made primarily in kind. Rent in kind accounted for 43.1 percent 
in the whole of Manchuria. Its regional proportion was 62.1 percent in southern 
Manchuria, 47.2 percent in central Manchuria and 23.5 percent in northern Manchuria. 
In comparison with rent payment in kind, rent in cash accounted for only 17.9 percent in 
Manchuria as a whole, with 20.5 percent in southern Manchuria, 9.8 percent in central 
Manchuria and 18.3 in northern Manchuria.
79
 It should be noted that the rate of rent in 
kind in southern Manchuria was much higher than other regions. Considering that 
southern Manchuria was the region with highest agricultural productivity, the volume of 
agricultural products used for rent payment in Manchuria might have been considerable, 
and substantial volumes of agricultural produce might not have gone directly into the 
crop delivery program of the state.    
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Conclusion  
The Japanese authorities directly intervened in agrarian production and circulation after 
the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932. The control over agrarian production and 
circulation is evident in the expansion of the reach of Japanese capital through the 
reorganisation of grain warehouses and the creation of cooperatives that provided 
financial services for farmers, the establishment of agrarian control organisations, and 
the enforcement of crop delivery first as a voluntary initiative and then as a compulsory 
practice. Specifically, the Japanese authorities extended their control over agriculture 
through the following strategies. First, the Japanese authorities diminished the status of 
grain warehouses that functioned as a guild-like organisation linking rural areas with 
urban areas in the sector of agrarian circulation. The Japanese authorities introduced 
Japanese capital into the operation of grain warehouses to reduce the strength of grain 
warehouses in accumulating capital in the 1930s and reorganised grain warehouses into 
larger associations formed in partnership to consolidate government control over the 
commercial activities of grain warehouses. Second, the Japanese authorities established 
cooperatives to strengthen government control over rural financial activity and to raise 
agricultural productivity. The initiatives of launching the cooperatives restrained the 
power of native capital and expanded the influence of Japanese capital in the rural 
economy. The cooperatives established parallel financial and marketing networks that 
would be competitive enough with grain warehouses, and linked farmers directly to the 
state. Although the financial services provided by the Japanese organisations penetrated 
deeply into the rural life, traditional financial practices still played an important part in 
the rural financial activity. Third, the Japanese authorities actively sought to maximise 
the appropriation of agricultural produce from the hands of farmers. The state not only 
needed the farmers to produce more, but it also needed to induce them to sell more of 
what they had produced. In doing so, the Japanese authorities initially set up state 
monopoly over major crops by establishing three separate companies and passing a 
number of laws. Subsequently the Japanese authorities integrated the three companies 
into a single company to unify control over agrarian procurement and distribution. The 
Manchukuo government combined the strategies of financial incentives, compulsory 
practices and rent regulation to increase crop delivery. In short, the Japanese agrarian 
control developed into a state monopoly that dictated cropping patterns, regulated crop 
prices, purchased and distributed crop supply, imposed output targets and extracted 
crops to sustain industrial growth. Agriculture became a means by which the state could 
utilise to achieve its own objective of effective rule. 
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Chapter Six: The Limit of Labour Control: Structure and Practice 
 
In the fourteen years of managing Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities established a 
coercive state apparatus that extended from social organisation and popular surveillance 
to organised control over manpower. Labour control constituted an indispensable 
component of the state coercion of Manchukuo. Labour provided manpower necessary 
for the economic development of Manchukuo. The recruitment of labour was 
accomplished by false promises and by force. After being recruited, labourers were 
regarded as manpower to be used to the limit of their endurance. Labour service, which 
was compulsory in nature in most cases, required labourers to render service to the 
Japanese army in opening up highways, digging mines and constructing public works. 
In spite of the harsh working conditions of their service, labourers were required to 
work for mere subsistence.  
The labour control system established by the Japanese authorities to recruit, 
manage and mobilise labour involved no direct state intervention in the early period of 
Manchukuo, but later evolved into a form of systematic and centralised state 
intervention. This chapter examines the structure of the labour force in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors and the labour control system in Manchukuo under Japanese rule. 
It argues that the Japanese labour control in Manchukuo evolved from a pattern of 
limited government intervention to a pattern of centralised control that involved 
coercion and compulsion.  
 
Wage Labour in Rural Manchuria  
Agricultural wage labourers were the basic component in the labour relations in rural 
Manchuria. Wage labourers remained a huge population and formed a pool of abundant 
and cheap labour in rural Manchuria. Agricultural wage labourers were divided by the 
term of employment into year, month and day labourers. Year labour constituted long-
term employment; while month and day labour were short-term employment.
1
 In the 
pattern of long-term employment, year labourers were contracted workers employed to 
work for a period of ten or eleven months. Year labourers engaged not only in 
agricultural labour but also in miscellaneous work such as the maintenance of houses 
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and farming equipment.
2
 Year labourers were normally the acquaintances of employers 
from the same villages who shared kinship ties with each other. The purpose of seeking 
la our from the resources of one’s acquaintances was to guarantee employment 
credibility and security.
3
 The contract of labour was usually renewed every year.
4
 The 
unpredictability of the conditions of agricultural work and labour force determined the 
renewal of contract on an annual basis. Poor harvest, inclement weather, as well as the 
sickness and death in the labour force all attributed to the unpredictability of labour 
relations.  
In the case of short-term employment, month labourers were usually employed 
to work during busy seasons. The term of employment was normally a period of two 
months from February to March and from September to October. The former was the 
period of fertilisation, while the latter was the period of harvest. In some cases, the term 
of employment could extend to as long as eight months.
5
 Day labourers were employed 
to work at weeding and in the harvest for a period of one to three days only. Employers 
usually sought for day labourers at special rural labour markets, usually in the local 
market towns.
6
  
Agricultural wage labourers were employed by both landlords and tenant 
farmers. Those landlords who did not engage in farming directly employed wage 
labourers to work on their land. Landlords who engaged in farming directly hired wage 
labourers on a temporary basis to supplement the labour supply in their households. 
Tenant farmers hired labourers to work along with them on the land that they leased 
from landlords.
7
  
Agricultural wage labourers received their wages in cash and kind. In general, 
cash was commonly paid to short-term labourers and kind was usually paid to long-term 
labourers.
8
 In the case of cash payment, the average wages in 1934 were eighty-one 
yuan per year for year labourers, eleven or twelve yuan per month for month labourers 
and 0.39 or 0.74 yuan per day for day labourers.
9
 In the case of kind payment, grain was 
normally used as the form of wages. The types of grains that were used for wage 
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payment varied from region to region in Manchuria. Soybean, millet, corn, wheat and 
sorghum were commonly accepted forms of wages.
10
  
The wages of year labourers paid in accordance with a labour contract were 
relatively stable. In contrast to the stability of the wages of year labourers, there was 
much unpredictability in the wages of month and day labourers. In general, the wages of 
month labourers tended to be higher during harvest seasons and lower during 
fertilisation seasons. The wages of day labourers tended to be higher during weeding 
and harvest seasons and lower during the less busy time of the year.
11
 In addition, the 
package of remuneration for wage labour included free food and accommodation for 
year and month labourers, but only occasionally for day labourers. The day labourers 
who lived in the same villages as their employers were often not offered 
accommodation.
12
  
No comparative data is available about the conditions of the prices and wages in 
rural Manchuria, though we know commodity prices inflated remarkably in the 
Manchukuo period. It is therefore difficult to give a clear assessment about the living 
standard of wage labourers and its implications for labour relations in general. It is only 
possible to examine their living conditions from a case study of the composition of daily 
consumption of wage labour in Manchuria. An investigation conducted by the State 
Council of Manchukuo about the living expenses of labourers in Dadaosanjiazi village, 
Longjiang County suggests that 61 percent of their income was used for food 
expenses.
13
 This high percentage indicates that the living standards of wage labourers 
might have been at a level so low that only a basic level of subsistence could be 
maintained.  
The labour relationship between wage labour and employers represented an 
unstable structure that was subject to change and vulnerable to influence. The formation 
of the unstable structure can be explained by the following two factors. One, wage 
labour made the individual worker an economic unit. Working for wages stimulated 
individual workers to cut their family ties and move from villages to cities. Two, the 
labour relations were established on an informal form of oral contracts and on the basis 
of economic interests. Specifically, the contracts of wage labourers were not legally 
bound to formal rules, so the relationship between wage labourers and employers was 
only loosely regulated and the supply of labour was dependent largely on the basis of 
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credit and trust. In addition, the relationship between wage labourers and their 
employers was driven primarily by economic interests, so the labour supply was not a 
form of exploitation as intense as the relationship between landlords and peasants in 
which peasants were legally bound to the land and subject to tight control by landlords. 
Although employers and labourers were acquaintances with each other in many cases, 
the kinship factor did not carry much weight in the contract. This relationship would be 
terminated automatically once their contract expired. The informality and economic 
nature of the contract led to vulnerability in their relationship.   
 
Employed Labour in the Japanese Villages in Manchuria 
In 1932, the Kwantung Army along with the Japanese Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
initiated a colonisation project to send some of the Japanese agrarian population to 
Manchuria. The Japanese farmers were sent to settle either near the border of the Soviet 
Union in northern Manchuria or near the South Manchuria Railway line. These areas 
could be used to ward off Chinese guerrillas and military forces near the border with the 
Soviet Union.
14
 When the Japanese immigrants settled in Manchuria, they acquired land 
from the Japanese authorities. The acreage of land that they acquired from the Japanese 
authorities varied from 5 to 20       with 10       being the average.15  
The Japanese Kwantung Army established several institutions to organise land 
acquisition. In the early 1930s, the East Asia Development Company was actively 
involved in land acquisition. The EADC was a subsidiary company of the SMRC 
established in Fengtian in December 1921.
16
 After 1936, the Kwantung Army shifted 
the handling of land acquisition from the EADC to other institutions and the 
Manchukuo government. In January 1936, the Manchukuo government established the 
Manchuria Colonial Development Company (Ma      a         a        a   a) to 
take over the business of land acquisition of the EADC. In September 1937, the MCDC 
was renamed the Manchuria Colonial Development Corporation (Ma      a        
    a). In January 1939, the Manchukuo government founded the General Bureau for 
Colonial Development ( a  a      y   ), an organisation reorganised on the model of 
                                                          
14
 Takemaro Mori, “Colonies and countryside in wartime Japan,” in Farmers and Village Life in 
Twentieth-Century Japan, eds. Ann Waswo and Yoshiaki Nishida, London: Routledge Curzon, 
2003, 183. 
15
 Lecai Gao, R     “Ma z   ” y     ya j  , Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2000, 325. 
16
 For a discussion of the EADC, see Yoshiki Enatsu, “Kindai tōhoku Ajia chiiki no keizai tōgō 
to Nihon no kokusaku kaisha,” T      Aj a     y , no. 8, March 2004, 1-24. 
145 
the Colonial Development Department (takuseishi) within the Manchukuo 
government.
17
  
The Japanese authorities often combined the adoption of official policy and 
intimidation or outright force against the Chinese farmers in the practice of land 
acquisition.
18
 The Japanese policy concerning the type of land to be purchased from 
Chinese farmers was unclaimed fields, which Japanese settlers could reclaim and bring 
into cultivation. In practice, though, the Japanese authorities preferred land that was 
already being cultivated to avoid additional time and effort for reclamation. The 
Japanese authorities believed in the authority of village elites in pressuring the farmers 
in agreeing to the sale of their property, so they usually contacted the village headmen 
or elders to have them persuade farmers to sell their land instead of negotiating directly 
with farmers.
19
 In actual transactions, the Japanese authorities always undervalued 
Chinese land and paid well below its market value. In most cases, the payment was very 
low, amounting to only less than one third of the market price.
20
 For example, in 1932 
and 1933 in Sanjiang, the Japanese authorities purchased uncultivated land at 2-4 yen 
per xiang and purchased cultivated land at 15 yen per xiang. However, the market price 
for uncultivated land was 5-25 yen per xiang and the price for cultivated land was 50-
100 yen per xiang in this region during this time.
21
  
The Japanese immigration brought about a structural change in the labour 
relations in rural Manchukuo. The change was characterised by the increase of 
employed labour and decrease of self-employed labour. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the shortage of labour facing the Japanese immigrants after their arrival in 
Manchuria. The shortage of labour was caused by the following factors. First, when the 
Japanese immigrants arrived in the designated locations for settlement, they were 
confronted with armed resistance organised by guerrillas, landlords and rich peasants. 
The local resistance not only compelled the Japanese immigrants to organise self-
defence, but also pushed some immigrants to withdraw from the settlement program and 
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to return to Japan.
22
 Second, the locations in which the Japanese immigrants had settled 
were usually uncultivated land in northern Manchuria that demanded large input for 
reclamation. The unfamiliarity of Japanese immigrants with the land and climate 
conditions of Manchuria discouraged them from engaging directly in farming and 
pushed them to hire local labour to work on their farms.  
The labour distribution of Japanese immigrants shows that the percentage of 
Japanese immigrants who engaged directly in farming was very small. The small 
percentage was common to the Japanese immigrants who came to Manchuria during 
different periods in the 1930s and 1940s. In the case of the first group of Japanese 
immigrants, only 30 percent of immigrants engaged in farming in 1933 and 1934. The 
actual number was even smaller because of sickness and other reasons.
23
 Among the 
second group of Japanese immigrants who arrived between June 1934 and February 
1935, those who engaged in farming accounted for 20 percent of total number of 
immigrants.
24
  
Table 6.1. The Structure of Labour Force in Mizuho Village in 1940 
 
 Number of Workers Percentage 
Self-Employed Labour 
Male 19,881 26.3% 
Female 3,645 4.9% 
Total 23,526 31.2% 
Employed Labour 
Year Labour 32,171 43.6% 
Month Labour 4,092 5.4% 
Day Labour 13,171 17.4% 
Apprentice 2,516 3.4% 
Total 51,950 68.8% 
Total 75,476 100% 
 
Source: Kobayashi, “Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai,” 45 . 
 
The rate of employed labour in the households of Japanese immigrants was 
much higher than that in the households of Chinese farmers. According to the Japanese 
investigation conducted in 1934, the general conditions of labour relations in the 
Chinese farming households in northern Manchuria was that an average of 6.7 persons 
were self-employed labour and 0.5 person was employed labour.
25
 This figure shows 
that the main source of labour for Chinese farmers was family labour. According to the 
1940 data about the general labour conditions of the Japanese immigrants in Manchuria, 
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the employed labour amounted to 0.45 year labourer, 1.10 month labourers and 29 day 
labourers in each Japanese household.
26
 Apparently, there was a stronger tendency for 
the Japanese immigrants to hire labour than for the Chinese farmers to do so. The 
concrete example of Mizuho, a Japanese immigrant village in Heilongjiang Province in 
northern Manchuria, shows that the rate of employed labour in Japanese villages was 
extremely high. As shown in Table 6.1, the conditions of the labour force in Mizuho 
Village in 1940 shows that the employed labour accounted for 68.8 percent and only 
31.2 percent of labour was self-employed labour. In the meantime, the percentage of 
long-term employed labour was higher than that of short-term labour.   
 
The Structural Change in Labour Force  
 
Table 6.2. Distribution of Labour Force by Sector in Manchuria in 1931 
 
Sector Agriculture Industry Commerce Education Military 
Public 
Service 
Total 
Percentage 72.3% 7.6% 9.1% 8.2% 1.8% 1.0% 100% 
  
Source  Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Ma        za     p , Tokyo  Kaizōsha,   33, 43 .  
Note: the data of this source was originally published in 1931, so presumably the data reflects the 
conditions of Manchuria in 1931.  
 
The agricultural labour force played a predominant role in the structure of labour 
relations. Between 1932 and 1945, the majority of the economically active population 
of Manchuria were engaged in agriculture. The predominant position of agricultural 
labour is evident in Table 6.2, which shows that agricultural labour accounted for 72.3 
percent of the total labour force of Manchuria in 1931.  
Changes in the distribution of the labour force occurred with the urbanisation of 
Manchuria. The rapid industrial growth following the implementation of the Five-Year 
Plan in 1937 created somewhat greater demand for labour and facilitated movement of 
labour from rural areas to urban areas. With the pulling force from the industrial sector, 
the scale of movement of rural labour from the rural areas to urban areas rose slightly. 
Table 6.3 shows that the working population in the agriculture sector declined slightly 
and the working population in the mining and industry sectors increased slightly during 
the period of 1935 and 1942. However, the decline in the position of agricultural labour 
was only very small. 
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Table 6.3. Distribution of Labour Force between 1935 and 1942 (unit: percent) 
 
Sector 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 
Agriculture 38.40 38.46 37.56 37.31 38.59 37.50 36.48 35.44 
Fishery 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Mining 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.73 0.72 0.82 0.91 1.00 
Industry 2.49 2.59 2.69 2.81 2.74 2.85 2.94 3.04 
Commerce 3.69 3.68 3.65 3.68 3.50 3.49 3.48 3.74 
Transport 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40 
Public Service 
and Self-
Employment 
1.26 1.56 2.02 2.20 2.21 2.63 3.01 3.39 
Family 
Business 
1.75 1.72 2.00 1.61 1.25 1.38 1.51 1.63 
Other 
Employment 
1.14 1.42 1.80 1.94 2.17 2.52 2.85 3.18 
Employment 
Total 
49.65 50.43 50.79 50.75 51.63 51.67 51.68 51.66 
Unemployment 50.35 49.57 49.21 49.25 48.37 48.33 48.32 48.34 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source  Mineo Yamanaka, “‘Manshūkoku’ jinkō tōkei no suikei,” The Journal of Tokyo Keizai University, 
no.  245, March 2005, 187. 
 
Table 6.4. The Movement of Farming and Non-Farming Population in Manchuria (unit: thousand) 
 
Year Farming Index 
Percentage 
in Total 
Population 
Non-
Farming 
Index 
Percentage 
in Total 
Population 
Total Index 
1934 23,668 100 84.7 4,286 100 15.3 27,945 100 
1935 24,896 105 86.3 3,952 92 13.7 28,848 103 
1936 25,279 106 85.0 4,478 104 15.0 29,757 107 
1938 24,568 103 76.7 7,463 174 23.3 32,031 115 
1939 24,584 104 74.5 8,790 205 25.5 33,373 119 
1940 29,608 125 72.5 11,234 262 27.5 40,842 146 
1941 31,927 135 72.4 12,184 284 27.6 44,110 158 
1942 33,423 141 72.8 12,477 292 27.2 45,899 164 
1943 32,595 138 72.1 12,620 295 27.9 45,215 162 
1944 32,488 137 67.4 15,723 367 32.6 48,211 173 
 
Source: Roman H. Myers, The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1982, 179.  
Note  data for   34 excludes Xing’an Province; data for   35 and   36 excludes Xing’an and  ehe 
Provinces; data for   38 and   40 excludes  ehe and est, East and South Xing’an Provinces.  
 
The movement of labour force can be seen as a natural movement of agricultural 
labour who either sought work in mines, factories and construction worksites in urban 
areas or sought employment from landlords and rich peasants in rural areas. The 
movement of the labour force can also been seen as the result of government attempt of 
regulating population mobility to enable the expansion of industrial production. As 
shown in Table 6.4, no drastic change occurred in the structure of the farming and non-
farming population of Manchuria between 1934 and 1936. The percentage remained on 
an average level of 85 percent. After 1938, however, change in the population structure 
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became much more remarkable. Table 6.4 shows that the share of farming population 
started to decline from 76.7 percent in 1938 to 67.4 percent in 1944. The position of the 
farming population in the demographic structure of Manchuria in 1934 and 1938 
suggest that the decline of the share of farming population was almost a difference of 20 
percent.  
 
Labour Supply and Demand   
The supply of labour in the early period of Manchukuo was not a serious concern for 
the Japanese authorities. During this period, the supply of labour for urban construction 
was adequate because the depressed conditions in agriculture forced numerous villagers 
to move to cities. However, the labour supply only remained sufficient until the eve of 
the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. The war led directly to the decline of 
migrant workers from North China, whose number dropped from 399,000 in 1936 to 
362,000 in 1937.
27
 In spite of the decline of labour supply, labour demand continued to 
increase. The demand for labour became acute when the Manchukuo government 
implemented and revised the Five-Year Plan in 1937 and 1938 respectively. The plan 
set a huge quota for the production of metal, coal, machine tool, chemicals and 
construction industries.
28
 In order to meet the production quota, the Manchukuo 
government needed to absorb one million workers into various industries within a 
period of five years.
29
 The increasing demand for labour and decreasing supply of 
labour created an acute shortage of labour in Manchuria. As shown in Table 6.5, all the 
major cities in Manchuria except Dalian and Jinzhou were facing a shortage of labour at 
the end of July 1937.  
The industrial development of Manchukuo created great demand for both 
unskilled and skilled labour. The demand for unskilled labour was estimated to be much 
greater than the demand for skilled labour. Because most unskilled workers came from 
the rural areas of Manchuria, rural areas became the main source for the supply of 
labour for the industries in Manchuria. In addition, there was demand for skilled labour. 
In order to meet this demand, the Japanese introduced programs to train skilled labour 
                                                          
27
 David Tucker, “ a or Policy and the Construction Industry in Manchukuo  Systems of 
 ecruitment, Management, and Control,” in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: 
Unknown Histories, ed. Paul H. Krastoska, Armonk: Sharpe, 2005, 39. 
28
 In comparison with the original plan, the revised plan greatly increased the demand for labour 
in mining industry. Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, Ma           :     , Tokyo  Manmō 
dōhō engokai,    0, 532-46. 
29
 Shujuan Li, Riben zhimin tongzhi yu dongbei nongmin shenghuo: 1931-1945 nian, Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2014, 277.  
150 
in Manchuria. The training took place primarily in the training centres in Fengtian, 
Andong and Harbin. However, exceptions were also made to send the skilled workers 
with exceptional skills to Japan for further training.
30
  
 
Table 6.5. The Conditions of Labour Shortage at the End of July 1937 
 
City Number Needed Number Available Number Insufficient 
Dalian 15,000 15,000 --- 
Fengtian 27,000 25,000 2,000 
Xinjing 34,500 34,000 500 
Anshan 5,000 4,000 1,000 
Fushun 8,600 8,000 600 
Harbin 10,800 10,000 800 
Andong 2,500 2,000 500 
Mudanjiang 21,200 19,000 2,200 
Qiqihar 3,900 2,500 1,400 
Jinzhou 3,000 3,000 --- 
Jilin 7,760 7,000 760 
Construction 58,809 42,187 16,622 
Other 30,036 21,276 8,760 
Total 228,105 192,963 35,142 
 
Source  Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsa u, Ma        za     p , Tokyo  Kaizōsha,   3 , 44 -2. 
 
Table 6.6. An Estimate of Workers Needed by the Five-Year Plan 
 
Year Category 
Ceramics and 
Construction 
Materials 
Mining Industry Transport Total 
1937 
Skilled 1,660 1,860 220 --- 3,740 
Unskilled 151,542 21,000 1,600 402 174,544 
1938 
Skilled 310 670 1,930 --- 2,910 
Unskilled 221,523 21,600 5,970 914 250,007 
1939 
Skilled --- 520 2,060 --- 2,580 
Unskilled 204,963 24,400 3,130 914 233,407 
1940 
Skilled --- 2,260 4,520 -- 6,780 
Unskilled 186,108 45,400 10,620 914 243,042 
1941 
Skilled --- 1,100 5,170 --- 6,270 
Unskilled 118,741 69,600 12,970 922 202,233 
 
Source  Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsa u, R d         a         y , 6-8.   
 
The labour supply and demand in the agricultural and industrial sectors were 
imbalanced. In the agricultural sector, there was a labour surplus. According to the 
estimates of the Manchukuo government, there was a sizable surplus in the supply of 
labour for agriculture during the period of 1938 to 1941. As shown in Table 6.7, labour 
surplus increased continuously for four years between 1937 and 1941. In contrast, the 
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supply of labour for the industrial sector could not meet the demand for labour. 
Shortages of skilled and unskilled workers were keenly felt in in almost all the sectors 
of industry. As shown in Table 6.6, mines needed the most workers, followed by the 
construction industry. The demand for unskilled labour in mines was estimated to 
increase continuously during this period.  
 
Table 6.7. The Conditions of Labour Supply for Agriculture between 1936 and 1941 
 
 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
Needed 6,746,614 7,494,209 7,553,097 7,628,216 7,717,644 7,814,234 
Available 6,376,476 7,873,370 7,968,634 8,065,051 8,162,634 8,261,402 
Surplus  379,161 415,537 436,835 444,990 447,168 
Shortage 370,138      
 
Source  Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsa u, R d         a         y , 149-52.  
Note: the data for the period of 1936 and 1937 reflects the real conditions of labour supply in thirteen 
provinces in Manchuria. The data for the period of 1938 to 1941 is an estimate of the conditions of labour 
supply in ten provinces in Manchuria, and it does not reflect the real conditions of labour supply in this 
period.  
 
The Conditions of Labour Force  
The working conditions in the industrial sector were extremely demanding for workers 
in terms of working hours. Working hours varied in Chinese and Japanese enterprises in 
Manchuria. In the Chinese enterprises of northern Manchuria, working hours were 
normally a minimum of twelve hours a day. In the manufacturing industries where 
wages were paid according to the workload completed, working hours ranged from 
fourteen to fifteen hours a day. In extreme cases, working hours amounted to eighteen 
hours a day. Working hours including rest breaks averaged fourteen hours a day.
31
 In 
comparison with the working hours in Chinese enterprises, the conditions of Japanese 
enterprises seem to have been less severe. The data of August 1939 suggests that 
working hours in Japanese enterprises averaged 10.4 hours, of which 9.5 hours were 
actual working hours, while rest breaks were 0.9 hours. The average working days in a 
month were 27.6 days. However, this figure only reflected regular working hours 
excluding overtime work.
32
 The same data also shows that the overtime work averaged 
approximately either 30 minutes or 90 minutes in some cases.
33
  
The payment of wage varied in Chinese and Japanese enterprises. Chinese and 
Japanese enterprises both adopted the method of paying wages to workers in accordance 
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with working hours and workload. In Chinese enterprises, wages were paid primarily by 
hours. Wages were paid to adult workers on monthly or fortnightly instalments. 
Apprentices were normally paid on a monthly basis. In most cases, workers were paid 
in both kind and cash. Only highly skilled or temporary workers were paid fully in cash. 
In order to encourage commitment of workers to their work, employers distributed 
loyalty bonuses to workers at the end of each fiscal year.
34
 In the case of Japanese 
enterprises, wages were predominantly paid on a daily basis in factories and paid in 
accordance with their output in coal mines. The data of August 1939 suggests that 
factory workers who received payment on a daily basis accounted for 82.9 percent in 
the total number of workers. Workers in coal mines who received payment on their 
completion of output accounted for 53.9 percent of the total number of workers.
35
  
 
Table 6.8. Monthly Wages of Labourers in the FC between 1939 and 1943 (unit: yuan) 
 
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 
Japanese 105.2 110.07 118.79 134.5 151.69 
Chinese 40.87 46.86 57.50 67 75.91 
 
Source  Takao Matsumura, “Fushun meikuang gongren shitai,” in Mantie yu Zhongguo laogong, eds. 
Xueshi Xie and Takao Matsumura, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003, 350.  
Note: the data on the Chinese labour only represented the employees whose ranks were higher than the 
ranks of regular employees. It is assumed that the wages shown in the data were the highest among all the 
Chinese employees.  
 
The Japanese adopted a discriminatory policy on workers’ wage. Although wage 
levels varied from enterprise to enterprise, there was a marked difference in the wages 
of Japanese and Chinese workers. In the case of factories, the average wage of Japanese 
workers was approximately three times of that of the Chinese workers. In 1936, the 
nominal wages of Japanese and Chinese workers were 2.33 yuan and 0.71 yuan 
respectively.
36
 In 1939, the wages of Japanese male and female workers were 3.78 yuan 
and 1.82 yuan respectively. The wages of Chinese male and female workers were 1.09 
yuan and 0.53 yuan respectively.
37
 In coal mines, the nominal wage of Japanese male 
workers was an average of 3.33 yuan in 1939. However, the nominal wages of Chinese 
male and female workers in the same year were only 0.98 yuan and 0.30 yuan 
respectively.
38
 A comparison of the wages of the Japanese and Chinese employees in 
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the Fushun Colliery further illustrates the wage differences between Japanese and 
Chinese labour force. The enterprises made efforts to increase wages for workers after 
1938, but the increase still did not keep pace with the increase of the prices of consumer 
goods in Manchuria. As a result, the purchasing power of workers actually declined in 
spite of their wage increase.  
After the enterprises recruited workers, they had great trouble in keeping them 
firmly in the workplace. Workers remained in the workplace only temporarily and they 
usually maintained a high level of mobility. A very large number of workers stayed 
employed at a single job for six months to a year only.  
Labour turnover increased rapidly from 1939 to 1940. As shown in Table 6.9, 
there was a general increase in labour turnover from September 1939 to August 1940. 
Labour turnover increased continuously from September 1939 and peaked in June 1940 
at a rate of 8.89 percent. Labour turnover dropped slightly to 7.22 percent in August 
1940.  
There are few substantial data on the reasons for the turnover rate of workers in 
the enterprises, so it is difficult to make accurate assessment on the overall conditions of 
labour turnover in Manchuria. We can, however, evaluate several factors that might 
have contributed to the turnover rate of Chinese workers in general. The high turnover 
rate can be explained by the conditions of both workplace and workers. The long 
working hours and low wages in the enterprises discouraged workers to remain loyal to 
their workplace. Japanese employers made only limited efforts to provide training for 
workers. The number of Chinese workers was extremely high in the workplace. In the 
case of a machine tool factory in Fengtian, in 1934 about 96 percent of its workers were 
Chinese and only 4 percent were Japanese. In 1939, the Chinese workers still accounted 
for about 91 percent while Japanese workers made up only 5 percent.
39
 Chinese workers 
usually maintained weak loyalty to the workplace. They usually worked just long 
enough to earn the amount of wages they wanted, and then they either moved to another 
job or simply returned to their villages.  
Turnover rate created a vicious cycle in the workforce. In order to maintain 
output levels, the enterprises usually forced employers to extend working hours. This 
attempt resulted in the loss of production, the reduction of performance levels, 
unnecessary overtime and low morale from other workers who had to cover the 
workload of the workers who left the workplace, and high accident rates.
40
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Table 6.9. The Number of Workers Leaving and Entering Industry in 1939 and 1940 
 
Period 
Number at the 
Beginning of Month 
Hired Departed Final Number 
Rate of 
Labour 
Turnover 
September 1939 37,400 3,061 2,566 37,904 6.82% 
December 1939 38,615 5,479 3,025 41,069 7.60% 
February 1940 37,308 5,198 2,988 39,518 7.78% 
April 1940 41,964 5,325 3,649 43,640 8.53% 
June 1940 44,364 3,400 3,920 43,844 8.89% 
August 1940 44,365 3,425 3,211 44,579 7.22% 
 
Source: Myers, The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 190-2.  
Note  la our turnover is calculated on the  asis of Myer’s data. The formula for the calculation is the 
number of departed workers divided by the average of the numbers of workers at the beginning in one 
month and at the end of the year and then multiplied by 100.  
 
Labour Recruitment and Management  
Labour was primarily recruited from Manchuria and North China. For the recruitment 
of labour from Manchuria, the Japanese circulated posters advertising work 
opportunities in rural areas, or hired local people to recruit labour through their personal 
connections, or hired agents to recruit labour by contracting them to provide the quota 
of labour needed.
41
 For the recruitment of labour from North China, the Japanese 
established the Dadong Company (Dadong gongsi) as their agent to handle the matters 
of investigation of prospective labourers, the recruitment and transport, and the issuance 
of identity papers. The Dadong Company was capitalised at 0.1 million yen and 
supervised by the Japanese intelligence agency in Tianjin. When the company was 
established on 1 April 1934, it had a head office in Tianjin and several visa-processing 
offices in North China and a branch in Dalian. On 16 February 1935, the Japanese 
authorities reorganised the Dadong Company into a partnership venture capitalised at 
one million yen. Its head office was relocated from Tianjin to the Manchukuo capital 
Xinjing. Its main functions remained the handling of matters related to immigration and 
labour control.
42
  
The Japanese enterprises in Manchuria, most of which were the SMRC 
enterprises, depended on the batou system to recruit and manage labour. The batou 
system was an arrangement that integrated labour procurement, management and care.
43
 
The batou was a subcontractor who acted as the intermediary between workers and 
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employers. He not only recruited and delivered workers to employers, but also provided 
food, temporary housing and recreation for workers. Batou received wages from the 
employers, deducted a percentage from the wages and then distributed the balance to the 
workers.
44
 In this way, batou were directly involved in the recruitment and management 
of workers, and they retained full authority to employ, dismiss, and discipline workers. 
Batou were paid on the basis of the completion of their output quota and employers had 
no authority to supervise the labourers in any way.  
The organisational structure of the batou system consisted of chief batou 
(dabatou), sub-batou (xiaobatou) and workers. The basic unit of the system was a squad 
of workers. A sub-batou was in charge of each squad. The number of workers managed 
by the chief batou varied. A chief batou might have more than one thousand workers or 
only thirty or forty workers under their control.
45
  
The batou system offered advantages to both the employers and workers. To the 
Japanese employers, it was convenient to depend on the batou system for the direct 
management of workers because of cultural and linguistic barriers in communicating 
with Chinese workers. To the workers, the batou system offered security and protection 
in payment, transport, accommodation and medical care. Given such advantages, the 
batou system retained strong connections with both Japanese employers and local 
workers in Manchuria.  
The Japanese policy on the batou system underwent changes during their 
fourteen years of labour control in Manchuria. Between 1932 and 1937, Japanese 
enterprises generally entrusted the recruitment and management of labour to batou.
46
 
Between 1937 and 1940, the Japanese authorities restricted the batou system and sought 
other means of recruiting and managing labour. From 1940 to 1945, the Japanese 
authorities relaxed the control over the batou system in labour recruitment and 
management.
47
  
Between 1932 and 1937, the Japanese authorities concluded that the direct 
involvement of the batou system in recruiting and managing workers had weakened the 
capacity of the Japanese control over the labour force. The Japanese enterprises reduced 
the authority of batou in labour management and reinforced their own control over 
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Chinese workers. In the case of the FC for example, the Japanese employers were 
directly involved in the management of batou. The Japanese employers not only directly 
supervised the work performance of batou, but also appointed and dismissed batou and 
sub-batou.  
    
Table 6.10.  The number of Batou in the FC between 1931 and 1943 
 
Year 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 
Number 128 107 118 109 76 71 82 93 224 391 340 343 439 
 
Source: Xueshi Xie, Mantieshi ziliao, vol.  4, no. 2, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987, 568.  
 
From 1937, the Japanese enterprises further reduced the role of the batou system 
by direct recruitment and employment. In 1940, the FC set up recruitment offices in 
several cities in North China and sent agents to the recruiting areas to recruit workers.
48
 
However, these efforts to eliminate the influence of batou in labour management were 
only made on a narrow scale and the effect was limited. Even though in some cases 
workers were hired directly by the FC, the FC still relied on batou to supply them with 
workers.  
After 1940, the Japanese enterprises reutilised the batou system of labour 
control. According to the rules of the FC revised on 1 February 1940, a new level of 
batou known as the operations batou (zuoye batou) was set up under the sub-batou. 
Now the batou system became a four-level structure consisting of batou, sub-batou, 
operations batou and workers.
49
 The FC also raised the salary of batou and workers to 
stimulate commitment of workers to improve their work performance, to prevent 
turnover and to develop the loyalty of workers to their workplace. As shown in Table 
6.10, the number of batou in the FC fluctuated between 1931 and 1937, and it did not 
show a trend of consistency. However, the number after 1937 increased rapidly from 82 
in 1937 to 439 in 1943. The rapid increase in the number of batou shows that the 
Japanese enterprises tightened their control over the labour force.  
The government regulation of the labour force was only effective on group 
labour hired through the batou system, which was only part of the labour force. Group 
labour accounted for less than one third of the total labour force in Manchuria. Between 
1937 and 1940, group labour accounted for 17 percent, 29 percent, 33 percent and 31 
percent in the total number of the labour force in Manchuria.
50
 Even in 1939 when the 
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number of group labour employees was at its peak, they accounted for only one third of 
the total number of migrant workers. In addition, group labour workers had only limited 
choice of occupation. They were only allowed to work for the areas of vital importance 
to the state: civil engineering, mining, industry and communications. Among these four 
areas, the largest number of workers entered the civil engineering and mining industries. 
In 1940, the number of workers in these industries accounted for 93 percent in the total 
number of group labour employees.
51
Aside from the group labour force, individual 
labourers who entered Manchuria for employment or family reasons constituted the 
majority of labourers in Manchuria. However, individual labour was largely free from 
government regulation. Given the greater share of individual labour in the total number 
of the labour force in Manchuria, the Manchukuo government failed to exercise full 
control over the labour force.  
 
The Labour Control System  
1. Policies and Organisations  
The Japanese authorities adopted two diametrically opposed policies on labour control 
in Manchukuo. From 1932 to 1937, the Japanese adopted a mild labour policy of 
limited government intervention. Under this policy, the government depended on North 
China for the supply of labour. The government, however, restricted the mobility of 
labour from North China to Manchuria due to concerns with security. From 1937 to 
1945, the Japanese pursued an aggressive labour policy that involved compulsion and 
coercion in the conscription of labour.
52
 
The labour policy in the period between 1932 and 1937 was a result of the 
 alanced demand and supply of la our and the Kwantung Army’s concerns with pu lic 
security. Although the industrialisation plan initiated by the Manchukuo government 
greatly increased the demand for labour, the supply of labour was adequate. At this time, 
the size of the labour force from North China remained one million per year.
53
 
Depressed conditions in the agricultural sector in Manchuria forced numerous farmers 
to move to industrial sectors at this time. The Kwantung Army perceived Chinese 
workers from North China as a potential threat to the public security of Manchuria, so 
in 1937 they established a labour control system to restrict the mobility of the labour 
force from North China to Manchuria.  
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The labour control system was made up of a committee, a law and an 
organisation that dealt directly with labour relations. The committee, known as the 
Labour Control Committee (  d            a ), was set up within the Kwantung Army. It 
had twenty-seven members on board who were leaders of the Kwantung Army, the 
Manchukuo government, the SMRC, the GGK and other government bodies. The 
organisation was the Dadong Company. The law was the Restriction of Foreign Labour 
Force ( a        d   a         a         ) enforced in March 1935. This law 
designated the Dadong Company as the sole agent for foreign labour control.
54
  
The direction of Japanese labour control policy changed dramatically in 1937 as 
a direct outcome of the implementation of the Five-Year Plan and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War. In comparison with the previous labour policy, the current labour 
policy became increasingly interventionist and active. In 1937, the sharp decline in the 
immigration of Chinese workers entering Manchuria made the recruitment of labour 
increasingly difficult. This situation propelled the Japanese authorities to shift the focus 
of their labour policy from limited government intervention to systematic and 
centralised government control.  
The labour control system during this period was made up of an organisation for 
the implementation of labour control, a committee for the legislation for labour control 
and two laws. The organisation was the Manchuria Labour Association (Ma          
 y  a ) established on 7 January 1938. It was funded by various public bodies including 
the Manchukuo government, the SMRC, the Dadong Company, and the Manchuria 
Civil Engineering Company (Ma     d                y  a ). The organisation was in 
charge of the distribution, registration, training and employment of labour. Among these 
responsibilities, the organisation was primarily involved in the registration of labour. 
The organisation registered workers in the system, issued workers identity cards and 
collected their fingerprints to serve security purposes.
55
 The committee was the Labour 
Affairs Committee (         a ) established in July 1938.56 It set quotas for the labour 
from North China into Manchuria. The first law was the Labour Control Law (  d  
       ) promulgated on 1 December 1938 and enforced on 30 January 1939. This law 
provided a legal basis for the extension of working hours and reduction of wages in the 
workplace. The second law was the National Mobilisation Law (    a   d     ), 
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proclaimed by the Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in March 1938. Its 
provisions were applied to Manchukuo in order to control the material and human 
resources. The National Mobilisation Law gave the Manchukuo government 
unprecedented powers to mobilise labour.
57
  
The labour shortage grew more urgent when the Pacific War started in 
December   4 . The la our shortage derived in part from the Kwantung Army’s 
restriction of money order remittances to North China. This initiative prohibited 
Chinese workers from sending money back to their hometowns in North China. The 
exchange of the Manchurian currency to the currencies in circulation in North China 
was also restricted. The money restriction discouraged workers from continuing to work 
in Manchuria and caused high labour turnover from Manchuria to North China.  
Wartime conditions made the recruitment of labour from North China more difficult. 
In response to this situation, the Manchukuo government established the New Labour 
System (          a    ) on 10 September 1941 to directly control the recruitment and 
distribution of labour in Manchuria.
58
 In this system, the labour conscription shifted 
from North China to Manchuria. The Labour Control Law was amended for the 
government to control the labour force directly, while the Manchuria Labour 
Association was reorganised into the Labour Service Promotion Association (     
shinkokkai) in October 1941. This association succeeded the Manchuria Labour 
Association in the roles of the mediation of workers, the protection of workers, and the 
improvement of labour management and the implementation of labour control. This 
new association represented the interests of the SMRC. The SMRC placed its 
employees in the key positions of the association and provided substantial funds for its 
operation.
59
  
    
2. Compulsory Labour Service  
The Manchukuo government turned to coercion and compulsion for labour conscription. 
The coercive system of labour conscription included the organisation of labour service 
corps and the recruitment of compulsory labour. These efforts were intended to pull all 
available labour resources into the workplace to increase productivity.  
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On 9 February 1942, the Manchukuo government issued two administrative 
orders to conscript labour: Emergent Labour Service Rules (  d   a     y        
kisoku) and Emergent Labour Recruitment Guidelines (  d   a     y        y   ). 
These orders authorised the government to conscript labour through coercive and 
compulsory measures. In case of necessity, employers could submit a proposal to the 
MCA for the supply of labour. Their proposal included the place and type of work and 
number of workers needed. The MCA would in turn order the local governments to 
deliver workers. After receiving the orders from the MCA, local governments at city, 
county or village levels would start to conscript civilians. Adult males aged between 
eighteen and fifty were all eligible for the compulsory labour service. The sources 
available suggest that the number of civilians conscripted for the compulsory labour 
service was approximately 480,000 in 1943 and 700,000 in 1944.
60
 The selection of 
workers varied from region to region. In some cases, workers were conscripted by the 
government arbitrarily. The process of conscription was as follows: upon receiving the 
order of labour conscription from the higher level of government, the county governor 
would select workers from the government’s workers register  y lot; then the authorities 
would inform the selected workers of the details of the work, including the date and 
venue of work; afterwards, these workers would be organised into teams and sent to the 
agent in charge of receiving the conscripted workers or local administrators.
61
 In other 
cases, one member from each household in villages was registered by the county 
government as reserve labour. Their names were numbered in a sequential order in the 
register of workers. Once the order for labour supply was made, the county government 
would conscript workers according to the order of names in the register.
62
   
It appeared that physical labour and money could both be used as the form of the 
compulsory labour service. In the case of physical labour, village heads would enlist 
peasants from villages to fulfil the government quota of compulsory labour. Rich and 
middle peasants often hired poor peasants to substitute for the compulsory labour 
service. As a result, poor peasants constituted the majority of peasants drafted for the 
compulsory labour service. For example, in Shang village of Zhangwu County in 
Jinzhou Province, wage labourers and tenant peasants accounted for 83 percent of the 
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total number of peasants who were drafted for compulsory service from January to 
March in 1942.
63
 In addition, money could be used to substitute for physical labour. In 
this form of service, village heads would collect from peasants the amount of money 
assigned by the government. Peasnats paid the money according to the size of their 
landholdings. The larger the land was, the larger the amount of money collected.  
 
3. Youth Labour Service  
The Japanese authorities targeted youth in Manchuria as an enormous and strategic 
source of labour for agricultural production, public construction work and military 
conscription. Towards the end of the 1930s, the Japanese launched compulsory national 
labour service to command the loyalty and devotion of youth to the state. Youth labour 
was mobilised broadly for military and civil purposes. Young people served in a wide 
range of projects including the construction of military facilities and the transport of 
strategic resources, roads, bridges, and planting of trees.  
The idea underlying the youth labour service in Manchuria originated in Nazi 
Germany’s Hitler Youth (Hitler-Jugend) and National Labour Service 
(Reichsarbeitsdienst). The concept was adopted by Handa Toshiharu, the head of the 
Planning Department of the headquarters of the CA. Handa believed that it would be in 
the interest of the government to utilise the youth of the country to supplement the 
supply of labour for the construction projects of the state. According to Handa, when 
conscription was introduced in Manchukuo in 1940, the male adults whose age met the 
requirement of military service amounted to 300,000; however, only ten percent could 
be conscripted into military service. For strategic reasons, it would be extremely 
important to draft the remainder of the youth into labour service through compulsory 
measures.
64
 After his return from an investigation tour in Nazi Germany in 1938, he 
pushed the Manchukuo government for the establishment of a youth labour service. 
Handa proposed the establishment of the national la our service to Itagaki Seishirō and 
Tōjō Hideki.65  
The Kwantung Army approved Handa’s proposal of youth la our service  y 
introducing the National Labour Service Law (                    ) in 1942. This law 
took effect on 1 January 1943, making the youth labour service compulsory. After the 
enforcement of the law, a youth corps was organised; male adults aged between twenty-
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one and twenty-three were legally obliged to serve in the corps for a term of twelve 
months. They were involved in construction projects for national defence, railways and 
roads, flood control and tree planting, land improvement, agricultural and industrial 
production, and disaster relief.
66
 This law was amended in March 1945 to extend the 
age range from 21-23 years to 21-30 years.
67
  
The National Labour Service Corps (                   a ) was divided into 
general corps (ippantai) and special skills corps (tokugitai). The general corps was 
composed of battalions (daitai), companies (    a ), platoons (    a ) and squads 
(buntai). A company was the basic unit of organisation. A company consisted of five 
platoons, and a platoon consisted of two squads. The basic membership of a company 
was three hundred, and the basic membership of a company was twenty. The special 
corps was composed of battalions and companies.
68
 
The mobilisation for youth labour intensified towards the end of Japanese rule in 
Manchukuo. The number of youths mobilised compulsorily into the national labour 
service increased rapidly from 1943 to 1944. In 1943, the goal was set to mobilise 
116,000 youths for labour service and the number achieved was 80,000. In 1944, the 
number achieved was 250,000.
69
   
 
Conclusion  
The Japanese made no drastic change in the composition of the labour force of 
Manchuria. The labour force was still concentrated in the agricultural sector of 
Manchuria. The labour relations in the agricultural sector were centred on wage labour. 
Wage labourers were mainly landless labourers who engaged temporarily in agriculture. 
Rapid industrialisation of the economy of Manchukuo facilitated the mobility of labour 
from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. The labour relations in the industrial 
sector were characterised by harsh working conditions and high turnover rates.  
The Japanese authorities increasingly intervened in labour recruitment and 
management. Initially the Japanese authorities relied on the batou system to recruit and 
manage the labour force in Manchuria. This system was effective in delivering large 
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numbers of workers to the enterprises for limited and flexible time periods. As the 
Japanese labour control policy developed into a more centralised system, the direct 
labour management by the batou system conflicted with the Japanese efforts to 
rationalise labour arrangement. Towards the end of Japanese rule in Manchukuo, the 
Japanese authorities took the initiative of managing labour, but their efforts were only 
made on a limited scale.  
The Japanese labour policy was a short-term strategy that served a temporary 
purpose. It was largely shaped by the Japanese struggle with labour demand and supply 
in Manchuria. From 1932 until 1937, the Japanese labour policy developed from the 
Japanese concerns of maintaining internal security. After the Mukden Incident, the 
Japanese authorities restricted the Chinese immigration to Manchuria as a complement 
to promoting Japanese immigration. This policy interrupted the population mobility 
from North China to Manchuria. When this policy came into conflict with the 
increasing demand for labour under the Five-Year Plan in 1937, the Japanese authorities 
pursued an aggressive labour policy that involved direct state intervention in labour 
relations. After 1940, the Japanese authorities reduced their dependency on North China 
for labour supply and turned to Manchuria. In the meantime, the Japanese authorities 
implemented coercive and compulsory measures to conscript labour.  
The efficacy of the Japanese labour policy in Manchukuo was reflected more in 
the industrial sector and less in the agricultural sector. This is evident in the number of 
workers conscripted into the factories and mines of Manchuria. In contrast to the effect 
of labour policy in the industrial sector, the power of Japanese labour regulation 
penetrated only limitedly into rural areas. The effect of Japanese labour policy in rural 
Manchukuo is evident in the increase of wage labour in the structure of labour relations 
in rural Manchukuo. The increase was facilitated by the Japanese employment of 
Chinese labour on a regular basis and on a large scale in Japanese villages. The 
employment of wage labour, however, was necessitated by the Japanese immigration 
policy. Thus, the position of wage labour in the labour relations in rural Manchukuo 
served only as an indirect outcome of the Japanese labour policy in Manchukuo.   
 
165 
Conclusion 
 
The Japanese creation of Manchukuo in the face of difficulties and resistance was an 
enormous task. The Japanese authorities made enormous investment in the suppression 
and pacification of local subjects, as well as in the construction of political and 
economic structures for the consolidation of the regime. This study has explored the 
attempts undertaken by the Japanese authorities to reshape the social structures of 
Manchukuo between 1932 and 1945. This study has also examined the structure of 
Japanese power in rural Manchukuo. By drawing mainly on primary and secondary 
sources in Chinese, English, and Japanese, this study investigates the nature, motive and 
logic of Japanese strategies and policies in rural Manchukuo. This study has shown that 
the Japanese rule took subtle and complex forms of control in Manchukuo. Set in the 
discourse of Japanese imperialism, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
how were the control mechanisms shaped into vehicles for the empire building of 
Manchukuo? What did the Japanese authorities actually achieve in their rule over the 
rural society? What was the strength, limitations and logic of the Japanese rule over 
rural Manchukuo?  
This study treats the Japanese authorities as heterogeneous forces exercising 
their will on Manchurian society. Multiple actors served as the agents of Japanese 
imperialism for the rural control of Manchuria. The main actor was the Kwantung Army. 
It manipulated the political and economic management of the Manchukuo state and 
eliminated competition from other Japanese agents. The fundamental role of the 
Kwantung Army in the political and economic control of rural Manchukuo lay in its 
authority to reshape the social and economic structures of rural areas. Aside from the 
Kwantung Army, other Japanese agents including the Japanese government and 
Japanese enterprises also played a part in the rural control of Manchuria. These agents, 
however, carried out policies that were in line with the intent of the Kwantung Army 
and were subject to supervision by the Kwantung Army.  
This study does not treat the Japanese immigrants who settled in Manchuria as 
the agents of Japanese imperialism. Admittedly, the Japanese immigrants received 
privileges in Manchukuo. The Japanese immigrants not only had easier access to 
employment opportunities and land reclamation, but also were excluded from the 
institutional surveillance that the Japanese authorities exercised over the local subjects 
in rural Manchukuo. They also brought about structural change in labour relations in 
rural areas. However, the Japanese immigrants came to Manchuria only as part of the 
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scheme of Japanese imperialist expansion and they were subject to the rule of the 
Japanese authorities. In this sense, they were not involved directly in ruling local 
subjects and thus only played a minor role in the Japanese venture in Manchukuo.  
Although Japanese imperialism established its sphere of influence in Manchuria 
on the eve of the Mukden Incident in 1931, the Japanese influence in rural Manchuria 
was very limited. During this time, the SMRC acted as the agent of Japanese 
imperialism and conducted extensive commercial activity in the southern part of 
Manchuria. Although Japanese imperialism was involved in the commercialisation of 
soybeans produced in rural Manchuria, the Japanese interests focused principally on the 
industrial sector and the Japanese power exerted limited impact on the rural society of 
Manchuria. Rural Manchuria remained an agrarian economy where kind rather than 
cash was the currency of commercial activity.  
In the Manchukuo period, rural areas grew increasingly important for the 
Japanese imperialistic endeavours. The Japanese authorities perceived rural areas as a 
major source of raw materials for the economic development of the Japanese empire. 
The Japanese authorities engaged actively in the formation of Japanese capital and the 
establishment of agrarian monopoly in the agricultural sector in order to achieve a 
monopolistic position in the Manchurian economy. 
Japan created Manchukuo as a client state. Although the Manchukuo state was 
nominally sovereign, its government was subject to Japanese military occupation and its 
policy was subject to Japanese instruction. The administrative structure of the 
Manchukuo government was a bureaucratic-military establishment under the control of 
the Kwantung Army. At the central level, the Kwantung Army established an 
administrative structure that was capable of overseeing the civil and military affairs of 
Manchukuo. As a system of political tutelage, it reflected their plans in the political 
management of Manchukuo. Japanese officials dominated the bureaucracy and left little 
space to Chinese officials for improvisation. At the local level, the Kwantung Army 
introduced the illusionary practices of local self-government into the rural 
administration. The administrative structure created a sense of legitimacy of 
government that tied local subjects together into the organisational structures of the 
state.  
Japan created Manchukuo by force and violence, but it aimed to build an 
enduring social and economic basis in the new state rather than mere military might. 
Shortly after the founding of Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities worked to establish a 
new social order by reshaping the social, economic and political structures of the state. 
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The logic of Japanese rule followed a pattern of combining physical force, 
administrative construction and economic exploitation.  
The use of force was prevalent in the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. The 
physical force employed by the Japanese authorities took the forms of 
counterinsurgency operations, residential relocation of civilians and compulsory labour 
service. This form of control involved direct efforts to bring people living outside state 
authority under state control and encompassed the construction of institutions and 
capacities that enabled those efforts. Civilians were pressed into service for the state, 
taxes were forcibly extracted from agricultural classes, and local rulers were dismounted 
over a superior structure of authority.  
Force alone was insufficient to maintain effective control over a large 
indigenous population in Manchuria. As the state hegemony settled down, the Japanese 
authorities reinforced their position through the abrogation of extraterritoriality and an 
administrative reform. These efforts consolidated the Japanese capacity to intervene 
directly in the political control of Manchukuo and enhanced the administrative 
efficiency of central and local governance.  
Japanese rule penetrated deeply into the agricultural sector in economic terms. 
The Japanese rural control provided a basis for commercial and industrial activities in 
Manchukuo. The Japanese rural control over agriculture rationalised capital formation, 
agrarian production and distribution, and facilitated agricultural commercialisation. 
Through the reogranisation of agrarian finance, the Japanese authorities eliminated the 
native capital and introduced Japanese capital into the agricultural sector. The Japanese 
authorities established control institutions to supervise the production and distribution 
of agricultural products. In this process, the Japanese authorities actively employed 
measures of coercion and compulsion to maximise the effect of control. In consequence, 
the Japanese agrarian control in Manchuria facilitated a transition from uncontrolled to 
controlled market mechanisms, and then to direct requisition and quotas in the 
agricultural sector. Agrarian control enhanced the state capacity of control over the rural 
economy of Manchukuo.   
Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was characterised by the establishment and 
consolidation of Japanese power. The Japanese authorities built up state apparatus for 
administrative control, political mobilisation and economic exploitation. The Japanese 
control relied on a dynamic of shifting strategies of coercion, pacification and 
construction. The Japanese strategy of regime consolidation strengthened the coercive 
capacities of the state in political and economic realms.  
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Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was pragmatic. The Japanese authorities 
showed only lukewarm interest in the welfare of local subjects, but considerable interest 
in political domination and economic exploitation that would bring them tangible 
benefits. The extraction of tax and agrarian resources from rural areas revealed the 
pragmatism of the Japanese rule. Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was also highly 
repressive. The Japanese authorities frequently resorted to force to sustain their rule. 
Repression took physical and institutional forms that included military suppression of 
resistance and sophisticated forms of social surveillance. Japanese rule put local 
subjects into service for the state through tax contribution, agrarian product delivery and 
compulsory labour service. Although Japanese rule was repressive, we should not view 
it simply as plunder, but rather as exploitation through development. The Japanese 
authorities made continuous efforts to construct rural administrative structures and to 
rationalise agrarian production and distribution. These efforts facilitated social 
development and economic growth in the rural society. It is necessary to point out, 
however, that although the Japanese authorities were not averse to the social 
development and economic growth of rural Manchukuo, their ultimate goal was to 
advance Japanese imperialistic interests, rather than to benefit the local subjects in the 
long run.  
The Japanese authorities were remarkably successful in their rule over 
Manchukuo. The strength of Japanese rule lay in their competence in building state 
apparatus and social structures. These efforts involved eliminating local resistance, 
segregating civilians from insurgents, establishing a tax system to generate government 
revenue, utilising rural defence mechanisms, controlling the rural market, facilitating 
the formation of commercial capital and drafting labour for the construction of the 
economy. The Japanese rule extended power from the central government down to the 
bottom of rural society and laid the foundation for political and economic integration. 
Eventually, the Japanese rule transformed rural Manchukuo into structures that served 
the interests of Japanese imperialism, and facilitated the political stability and economic 
development of Manchurian society. 
The Japanese authorities promoted changes in the rural society of Manchukuo, 
but within specific limits. The changes were confined to the area of rural administration 
and economic restructuring, rather than deeper levels of social spheres such as local 
traditions and customs. The limit of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo appears to 
be their inability to bring about drastic change in the land ownership system of rural 
Manchukuo. Although the Japanese power facilitated the increase of wage labourers in 
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the rural labour force, the landownership system of rural Manchukuo remained largely 
untouched. The Japanese reluctance to change the class structure in rural society can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that they saw it useful to keep the class structure intact 
in order to extract agricultural resources and to keep the countryside stable. The limit of 
Japanese rule is also evident in the effectiveness of labour control. The Japanese 
authorities were only able to control a small proportion of the labour force in 
Manchukuo. Japanese labour control did not extend to the majority of the rural 
population. In general, the Japanese authorities lacked both experience and time to 
create ruling mechanisms in rural areas that could suit the social, political and economic 
conditions of rural areas. This defect resulted in the implementation of inconsistent 
policies and practices in the actual control.  
This study has demonstrated that the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was 
characterised by an absence of attention to the welfare of local subjects. The attitude of 
Japanese authorities towards local subjects was generally arbitrary and hostile. They 
perceived local subjects as suspect and dangerous. They adopted discriminatory policies 
that treated local subjects as inferior and developed sophisticated forms of social 
surveillance to monitor them. Japanese rule harmed the physical wellbeing of local 
subjects. The Japanese rule forced local subjects to relocate to hamlets constructed by 
the government. The Japanese rule established repressive institutions, laws and orders to 
discipline local subjects. The Japanese rule forced local subjects to contribute to the 
state economy by paying tax, delivering agrarian products and providing labour services.  
The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was a historical process continuously 
negotiated, contested, re-created, and altered by challenges from within and without. In 
the process of rural control, control mechanisms were reorganised, either enhanced or 
reduced, in their structure and function. Some were not improvised on the spot, but 
drew upon older styles of social control in the Chinese and Japanese tradition. These 
strategies not only constructed Japanese power in the centre of rural life, but also 
actively sought to encourage the use of local initiatives and structures. The Japanese 
strategies and policies of control over rural Manchukuo constituted a form of inventing 
tradition.  
This study has it has limitations. In order to generate a comprehensive 
understanding of Japanese strategies and logic in Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo, 
there is a need for more case studies to allow further assessment of rural control under 
Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo. In addition, there is also a need to examine the 
long-term consequences of the Japanese policy for political and social developments in 
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Manchuria after 1945. This is because the impact of Japanese rule over rural 
Manchukuo did not end immediately with the collapse of the Manchukuo regime. 
Rather, Japanese rule left in the region a significant legacy that exerted a profound 
impact on the subsequent attempts of state building by the Communists in Manchuria.
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GLOSSARY 
 
Notes:  
1. The sources are identified in the languages of their origins. The pinyin system is 
used to transliterate Chinese terms, the Hepburn system is used to transliterate 
Japanese terms, and the McCune–Reischauer system is used to transliterate 
Korean terms. Exceptions are made for terms that are accepted as English terms 
such as Kuomintang, Manchukuo and Mukden.   
2. Macrons are included on long Japanese vowels. Macrons are omitted in the 
Japanese place names that are commonly encountered in English such as Tokyo. 
Macrons are not omitted in cases in which place names are part of pu lishers’ 
names that appear in footnotes and bibliography. 
3. Where relevant, the Chinese terms are followed by Japanese pronunciation and 
the Japanese terms are followed by Chinese pronunciation. Korean terms are 
followed by Japanese pronunciation.  
4. Chinese and Korean terms are given in the traditional Chinese characters. 
Japanese terms are given in modern Japanese characters.  
5. Where terms share the same transliteration but different characters, the page 
number of the term that appears less frequently in the text is given.  
 
Acheng 阿城 
Aichi 愛知 
Andong 安東 
Ang’angxi 昂昂溪 
Anshan 鞍山 
Antu 安圖 
anzen nōson 安全農村 
banshichu 办事处 
bao 保  
bao 堡 (p.21)  
baojia guiyue biaozhun 保甲規約標準  
baojia 保甲 
batou 把頭  
Beian 北安 
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Beihamatang 北蛤蟆塘 
Beizhen 北鎮 
Benxi 本溪 
bianye yinhang邊業銀行  
Binjiang 濱江 
buntai分隊 fendui 
buraku部落 
buzai dizhu不在地主 
Changchun 長春 
Changrenjiang 長仁江 
Changxingdong 長興洞 
chianbu 治安部 zhianbu 
chihō jichi地方自治 
chō 町  
chō u 町歩   
Chōsen ginkō 朝鮮銀行  
Chōsen sōtokufu 朝鮮総督府 
chōson 町村 
Chos n inminhoe 朝鮮人民會 Chōsen jinminkai  
chungeng daikuan春耕貸款 
Chunxingcun 春興村 
chūō chian ijikai 中央治安維持会 zhongyang zhian weichihui  
chūōkai 中央会 
chūtai中隊 zhongdui 
cun 村 
dabatou 大把頭  
Dadaosanjiazi 大道三家子 
dadong gongsi大東公司  
daitai大隊 dadui 
dajiecun zhuyi 大街村主義 
Dalian 大連 Dairen 
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Daomugou 倒木溝 
Dong’an 東安 
dongbei kangri lianjun  東北抗日聯軍 
dongbei renmin gemingjun 東北人民革命軍 
dongbeijun 東北軍 
Dongbiandao  東邊道 
dongsansheng guangshanghao東三省官商號   
fen 分 
Fengitan 奉天 
Fengtiansheng ge xianquzhi shixing guize 奉天省各縣區制試行規則  
Fengyandong 鳳岩洞 
Fugui 富貴  
Fushun meikuang 撫順煤礦 
Fushun 撫順 
futuanzhang 副團長 
futuanzong副團縂  
gaikoku rōdōsha torishimari kisoku外国労働者取締規則 
gaimushō 外務省 
Gongzhuling 公主嶺 
guanshang liangzhan官商糧桟 
Haicheng 海城 
Hailar 海拉爾 
Handa Toshiharu 半田敏治 
Harbin  哈爾濱 
He Zonglin 何宗林 
Hebei 河北 
Hedong 河東 
Heihe 黑河 
Heilongjiang guanshang yinhao黑龍江官商銀號   
Heilongjiang 黑龍江  
Helong  和龍 
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Hoshino Naoki 星野直樹 
Huanren 桓仁 
Hulan 呼蘭 
Hunchun  琿春 
hyōgiin 評議員 pingyiyuan 
inin jimu 委任事務 
ippantai一般隊 yibandui 
Ishigaki Teiichi 石垣貞一 
Ishihara Kanji 石原莞爾 
Itagaki Seishirō 板垣征四郎 
jia 甲 
Jiandao 間島 Kantō 
jiaoyi shichang 交易市场 
jichi shidō u 自治指導部 
jie 街 
jiecun  街村 
jiecun yucheng yaogang  街村育成要綱 
jiecun zhidu queli jiben yaogang 街村制度確立基本要綱 
jiecun ziweifa 街村自衛法  
jiezhi cunzhi shixing guize 街制村制施行規則 
jikkō gassakusha実行合作社 shixing hezuoshe  
Jilin 吉林 
Jilinsheng guanshang yinqianhao吉林省官商銀錢號   
Jinfosi 金佛寺 
jingying dizhu經營地主 
Jinzhou 錦州  
Jinzhou 金州 (p.69) 
jitsugyō u実業部 shiyebu 
Jiutai 九臺 
jōmukai 常務会 changwuhui 
jūmin 住民 
175 
Kailu 開魯 
kaitaku sōkyoku開拓総局 
kanji監事 jianshi  
kantōchō関東庁 
keimushi 警务司 jingwusi  
keizaibu 経済部 jingjibu 
ken間 
Keshan  克山 
kinyū gassakusha 金融合作社 jinrong hezuoshe 
koaza 小字   
kokka sōdōinhō 国家総動員法 
kokumin kinrō hōkōhō 国民勤労奉公法 
kokumin kinrō hōkōtai 国民勤労奉公隊 
kokumin rinpo soshiki 国民隣保組織 
kokumuin 国務院 guowuyuan 
kōmin 公民 
konho shōken混保証券 
kōnō gassakusha 興農合作社 xingnong hezuoshe 
K    興農  
kōnō u興農部 
Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 
kōnōkai 興農会 
koyū jimu 固有事務 
ku 区  
Kuomintang 國民黨 Guomindang 
kyōgikai 協議会 xieyihui 
Kyoto 京都 
Ky wa   d  協和運動 
kyōwakai協和会 xiehehui 
kyōwatō  協和党 xiehedang 
li 里 
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liangzhan 糧棧 ryōsan 
lianzuo  連坐 
Liaodian 料甸 
Liaoning 遼寧 
Liaoyang 遼陽 
Linxi 林西 
Lishu 梨樹  
Liuhe 柳河 
Longjiang 龍江 
Longxingdong 龍興洞 
Longyanping 龍岩坪 
Luotuohezi 駱駝河子 
Lüshun 旅順 
Ma Zhanshan  馬佔山 
Manchukuo 滿洲國 Manzhouguo 
Manmō jiyūkoku setsuritsuan taikō満蒙自由国設立案大綱 
Manmō kyōwakoku tōchi taikōan 満蒙共和国統治大綱案 
Manshū chūō ginkō 満州中央銀行  
Manshū do oku kenchiku kyōkai 満州土木建築協会 
Ma      y     満洲評論 
Ma        za     p 満洲経済年報  
Ma      y  a           y  満洲共産匪の研究  
Ma         a  満洲年鑑  
Manshū nōsan kōsha 満州農産公社 
Manshū rōkō kyōkai 満州労工協会 
Manshū ryōkoku kaisha 満洲糧穀会社 
Manshū seifun rengōkai満洲製粉連合会 
Manshū seinen renmei 満州青年聯盟 
Manshū shingyō ginkō満洲興業銀行 
Manshū takushoku ka ushikigaisha  満州拓殖株式会社 
Manshū takushoku kōsha満州拓殖公社 
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Manshū tokusan senkan kōsha満洲特産専管公社 
Manshūkoku gunsei u gunji chōsa u 満洲国軍政部軍事調査部 
Manshūkoku shidō hōshin yōkō 満洲国指導方針要綱 
Manshūkokugun 満州国軍 Manzhouguojun 
Ma           a   pp  満鉄調査月報   
Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao 滿洲國政府公報 
Manzhouli 滿洲里 
Maohao 茂好 
Matsuki Tamotsu 松木侠 
meiyoshoku名誉職 
minami Manshū tetsudo ka ushikigaisha 南満州鉄道株式会社 
M            a   pp  民政部調査月報  
minseibu 民生部 minshengbu 
minseibu民政部 minzhengbu 
minseichō 民政庁 minzhengting 
minzoku kyōwa 民族協和 minzu xiehe 
Mitsu ishi shōji 三菱商事 
Mitsui bussan 三井物産  
Mitsui Mitsu ishi ginkō 三井三菱銀行 
Mitsuya Miyamatsu 三矢宮松 
Mizuho 瑞穂 
mu 畝 
Mudanchuan 牡丹川 
Mudanjiang 牡丹江 
mura村 
Nagao Kichigorō 長尾吉五郎 
naimen shidō 内面指導 
Na        y    pp  内務資料月報   
naimushō 内務省 
Nakamura Shintarō 中村震太郎 
Nanhamatang 南蛤蟆塘 
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Nanhuangdi 南荒地 
Nanking 南京 Nanjing  
Nara奈良 
Niigata新潟 
nin’i kumiai 任意組合 
Niuxinshan 牛心山 
nōji gassakusha農事合作社 nongshi hezuoshe 
nongmugye農務稧 nōmukei 
ōaza 大字 
Okamoto Goichi  岡本吾市 
Osaka大阪 
pai 牌 
pangneiqing 耪内青 
pangqing耪青 
pangwaiqing 耪外青 
Pulandian 普蘭店 
qian 銭 
Qingeng 勤耕 
qingmiaohui 青苗會 
Qingshanli 青山裏 
Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾 
qu 區 
qucun 區村制 
Rehe 熱河 
rengō kyōgikai 聯合協議会 lianhe xieyihui 
rengōkai 連合会 lianhehui 
riji理事 lishi 
rikugunshō 陸軍省 
rōdō tōsei iinkai 労働統制委員会 
rōdō tōseihō労働統制法 
rōdōsha kinkyū  oshū yōkō労働者緊急募集要綱 
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rōdōsha kinkyū shūrō kisoku 労働者緊急就労規則 
rōmu iinkai 労務委員会 
rōmu shinkokkai 労務興国会 
rōmu shintaisei 労務新体制 
ryōsan kumiai 糧桟組合 
sakizeni 先銭 
sangyō u産業部 chanyebu  
Sanjiang 三江 
Sanyuanpu  三源埔 
        pp  宣撫月報 
shachō 社長 shezhang 
shaku尺 
Shandong 山東 
Shang 赏  
Shangmingyuegou 上明月溝 
Shenyang 瀋陽 
shigikai 諮議会 ziyihui 
shihōka 司法科 sifake 
Shimennei 石門内 
Shitouhezi 石頭河子 
shōkin ginkō正金銀行 
shōryū ginkō 正隆銀行 
shōtai小隊 xiaodui 
Shuangcheng 雙城 
shūdan  uraku 集団部落 
shuijuanju稅捐局 
shukka shōreikin 出荷奨励金 
shusshi kumiai  出資組合 
Siping  四平 
sōmuchō 総務庁 zongwuting 
Suihua  綏化 
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Tachibana Shiraki 橘樸 
Taipinggou 太平溝 
Taiyangcun 太陽村 
Takayama Kazumi 高山一三 
takumushō 拓務省 
takuseishi 拓政司 
Taonan 洮南  
Tazigou 塔子溝 
Tianjin 天津 
Tieling 鉄嶺 
Tōa kangyō ka ushikigaisha東亜勧業株式会社 
Tōjō Hideki東条英機 
tokugitai特技隊 tejidui 
tokuyaku shū ainin 特約収買人 
tonarigumi隣組 
Tonghua 通化 
Tongliao 通遼   
Tōyō takushoku ka ushikigaisha 東洋拓殖株式会社 
tsubo坪 
tuanzhang 團長 
tuanzong 團縂 
tun 屯  
Tushanzi 土山子 
Wanbaoshan shijian万寶山事件 
Wang Ming  王明 
Wang Yongjiang 王永江 
Wangqing 汪清 
Wolonghu 臥龍湖 
Wuzhan 五站 
xiang 响 
Xiaobaicaogou 小百草溝 
181 
xiaobatou 小把頭 
Xilinhe 細鱗河 
Xing’an 興安 
xingzhengcun行政村 
Xinjing 新京 Shinkyō  
Xuedaishan 雪帶山 
yakuin 役員 
Yanji 延吉 
yen 円 
yiding qucunzhi danxing zhangcheng 議定區村制單行章程 
Yingkou 營口 
Yonemitsu Sakuta 米光作太 
Yongji 永吉 
Yu Zhen  於珍 
yuan 圓 
Yuan 院 In (p.99) 
zaiseibu財政部 caizhengbu 
zanxing baojiafa shixing guize  暫行保甲法施行規則  
zanxing baojiafa shixing xinde 暫行保甲法施行心得  
zanxing baojiafa 暫行保甲法 
Zhang Xueliang  張學良 
Zhang Zuolin  張作霖  
Zhangwu  彰武    
Zhongping 仲坪 
Zhongpingdong 仲坪洞 
zhuang 莊 
Zhuanjiaolou 轉角樓 
Zhuhe 珠河 
zirancun自然村 
ziweituan自衛團 
zuoye batou 作業把頭
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